The Future of the Past: Revisionism and Vietnam by unknown
Vietnam Generation
Volume 1




The Future of the Past: Revisionism and Vietnam
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/vietnamgeneration
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Complete Volume is brought to you for free and open access by La Salle University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vietnam Generation by an authorized editor of La Salle University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact careyc@lasalle.edu.
Recommended Citation




Vo Ium e  1 W inter  1989 NuvibER 1
2 iNTROdUGTiON
Kaii Ta l. Editor
4  The A merican BoMbARdMENT o f K ampuchea,
1969-1975
Ben Kiernan, University of Wollongong. Australia
4 2  iNflATioNARy Im pa c t o f t He V ietnam  W ar
Tom Riddell. Smith College
61 In Cold Blood: TH e V ietnam  W ar iN T ex t books
David Berman. University of Pittsburgh
81 Tw o  Quiet A m er icans : BR iTish  L ite r a tu r e
iNTO A merican PRopAqANdA
Mariam Darce Frenier. University of Minnesota at 
Morris
94 FiRST Blood REdRAWN
Don Kunz, University of Rhode Island
115 A  HuNdREd HAppy S pa rro w s : A n A merican
Veteran  R etu rn s  to  Vietnam
Larry Lee Rottman,Southwest Missouri State University
141 DispuTiNq t He W rec Kaqe: IdEoloqicAl
STRUqqlE AT t He VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORiAl
Harry Haines. Trinity College
157 On t He Cover o f t He Ro lllN q S to n e: TowARd
a TH eo ry  o f Cu Itu r a I TH era py
Kali Tal
iNTROdlJCTiON
K aLi T aL
I am proud to introduce the first issue of Vietnam Generation: 
A Journal o f Recent History and Contemporary Issues. We have put 
together a very fine collection of articles, representing disciplines as 
diverse as economics, literature, education, sociology, history, film, 
and popularculture. Each article also representsan individual response 
to the highly charged term 're v isio n ism '.
Ben Kiernan's article, "The American Bombardment of 
Kampuchea, 1969-1973', is an example of classic revisionist scholarship 
— the revision of historical narrative based on new or reinterpreted 
information. Tom Riddell's article, "The Inflationary Impact of the 
Vietnam W a r', also deals with revisionism in the classic sense: Riddell 
challenges the revisionist scholarship of economists W alker and Vatter, 
and charges that the ir reinterpretations of the past are ill-founded. 
David Berm an's article. "In  Cold Blood: Vietnam in Textbooks' takes a 
historiographical approach toward revision, and examines the way in 
which historical narratives are rewritten over time. Mariam Frenier, in 
"Tw o Quiet Americans: Turning British Literature into American
Propaganda', and Don Kunz, in “First Blood Redraw n,' examine the 
revision of popular concepts of history through the mediums of literature 
and film. Larry Rottmann, in "O ne Hundred Happy Sparrows: An 
American Veteran Returns to V ie tna m ', explores the personal revision 
process as he describes his emotional journey. Harry Haines, in “Disputing 
the Wreckage: IdeologicalStruggleatthe Vietnam Veterans M em oria l', 
demonstrates how the process of of personal revision intersects with 
the generation of public history at the site of the Vietnam Memorial in 
W ashington, DC. My own article, "O n the Cover of the Rolling Stone: 
Toward a Theory of Cultural The ra p y ', deals with the cause and effect 
of the revisionist im pulse, and suggests a new approach to the problem.
Despite the high calibre of the individual articles represented in 
this collection, it is apparent that articles on a number of topics are 
conspicuously absent. Included here are no papers devoted to the 
topics of race or gender and the Vietnam War, no papers which deal 
with Vietnamese perceptions of the American presence in Vietnam, 
no papers on the POW-MIA obsession, and no papers on the subject of 
these subjects are absent that they are inconseguential. What is 
missing is often at least as important as what is included.
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The re  is o n ly one artic le by a w om an in th is issue. The re  are no 
a rtic les by V ie tna m ese  schola rs; in fa c t, there  are no a rtic le s by non­
w h ite  m en. Th is im ba lance cries o u tfo ra n  exp lanation. It is not enough 
m ere ly to  sa y tha t no papers w ere  sub m itted  by m en o r w o m e n o f 
color. It is not enough to  sa y tha t on ly th ree  papers w ere  sub m itte d  by 
w h ite  w o m e n scho la rs, and tha t w e accepted one o f them  fo r p ub li­
cation. W e cannot excuse ourse lves fo r fa iling  to  inc lude these  
perspectives by saying  tha t w e w ould  have been open to  pub lish ing  
them  if  they had been subm itted.
Vietnam  G eneration  is intended to  p rovide a fo rum  fo r V ie t­
nam  W a r, V ie tnam  era . and V ietnam  generation schola rs. If ou r fie ld , 
at th is point in tim e , is so  narrow  tha t it does not inc lude the  w o rk  o f 
scho la rs of co lo r, o r o f w om en, the n  w e m ust b roaden our to p ic  area 
until it d oes inc lude th is w ork. W e are devoting one issue th is first ye a r 
to  an exp lo ration of race issues and V ie tna m , and a no the r issue to  a 
stud y on g e nd e r and w ar. But even th is is not enough. W e are 
com m itted  to  m ake a sincere  and consistent e ffo rt to  incorpora te  
q uestio ns o f race and gend er into every issue o f Vietnam  G eneration. 
In the  futu re  w e w ill not s im p ly w a it fo rth e se  a rtic les to  com e to  us in the  
m ail; w e w ill m ake a d irect e ffo rt to  so lic it them . A nd if. at tim e s, w e  fa il 
to  p resent these  a lte rnative  v iew s, w e w ill a lw ays try  to  be ho nest a b o ut 
w ha t w e  have not pub lished, carefu l to  po int out the  m issing  a rtic le s in 
o u r tab le  of contents.
The A merican BoMbARdMENT of 
K ampucNea, 1969-197?
B en KiERNAN
On March 18,1969, the United States A ir Force began its secret 
B-52 bom bardm ent of rural Cam bodia'. Exactly one year later, that 
country 's ruler. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was overthrown and the 
Vietnam W ar, combined with a new civil war, to tear the nation apart 
fo r the next five years. The United States bombing of the countryside 
continued (now publicly) and increased from 1970 to August 1973. 
when Congress imposed a halt. Nearly half of the US bombing tonnage 
was dropped in the last six months. The total was 540,000 tons. Rural 
Cambodia was destroyed, and 'Dem ocratic Kampuchea' rose in its 
ashes. The emergent Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) regime, 
led by Pol Pot, had profited greatly from the U.S. bombing. It used the 
widespread devastation and massacre of civilians as propaganda fo r 
recruitment purposes, and as an excuse fo r its brutal, radical policies 
and its purge of moderate Khmer communists. This is evident not only 
from contem porary press accounts, but also from post-1978 interviews 
with dozens of peasant survivors of the bombing who were unable to 
testify to  the ir experiences during the Pol Pot period, and from U.S. 
Governm ent docum ents newly declassified under the Freedom of 
Information Act.
By October 1972 the US and Hanoi had reached agreement on 
term s fo r a ceasefire and American withdrawal from Vietnam. 
W ashington had dropped its demand for a North Vietnamese 
w ithdrawal from the south, and Hanoi had dropped its demand fo r 
Nguyen Van Th ie u 's removal. Both demands had previously been 
preconditions fo r a settlement.
Henry Kissinger, of course, still insisted on Hanoi securing, from 
Pol Po t's CPK 'C e nte r', agreement to a settlement in Kampuchea as 
well. But it would have been c learto  him that this would be impossible, 
despite his own stated threat to  achieve it by concentrating US air 
power in Kampuchea2. The antagonism of the CPK Center (the Party's 
national leadership — Pol Pot, Nuon Chea. and leng Sary) to  Hanoi 
made it very unlikely that the CPK would coordinate its strategy with 
that of Vietnam. Further, a ceasefire in Kampuchea would have 
prevented the Center consolidating what it called its “ mastery over the 
revolutionary group(s) in every w a y", which was far from complete.
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Sihanoukists. moderates, and pro-Vietnamese communists still 
predominated in the rural areas. As CPK Southwest Zone documents 
had explained in 1971, “We want to and must get a tight grasp, fitter into 
every co rne r'3 of the diverse revolutionary movement in the 
Kampuchean countryside. A negotiated peace, or even an early 
victory, would not serve this aim.
In Vietnam,Thieu was also proving recalcitrant. It was apparently 
to appease him that Nixon ordered the “Christmas Bombing' of Hanoi 
and Haiphong in December 1972. Within a month, the Paris Agreement 
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam had been signed 
by all parties to the conflict there. It was to apply from January 27,1973 
(and its terms were little different from those agreed in October)4. The 
USA began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam. However, it saw 
Kampuchea as an integral part of the conflict, and as fighting 
continued the US soon switched the rest of its air arm there.
Washington portrayed this bombardment as an attempt to 
force the Khmer insurgents, now on the threshold of complete military 
victory, to negotiate with Lon Nol's pro-American government in 
Phnom Penh. The then CIA Chief Strategy Analyst in Saigon, Frank 
Snepp, has described the 1973 bombing of the Kampuchean countryside 
as “the centerpiece of the Administration ceasefire strategy'5. Whatever 
its aim, the political effect was twofold: to prevent a complete 
revolutionary victory at a time when the CPK Center's grasp over the 
revolution was still relatively weak, and to strengthen that grasp, which 
held the country on a course of continuing violence and warfare that 
lasted for the next decade and more.
In the words of William Shawcross, “within a few months an 
enormous new aerial campaign had destroyed the old Cambodia 
forever.'6 The campaign was certainly new in scale. During all of 1972, 
American B-52s and fighter bombers had dropped 53,000 tons of 
bombs on targets in Kampuchea, nearly all in the Eastern Zone of the 
country7. In the six months from February to August 15,1973 (when the 
US Congress imposed a halt), the figure was 257,000 tons, and they fell 
on all populated rural areas of the country (shown on Shawcross's 
map)®.
Whatever the reasons for the 1973 bombardment, the Nixon 
Administration was absolutely committed to it. The Secretary of the Air 
Force, Robert Seamans, later said:
the President wanted to send a hundred more B-52s. This was 
appalling. You couldn't even figure out where you were
going to put them all, you know....  I think It was at the same
time the President was going over to Moscow.... so, anyway.
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a message was sent to the airplane - this was that timely - as 
to why we couldn't send those B-52soverthere. As I understand 
It, the response when he touched down really burned the 
wires, and he said he wanted them over there... The total 
never did quite reach one hundred, but It was a pretty large 
number10.
In his book Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. 
Shawcross takes up the story: “The bombing of Cambodia was now so 
intense that the Seventh Air Force was faced with serious logistical 
problems. At one stage B-52 sortie rates were as high as eighty-one per 
day. In Vietnam the maximum had been sixty per day.' Air-traffic 
congestion made it impossible to warn other aircraft of impending 
strikes. The confusion was such that in one case a bombing strike took 
place sixty miles from the target area, according to the Seventh Air 
Force history, which “does not record its results'11.
TAblE 1. KAIVipUchEA
US BoivibiNq ancJ C PK A rmecI F o rces Gr o w tH, 1969-197?
Y ear BoivibiNq S o r t Ies BoivibiNq
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The impact of the bombardment had been severe enough 
from 1970 to 1972. As early as April 1970, a combined aerial and tank 
attack on the village of Chithou in Kompong Cham province took the 
lives of 200 people and killed all of the village's herd. Soon afterwards. 
In nearby Kandol Chrum, American bombs destroyed six houses and 
killed seven people. A local peasant recalls: “As a result of this, some 
people ran away to live far from the village. Others joined the 
revolution. *12 The pattern of recruitment of bombing victims to the CPK 
was to increase over time, as we shall see. In some cases, too. the 
Vietnamese communists were blamed, as the nearest possible culprit
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for deaths from bombing by the remote aircraft. The CPK Center 
encouraged such popular reactions as well.
This was ironic, in that much of the bombardment was the work 
of anti-communist Vietnamese. Shawcross wrote:
Cambodia was open house for the South Vietnamese Air 
Force... They behaved as If they were conquering a hostile 
nation, ralherthan helping a new ally; every Cambodian was 
a VC and a target. Perhaps the most chilling evidence of the 
pleasure the pilots took in It all was contained In a cable sent 
by (the Commander of US Forces In Vietnam, Creighton)
Abrams to the Pentagon. He reported that until now It had 
been virtually Impossible to Induce the Vietnamese to fly on 
Sundays. Now they were paying bribes of 1,000 plasters each 
to be allowed to go out seven days a week — over Cambodia.
...According to a CIA report from Phnom Penh, the ARVN 
commander. Captain Le Van Vlen, frequently called In air 
strikes “to drive the people from the villages'; he and his men 
would seize the villagers' animals and force them to buy them 
back’3.
Communist troops were not always the targets of the US 
bombing either. According to Shawcross again: "By the end of the 
summer much of the country was a free-fire zone for United States 
aircraft, and since their postoperational reports were almost all 
deliberately inaccurate, there was little follow-up to see what targets 
were actually being attacked. Pilots had far more liberty than in 
Vietnam to bomb any target they wanted.'14 The pro-US Lon Nol 
regime in Phnom Penh was also to blame in this respect. In September 
1970, US intelligence reported: “It was recently discovered that many 
of the 66 'training camps' on which (the Lon Nol army) had requested 
airstrikes by early Septemberwere infact merely political indoctrination 
sessions held in village halls and pagodas.' The report went on to 
quote a 'recent' Lon Nol regime intelligence assessment, to the effect 
that “the population has been largely taken in hand by the enemy and 
could become in a relatively short time a trump for him'. The communists 
had won this popularsupport not only because they “are well-behaved 
and respectful of the needs and cares of the population, but also 
because “aerial bombardments against the villagers have caused 
civilian loss on a large scale'. Unsurprisingly, the peasant survivors of 
the bombing were turning to the CPK for support16.
One casualty was Pol Pot's family home in Kompong Thom, 
which burnt to the ground after a US bombing strike there in July 1970.
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In November, an F -105 napalm raid on Kompong Svay village in the 
same province left ten villagers dead. According to a local man, Kun 
Chhay, however, the “cruellest of a ll' were the Cluster Bomb Units, 
which US planes began to scatter through the nearby forest and 
countryside in 1971. These bombs would detonate when people 
unwittingly stepped on them 16.
The bombings also led to large population movements. The 
two-month US ground invasion of Kampuchea in 1970 created 130X00 
Khmer refugees17. In 1971, sixty percent of refugees surveyed in the 
towns of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic gave the continued bombing as the 
main reason for their displacement18. A contemporary report on how 
bombing turned villagers into refugees also quoted a young Khmer 
peasant who said he had joined the revolutionary army a few days 
after an aerial attack on Kompong Cham province took the lives of 50 
people in his village of Thmar Pich19. This youth defected a year later, 
but another such victim of a 1971 bombing raid, who by the age of 
twenty had become a CPK company commander, told journalists on 
the Thai border in 1979 how his village in Pursat had been bombed eight 
years before, killing 200 of its 350 inhabitants and propelling him into a 
career of violence and absolute loyalty to the CPK20.
Not all the bombing was the work of American or ARVN pilots. 
The T-28 fleet of the Lon Nol air force, strafing and dropping napalm as 
well as explosives, took a toll in villages behind communist lines 
throughout the war. In 1971, T-28s destroyed the rice mill and houses in 
Prey Chhor village of Prey Veng province, and 200 houses were burnt 
down in nearby Dong village. In Kompong Speu, Kbar Chen village 
near Oudong lost six of its civilian inhabitants in a 1971 attack and two 
more in a second bombardment the next year21. Such T-28 raids 
probably struck the greatest number of Kampuchean villages. A 
peasant from Samrong in Svay Rieng recalls what he witnessed: “One 
day in 1971, a T-28 arrived on reconnaissance and before leaving it fired 
on people growing rice — they were considered 'VC '. Three planes 
then returned and dropped napalm. All the trees and many houses 
were destroyed, and more than ten people killed .'
However, the most dramatic incidents involved direct hits by 
US B-52s. The same peasant recalls:
Then In 1972 B-52s bombed three times per day, fifteen minutes 
apart, three planes at a time. They hit houses In Samrong and 
thirty people were killed. There were no troops In these 
villages. Atthattlm e there were some Vietnamese (communist) 
troops on the border (nearby), but they d idn't bomb the 
border; they bombed Inside It, people's houses.
American Bombardment 9
The town of Chantrea was destroyed by US bombs... The 
people were angry with the US, and that Is why so many of 
them Joined the Khmer communists.
When troops did approach villages, the planes came again. 
Another peasant from SvayRieng recalls: “In 1972, during a fierce battle 
between North Vietnamese and Thieu troops right in my village, six 
houses and all the trees were destroyed by napalm. There were no 
deaths though, because the people had all run away.'22
Attempts by communist troops to escape bombing by lodging 
in villages often proved fruitless. A CIA report describes the destruction 
by bombing of three-quarters of the houses in a Kompong Cham 
village in 1972; the surviving inhabitants in this case expelled the North 
Vietnamese troops23. Not far away in the same province, bombs fell on 
O Reang Au market for the first time in 1972, killing twenty people24.
All but one of these 1972 incidents occurred in the Eastern Zone 
of Kampuchea, where US strategic (B-52) bombardment was 
concentrated almost exclusively at the time. But the bombing there 
did not let up the next year (even though it spread equally intensively 
to the rest of the countryside, over all Zones but the Northwest)25.
O Reang Au was bombed twice more in 1973. The first time, the 
rice mill was hit, killing anothertwenty people, and then it was hit again 
and completely destroyed along with a number of houses nearby. Five 
more people died, including two Buddhist monks26.
Bombs also hit Boeng village in the same vicinity. It was burnt 
to the ground, and according to peasants from the area, many people 
were caught in their houses and there were “thousands of deaths', 
undoubtedly an exaggeration of the more accurate “many'. Again 
in the same district, Chalong village lost over twenty dead when the 
village and its pagoda were hit by T-28s during a battle. In this case, 
all the monks escaped unhurt, but an inhabitant notes:
On the river many monasteries were destroyed by bombs.
People In our village were furious with the Americans; they did 
not know why the Americans had bombed them. Seventy 
people from Chalong Joined the fight against Lon Nol after 
the bombing27.
In a direct hit on Trey Chap village in Prey Veng, a raid by four 
F - l l l s  killed over twenty people. The village was destroyed and 
subsequently abandoned. Meanwhile, Lon Nol's T-28s kept up their 
campaigns. Two kilometers away, Anlong Trea village was napalmed 
and bombed, killing three people and destroying four houses. “Over 
sixty people from this village then Joined the Khmer Communist army
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out of anger at the bombing', locals recall.'28
B-52s also scored a direct hit on Trapeang Krapeu village in 
Kompong Cham. At least twenty people died. Other raids in the area 
destroyed hundreds of hectares of rubber plantations29.
Still In the Eastern Zone, a 1973 bombing strike killed five elderly 
people near Krachap village in Prey Veng (CPK Region24). Asubsequent 
visit to the area by a reconnaissance plane was followed by four 
Dakota helicopters bringing troops. According to a local peasant 
woman, the troops “drove our cattle away and stole clothes, pots and 
pans, everything. There was nothing left here*. (In 1970. Saigon troops 
had already killed three of Krachap's inhabitants and stolen three- 
quarters of the cattle-herd.) The woman says that at this point, in 1973, 
she had yet to even meet a “Khmer Rouge'30.
The CPK Secretary of Region 24, a man known as Chhouk, was 
then based further north, in a village which his widow claims was 
bombed twice a month:
(The pilots) could see motorcycles coming and going and 
they knew that an office was there. While I was there over 
thirty people were killed by bombs. In their houses. In the 
trenches, or while running to the trenches. Some entire 
households were killed In their homes'.
Presumably this involved accurate targeting of a Khmer Rouge 
base. In a similar incident, a Khmer Rouge cadre recalls a direct hit on 
the district office in Komchay Meas, in which forty people were killed. 
(He adds thata number of otherpeople, who were merely foraging or 
trading along the roads, also died in raids by B-52s, Phantoms, and F- 
105s.)32 A third case occurred in the same area, according to a female 
cadre .when a jungle office was bombed in one of many attacks, each 
of which took several lives. “There were spies inside,' she claims, not 
only revealing the accuracy of the bombing, but also touching on an 
increasing Khmer Rouge tendency to punish alleged culprits who were 
simply more accessible than those actually performing the raids33. As 
we shall see. innocent village people suffered at the hands of the 
Khmer Rouge as a result of the bombing raids, even if they had 
escaped direct bombardment by US or Lon Nol aircraft.
In January and February 1973, the heaviest B-52 bombing was 
in the northern part of the Eastern Zone, known as Region 21. One local 
cadre from Memut says that O Klok village suffered a direct hit “right 
through the village' in this period. Thirty people were killed and over a 
hundred wounded, and 100 houses were destroyed34. In March 1973 
the bombing spread across the whole country, but remained heaviest
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in the East35. Associated Press reported popular complaints “about the  
bombing by the US B-52s and je t fighters, with increasing reports of 
bombs killing civilians and destroying villages'35. Even around Phnom  
Penh itself, international relief officials in the capital estimated tha t “no 
fewer than 3,000 civilians' were killed in the last three weeks of March37. 
According to a United Press International dispatch at the end of the 
month:
Refugees swarming Into the capital from target areas report 
dozens of villages, both east and southeast of Phnom Penh, 
have been destroyed and as much as half their population 
killed or maimed In the current bombing raids by B-52s and 
F-l 11 tactical fighter-bombers38.
Within days of this report, the US bombardment intensified, 
reaching a level of 3,600 tons per day on April 2-3 ,197339. B-52 carpet 
bombing was reported within ten miles o f Phnom Penh, as well as on 
the outskirts of Kompong Thom city. A fter thirty consecutive days of 
intensive American bombing, a US intelligence officer who had 
interrogated refugees from the village o f Ban Krom, sixteen miles from  
Phnom Penh, remarked: "Ban Krom has been completely leveled. 
There have been many dead, many wounded and many secondary 
explosions. We judge the bombing results quite satisfactory.'40 Ban 
Krom may even have been a military target. But large-scale civilian 
casualties must have been anticipated and accepted. As Elizabeth 
Beckerwrote in the Far Eastern Economic Reviewon April 16, “according 
to  military reports, the targets of these devastating missions are in 
heavily-populated areas'41. One “source' was cited by Associated 
Press to the effect that "the Americans are reluctant to  call in air strikes 
on villages where the opposition forces are mingling with the civilian 
inhabitants'42. But considerable evidence exists tha t even villages 
which did not house opposition forces were bombarded, resulting in 
massive loss of civilian life. One reason was later outlined to  William  
Shawcross by the chief of the political section in the US Embassy in 
Phnom Penh, William Harben. Shawcross writes that Harben was 
appalled by the bombing toll “and now did what others might have 
done':
He cut out, to scale, the 'box' made by a B-52 strike and 
placed it on his own map. He found that virtually nowhere In 
central Cambodia could It be placed without 'boxing' a 
village. "I began to get reports of wholesale carnage', he 
says. 'One night a mass of peasants from a village near 
Saang went out on a funeral procession. They walked straight
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Into a 'box'. Hundreds were slaughtered.'43
Shawcross also tells the story of Donald Dawson, a young Air 
Force captain who flew twenty-five B-52 missions over Cambodia in 
1973. A report that ’a Cambodian wedding party had been 'boxed' 
by B-52s... forced him, he said, to realize that the Cambodians were 
human beings and to recognize that nonmilitary targets were being 
h it'. On June 19,1973, Dawson refused to fly another mission. (He then 
joined in a lawsuit to have US courts declare the bombing of Cambodia 
illegal. Topreventthepossibilityofsuchajudgement.theUSGovemment 
granted Dawson conscientious-objector status, and the High Court 
never heard the case.)44
The B-52s needed ground radar beacons to guide them to their 
targets. One had been sited on top of the US embassy in Phnom Penh, 
but it was removed in April 1973 for fear of an accident. Shawcross 
continues: "At the same time more and more beacons were installed 
in Cambodian towns to cope with the expansion of the bombing. On 
August 7 one navigator who was using the Neak Luong beacon forgot 
to flip his switch. Six miles above the town the plane's belly opened and 
the long thirty-ton string of bombs 'boxed' without warning onto the 
people below.' 137 townspeople were killed and 268 wounded46.
Even apart from the death toll, as in earlieryears the population 
movements forced by the 1973 bombing were enormous. As Richard 
Blystone reported from Phnom Penh for Associated Press: ‘ No one can 
say with confidence how many refugees there are in Cambodia... The 
government's latest estimate is 520,000 registered displaced persons 
country-wide, with another 200XXX) unregistered. A consultantto a US 
Senate Subcommittee estimated recently that as many as 3 million 
people have been forced to leave home at one time or another during 
the country's three-year w ar,' out of a population of seven million. 
Blystone then added:
Among dozens of refugees Interviewed, many said fear o f US 
bombing was one of their reasons for fleeing, but few told of 
actually being bombed. At a pagoda outside o f Phnom 
Penh one woman said her 13 year-old son and two cousins 
died two weeks ago when a bomb hit a Jungle bunker where 
the family had taken shelter.
Asked whether they wanted the bombing stopped whatever 
the consequences for the Phnom Penh government, her 
neighbors grew enthusiastic. They said "Yes'46.
From April to June 1973 the bombing was most concentrated in
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the Southwest and Northern Zones of Kampuchea47. April also saw the 
heaviest bombing of the Northeast. Then in July and August the 
Southwest was carpet-bombed in the most intensive B-52 campaign 
yet. while tactical bombing raids increased by 21 percent, flouting 
Nixon's agreement with Congress that the intensity of the bombing 
would not be raised after July l 4*. The heretofore delicate CPK 
factional balance in the Southwest Zone49 warrants close attention to 
the bombing's impact there. Did it tip the balance in favor of the Pol 
Pot Center group ?
In many cases, careful digging of trenches by locals was 
sufficient to reduce deaths. AmpilTuk village in Region 15, for instance, 
was bombed eight times in 1973; twice by B-52s, four times by US jets, 
and twice by Lon Nol T-28s. "There were wounded but no one was killed 
because everyone hid in trenches," a villager reports50. However, 
another man from the same Region says that, only three days before 
the bombing halt on 15 August:
Three F-l 1 Is  bombed right center In my village, killing eleven 
of my family members. My father was wounded but survived.
At that time there was not a single soldier In the village, or In 
the area around the village. 27 other villagers were also killed.
They had run Into a ditch to hide and then two bombs fell right 
Into It. The bombs seemed to be guided Into It like they had 
eyes51.
Even where civilian casualties were not known to be high, the 
CPK were nowable to recruit large numbers of peasants by highlighting 
the damage done by US air strikes. An Intelligence Information Cable, 
dated 2 May 1973, from the CIA's Directorate of Operations made this 
point after investigations in Region 25 of the Southwest Zone:
1. Khmer Insurgent (Kl) cadre have begun an Intensified 
proselyting (ste) campaign among ethnic Cambodian 
residents In the area of Chrouy Snao. Kaoh Thom district,
Kandal province, Cambodia, In an effort to recruit young 
men and women for Kl military organizations. They are using 
damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme of their 
propaganda. The cadre tell the people that the Government 
of Lon Nol has requested the alrstrlkes and Is responsible for 
the damage and the ’suffering of Innocent villagers' in order 
to keep himself In power. The only way to stop ’the massive 
destruction of the country' Is to remove Lon Nol and return 
Prince Sihanouk to power. The proselyting (s/c) cadres tell the 
people that the quickest way to accomplish this Is to strengthen 
Kl forces so they will be able to defeat Lon Nol and stop the
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bombing.
2. This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of 
a number of young men for Kl forces. Residents around 
Chrouy Snao say that the propaganda campaign has been 
effective with refugees and In areas of Kaoh Thom and Leuk 
Dek districts which have been subject to B-52 strikes52
In Chamcar Ang village. Tram Kak district of Region 13 (Takeo 
province), in the same Zone locals say more than eighty people died 
when B-52s hit the village and its pagoda53. In the same Region, a CPK 
cadre recalled that Wat Angrun village was annihilated; a single family 
survived, and 120 houses were destroyed in the air raid. The cadre 
added, however: “The army was not hit all that hard, because at that 
time we put our lines right up against the enemy, and most of the 
bombs fell behind us. This was especially true in the case of E-52s which 
hit either the people or nothing.'54
Region 13 was one of the strongholds of the CPK Center, which 
it ruled through its ally Mok. Mok's son-in-law, Khe Muth, was Deputy 
CPK Secretary there, and chief of Tram Kak district. The 1973 bombing 
saw an intensification of CPK Center control. Now Muth was promoted 
to become CPK Secretary of a newly organized military force, the 3rd 
Southwest Zone Brigade. His wife Khom, daughter of Mok, then 
became CPK Secretary of Tram Kak district55.
In Kompong Chhnang (Region 31), Mam Lon, who was then a 
CPK subdistrict cadre, says that both T-28s and B-52s bombed his village 
of Prey Thom. He claims more than one hundred people were killed 
and wounded. “The people were very angry at the imperialists,' he 
adds. Although he draws no connection, Lon also reports that soon 
afterwards, as in Region l3,theCPK's political line hardened significantly, 
and a number of cadres, including himself, were soon dismissed55. 
These two examples reflect a general trend in the Southwest Zone in 
1973, which we will examine in detail.
The HEREdiTARy Enemy
Early in 1973, while continuing to wage war against Lon Nol.the 
CPK began an intensified campaign to drive the Vietnamese 
communists from the country, in combination with a new purge of 
Sihanoukists, pro-Vietnamese communists, and other dissident 'Third 
Force' cadre. At public meetings in the Southwest province of Kampot, 
Sihanouk was accused of supporting “the hated Vietnamese,' and 
both were described as enemies like Lon Nol57. According to a 
subdistrict cadre from Kompong Speu, Zone Secretary Mok rounded
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up hundreds of Khmer dissidents “from all over the Southwest' during 
1973. They were taken to a worksite and forced to perform hard labour 
before being executed58.
The reason usually given by CPK leaders for their increased 
hostility towards the Vietnamese communists in 1973, was the attempt, 
flowing from the Paris talks with the US, to get the CPK to negotiate with 
Lon Nol. In Kompong Speu,the same subdistrict cadre reports, ’ Mok 
told us that there had been three countries fighting the imperialists 
together. 'Now Vietnam and Laos have negotiated with the US. 
Kampuchea will not.' He said all cadres had to be instructed that 
Kampuchea would not negotiate.'59
Mok made this speech only two weeks after the new US 
bombing campaign began, and the subdistrict cadre's own village 
had just been destroyed by B-52s, with the loss of three lives. He 
continues: “And Mok said that the US had previously divided its 
bombing between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. But now that the 
other two had gone to negotiate, the US was bringing all its bombs to 
drop on Kampuchea alone, twenty-four hours a day, because it did 
not negotiate . '50
On the other hand, in Region 13, Zone cadres contradicted 
these claims, proclaiming that negotiations would notstopthe bombing, 
but “would only lead to a prolongation of the war'. The CPK's real 
intention was to allege Vietnamese perfidy, and to assert that, that, in 
the words of these cadres, refusal to negotiate “would demonstrate to 
the world that our Khmer Organization was independent'.
Mok preferred not to stress that the Vietnamese were 
withdrawing from Kampuchea as a result of the Paris Agreement, nor 
that, as was well known in the Party, not only Vietnam but “some of our 
friends like China also wanted us to negotiate'61. Thus, because it 
negotiated with the US while the CPK refused to, and because it had 
tried to get the CPK to change its mind, Hanoi was blamed by the CPK 
for the resultant American bombardment of Kampuchea.
A more reasonable explanation, it seems to me, would limit 
blame to the parties directly involved in continuing the Kampuchean 
war. For its part, the CPK can hardly be blamed for the bombing itself, 
even though it profited politically. Responsibility for the aerial 
devastation and massacre of course lies with its instigators, the US 
Government. Yet the 1973 bombing is unlikely to have been ordered in 
the event of a negotiated ceasefire like that concluded in Laos in 
February 1973. The CPK leadership would have been aware of this from 
the outset.
The CPK Center may have expected the bombing to indirectly 
serve its aims by inflaming hatred of the Vietnamese, and as we have
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seen this did occur in a number of cases. But the hatred often had to 
be conjured up by stressing more remote issues. A woman from the 
Southwest's Region 33, for example, says that Vietnamese communist 
troops were camped “in the forest west of my house' throughout 1973. 
They behaved well and created no problems, and the villagers talked 
without strain of solidarity, she says. But when they left at the end of the 
year, the CPK subdistrict chief began to talk of “mutual enmity' 
between the two peoples62. He was probably following local CPK 
documents which referred to Vietnamese as the “hereditary enemy' 
and the “acute enem y'63.
A Hanoi-trained Khmer communist cadre, Yos Por, recalls a 
meeting in Kampot in late 1973, which was addressed by Mok, and two 
CPK Region 35 leaders.
They collected all of us who had studied abroad, at Wat 
Chhouk, and started to accuse us... of selling the territory to 
Vietnam. They were Instigating the breaking of solidarity with 
Vietnam, talking In terms o f history. Mok said that Kampuchean 
territory was wherever there are sugar palms. This included 
Kampuchea Krom (‘Lower Cambodia', the Mekong Deltaj. 
which Vietnam had taken (In the eighteenth century). The 
Kampucheans would fight to get It back, Mok said64.
Within months, a CPK district chief in Kompong Chhnang (Region 31). 
told his subordinates: “Kampuchea Krom must be liberated; it was 
once Khmer territory and we have lost it all. If we do not fight the 
Vietnamese, we will lose the rest of our country... Vietnam is the most 
acute enemy, the hereditary enemy. After victory we aim to go and 
liberate Kampuchea Krom .'65
Underlying the anti-Vietnamese position, then, was the CPK's 
revival of national chauvinism. Defeat of the US and Lon Nol was only 
a step towards the national and racial grandeur of which young 
members of the traditional elite had long dreamed66. In rural warlords 
like Mok (and Pauk in the Northern Zone), the former members of the 
upper classes who made up the CPK Center now had the means to put 
their dreams into effect.
THe CLass ENEiviy
On 20 May 1973, as the US bombardment approached its 
height, the CPK Center launched a 'cooperativization' program, 
which initially involved organizing peasants into groups often, twenty, 
or thirty families. This had already occurred in many CPK-held areas, 
but now land was to be collectivized as well and the produce of the
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peasants' labour was to be confiscated by the authorities. In some 
cases, regulations concerning the destruction of religion and family 
life, and enforced communal eating in mess halls, were also 
implemented. This was termed the "Democratic Revolution'67.
The increased demands of the CPK armed forces, resulting 
from the bombing, partly motivated this new campaign. The CIA 
Intelligence Information Cable of 2 May 1973 reported the testimony of 
a CPK platoon commander, who said that “B-52 strikes in Leuk Dek 
district killed many soldiers and guerrillas of the K-24 and K-25 battalions. 
He said villagers left their homes and took only what they could carry. 
In spite of the disruption, Khmer Insurgent (Kl) finance-economy cadre 
were ordered to collect as much food and money as possible to supply 
Kl and North Vietnamese army forces. This has caused resentment 
among the villagers, many of whom were already short of food.'68
A CPK document dated February 1974 gave one of its reasons 
for the campaign, as follows: "Our country is at war and no mercy has 
been shown us. Therefore, many of our young people have gone off 
to the battlefield, and only the old and women are left.'69 A CPK 
member later explained that by ensuring a minimum subsistence for all 
villagers through collection of rationing of supplies, the communists 
could “release forces' for the army and its logistical needs, notably the 
able-bodied who in theory were no longer needed to support their 
families70.
However, both these CPK sources also gave a second reason, 
an ideological one. The CPK document explained: “We must construct 
a clean, honest society.'  What this meant was to be outlined the next 
year in the CPK's internal magazine, Tung Padevat (Revolutionary 
Flags). Its author expressed a studied ambivalence about the situation 
in communist-held areas up to 1973:
There was progress on the one hand, and the same old 
society on the other... The state confiscated land from the 
traitors... and took control of It... This was a good point... 
(Secondly, however) those In possession of the land continued 
to keep their private ownership. Furthermore, previously 
landless peasants, and previously landless workers now 
received land from the state. Therefore, land remained In 
private ownership In general71.
The result was that “the traders and the enemy... were the masters... We 
could not become the masters if we continued on this road... Our state 
was their satellite.' The example given illustrates the extreme sensitivity 
of the CPK: “Kratie township showed the same signs as in the old 
society. Honda motorcycles were speeding up and down the streets
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like before, while our ragged guerrillas walked in the dust.'72
So in 1973 the CPK Center decided that it must ensure that "the 
state controlled everything'. Kratie's population was evacuated to 
the countryside. There was to be "no more trading, mortgaging, labor 
exchanging or buying on credit'. A state monopoly was decreed over 
rice, salt, fuel, cloth and petrol. Without petrol, private owners of 
vehicles (and Honda motorcycles) 'disappeared'; the CPK state took 
over their equipment. Private ownership of land and of the means of 
production was also abolished73.
The political motivation for all this is underlined by a former 
Eastern Zone CPK member, who attributes the changes to heightened 
revolutionary zeal resulting from the advances the Party had made 
thus far: 'The  reason was that the people supported the Khmer Reds, 
so the Khmer Reds decided to move on to higher-stage cooperatives. *74 
Given more than an inch by their association with Sihanouk, their aid 
from the Vietnamese communists, and the popular reaction to the US 
bombing, the CPK Center now decided to take a mile. Popular 
approval of relatively moderate policies became an excuse for extremist 
ones.
The accounts of two peasants from different parts of the 
country illustrate this. They also contradict the claim that the 
cooperatives provided a superior means of ensuring the subsistence of 
villagers. Nem,46,from Region 31 in the Southwest Zone, says that the 
mutual aid teams introduced in 1972 were popular in his village; each 
person earned an adequate ration of paddy per year. But in late 1973, 
cooperatives were organized, and Nem became a cook in the 
communal eating hall. Rations were insufficient, popular 
disenchantment rose, and within a year villagers were being executed 
for stealing food from the common store75.
Sang, 43, a peasant from Region 22 in the Eastern Zone, recalls 
that 'the  living conditions of the people were really prosperous' after 
the introduction of mutual aid teams in 1972. ' It  was easy, no 
problems.' But,
Then In 1973 the cooperatives were formed, and difficulties 
began. The rice was stored in collective warehouses, and 
food ran short. Eventually people ate only rice gruel, with salt, 
water and banana stalks. We had to get permission to raise 
our own poultry, under pain of imprisonment.
Importantly, though. Sang noted that the cooperatives were not 
established "all at once' in mid-1973. Rather, the local Party leaders 
'selected certain good places, with good cadres' to start with, “for
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fear of popular reaction'. The process was not complete even two 
years later, when communal eating was finally instituted (much later 
than in the Southwest). Sang described the local CPK district and 
subdistrict chiefs up to that time, in favorable terms. Three villagers 
were imprisoned in 1974, but he reported no executions or starvation. It 
is hard to believe that the cooperatives could have been established 
at all without, firstly, some degree of public confidence in the local CPK 
leaders, and secondly, the fact that "people in our village were furious 
with the Americans'. For it was in Sang's village, called Chalong, that 
more than twenty people were killed in a T-28 bombardment in 1973, 
and seventy others immediately joined the communist army76.
TH e No r tHern  Z one : TH e em erqence o f D em o cratic  
K a m p u c h e a
Outside the Eastern Zone, the CPK response to the bombing 
was far more dramatic. Even where no deaths resulted, there were 
frequently subsequent arrests of villagers suspected of being “spies' 
who had called in the air strikes. The most proximate potential culprit 
againtookthe blame. Paranoia beganto plague the Khmer communist 
movement as never before. In the Northern Zone, Kun Chhay. who 
lived in Sankor village of Region 32, recalls that Ke Pauk's CPK troops 
now accused the villagers of being "CIA agents' who had brought in 
the US planes. The people of Sankor, now afraid of both US bombing 
and Pauk's justice, offered no resistance when Lon Nol forces penetrated 
the area and created a third alternative: "(They) pointed guns at us, 
and told us to leave for Kompong Thom C ity.'77
According to Chhay. this new Lon Nol army patrolling was the 
culmination of "countless' raids on Kompong Svay district by B-52s, T- 
28s, F-105s, F-l 1 Is , and Skyraiders, mostly from mid-1972 to March 1973. 
B-52s, for instance, struck Stung Kambot village at 9 o'clock one 
morning in February 1973. They killed 50 villagers and seriously wounded 
30 others. No Khmer Rouge were among the casualties. A week later 
another raid struck at nearby Prey Tup village. Then in March 1973, B- 
52s and F-111 s bombarded an ox-cart caravan at O Saray in the same 
district, killing ten peasants78.
The effect of all this was predictable. Chhay says: “It often 
happened (that) people were made angry by the bombing and went 
to join the revolution.' And if they did not, they ran the risk of being 
blamed. as spies, for the damage and loss of life their communities had 
suffered. Pauk's troops killed peasants on such accusations. (And 
after the war ended in 1975, Chhay says, further revenge was exacted 
by CPK cadres from city people and others they held responsible for 
the bombing.)79
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Further south, a peasant youth named Thoun Cheng recalled 
the impact of the bombing on his village of Banteay Chey. For three 
months, B-52s bombed the village three to six times per day. Several of 
Cheng's family members were injured in the raids, and over 1,000 
people were killed — nearly a third of Banteay Chey's population. 
After the bombing ended, Cheng says, “there were few people left to 
be seen around the village, and it was quiet“80.
Another young peasant, Tong Teng, joined the communist 
army in 1970 in Santuk district of the Northern Zone. He told Frangols 
Ponchaud and Bruce Palling in a 1982 interview that “bombing was a 
normal thing from 1970 on '. He added:
If you mean big bombs, I saw them being dropped at Andaung 
Prlng (village)... The bombs came tumbling down In a big 
clump... right onto Andaung Prlng, and that time villagers 
were killed In amazing numbers... The bombs fell In the village, 
setting fire to people's houses and killing them... sometimes 
they didn't even have the time to get down out of their 
houses.
The bombing was massive and devastating, and they Just 
kept bombing more and more massively, so massively you 
couldn't believe It, so that it engulfed the forests, engulfed the 
forests with bombs, with devastation81.
Chhit Do had come into the communist movement from a 
similar background, and at the time of the 1973 bombing he was an 
agitprop leader in the Angkor Wat area of northern Kampuchea. He 
was there at the time of Norodom Sihanouk's clandestine visit in March, 
1973. (He recalls: “Sihanouk had been gone only a day when the B-52s 
came after him and bombed... The bombing completely tore up that 
road, as if it had never existed.') In late 1973 Chhit Do became a CPK 
subdistrict chief, and after victory in April 1975, commander of a 3,000- 
strong regional work brigade. In 1979, he fled the country, and three 
years later he too looked back on the period of the US bombing: “It was 
difficult in every possible way... due both to everybody's fear of the 
bombing and to the fact that everybody was engaged in making war 
outside of their villages. All the young people had gone off to war... 
There wasn't anything to eat. They still had to turn over rice to the 
Khmer Rouge.'  Bruce Palling then asked Chhit Do a series of questions:
Q. Were people being killed by the bombs ?
A. Oh yes, there were some... Some Khmer Rouge soldiers and
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some ordinary people were killed by the bombs, by the 
planes.
Q. Did the Khmer Rouge make use of the bombing to do 
propaganda against the US ?
A. Oh yes, they did make use of It. They did use It to stigmatize 
the US. They said that all this bombing was an attempt to 
make us an American satellite, a manifestation of simple 
American barbarism, because, after all, as they pointed out, 
we had never done anything to these Americans, the people 
had never done anything atall to America. TheKhmersdldn't 
even have any alrplanesand here the Americans had brought 
theirs to bomb us, causing great pain to us. with their war. Their 
country was way over there somewhere and here they had 
come to Interfere with us... (The) propaganda was that this 
guy Lon Nol had already sold the country to the Americans, 
because Lon Nol wanted power, wanted to be President...
Q: Could you be more specific about the content of their 
propaganda?
A: They shouted and they cursed and called for opposition to 
the Americans. Moreover, they took the people to see the 
effects of the bombing as a kind of additional political 
education. Every time after there had been bombing, they 
would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and 
deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been 
gouged out and scorched. And the political education 
cadres would pick up pieces of shrapnel and these slabs of 
metal that had been part of the bomb casings to show them 
to the people and point out that the bombs were the size of 
a man, the size of 100 kilogram rice sacks. They would say that 
the purpose of the bombing was to completely destroy the 
country, not simply Just to win the war while leaving the 
people alive to rebuild It after the war was over, but to 
annihilate the population, and that It was only because we 
were taking cover, moving around to avoid the bombing, 
that some of us were surviving. So they used the bombing, the 
bomb craters and the bomb shrapnel to educate the people 
politically, to make the people hate and be enraged at the 
Americans. They said that In Japan, the Americans had 
dropped an atom bomb during World War II. They said that 
we must point our anger at the Americans and never forget, 
that even If every last one of us were killed, we still must not 
give up. As long as anybody was left alive, we must Just keep
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on struggling and struggling.
Q: That's what the cadres said, but how did the people 
themselves feel?
A: The ordinary people were terrified by the bombing and the 
shelling, never having experienced war, and sometimes they 
literally shit In their pants when the big bombs and shells came.
Artillery bombardments usually Involved 200-400 shells per 
attack, and some people became shell-shocked. Just like 
their brains were completely disoriented. Even though the 
shelling had stopped, they couldn't hold down a meal. Their 
minds just froze up and would wander around mute and not 
talk for three or four days. Terrified and half-crazy, the people 
were ready to believe what they were told. What (the Khmer 
Rouge) said was credible because there were just so many 
huge bombs dropped. That was what made it so easy for the 
Khmer Rouge to win the people over... It was because of their 
dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating 
with the Khmer Rouge, Joining up with the Khmer Rouge, 
sending their children o ff to go with them, to Join the Khmer 
Rouge....
Q: So the American bombing was a kind of help to the Khmer 
Rouge ?
A: Yes, that's right. Itwasa kind of help. It helped to get them 
to come over to the Khmer Rouge and help, because the 
people saw, well, sometimes the bombs fell and hit little 
children, and their fathers would be all for the Khmer Rouge.. ®2
An earlieraccount of the effectsof the bombing inthe Northern 
Zone comes from a CPK infantryman who subsequently defected to 
the Lon Nol government. His first battle was the early 1973 siege of 
Kompong Thom, which he says progressed successfully for several 
months. Towards the end of that period the town's residents began to 
flee through the battle lines into the insurgent zones. "But one night... 
we heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth 
trembled, rose up and opened beneath ourfeet. Enormous explosions 
lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.'
In the morning we received the order to retreat at the double 
from Kompong Thom. The countryside was upturned .cratered 
with huge holes; the trees were smashed to splinters and all 
our trenches had been disemboweled or burled. Hundreds of 
our comrades had been killed. We were scarcely better off
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- we could no longer hear anything, and we could hardly walk 
straight. With the other survivors we headed by truck towards 
the forests of the Northwest.
Just as they did in the Southwest, CPK internecine antagonisms 
in the Northern Zone became most serious in 1973. The same soldier 
reports that by the year's end:
There had been conflicts between the civil and military 
leaders (Koy Thuon and Ke Pauk, respectively) of the 
Organization. The civil leaders claimed that the military 
offensive had been launched too early, and that Its failure 
had compromised the establishment of the new 
administration. The military claimed that the civilians' mistakes 
had broken the patriotic spirit of the population, who after the 
B-52 raids and the retreat of our forces had fled to the other 
side.
Many villagers, peasants and officers had been executed 
and the disorganized Khmer Rouge militias had been fighting 
one another63.
Obviously, the military debacle sparked recriminations. As Pol Pot 
himself had his headquarters in the Northern Zone, these proved 
crucial. Koy Thuon was later accused of “giving no thought to the 
battlefield'*4. A previously influential moderate CPK leader, Thuon 
was pushed aside by Ke Pauk, whose fellow warlord Mok, another Pol 
Pot ally, was at that very time fuming his guns on moderates in the 
Southwest Zone.
Afterthe bombing halt in August 1973, the soldier returned with 
his unit to Kompong Thom to find that the population movement into 
the countryside had reversed. 50,000 peasants had in fact fled into 
Kompong Thom town. “The countryside was deserted, the villages 
empty,' the soldier recalls. This was not just because of the US 
bombardment or the aggressive Lon Nol army patrolling. It was also 
because Ke Pauk (and probably Pol Pot's wife Khieu Ponnary, who in 
July 1973 was reported to have become CPK Secretary of Kompong 
Thom province) had fully implemented the Democratic Revolution in 
the region.
In the Kompong Thom region the Organization (the CPK, was) 
led by very severe men... Their discipline was terrible; there 
were many executions... Buddha statues were destroyed and 
pagodas secularized; youths forced to work very hard, 
especially when the villages had been reorganized and
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rebuilt; the Organization had not allowed the construction of 
Individual houses; there were camps for women, children, 
young women and young men; meals were eaten 
communally and rations consisted only of rice soup without 
meat... children were forbidden to respect their parents, 
monks to pray, husbands to live with their wives...85
In Kompong Kdei district of Siemreap province, during 1972, 
some bombing of the area had already begun; and although the 
digging of trenches kept the number of local deaths low, the 
appearance of US planes inspired great fear. According to a Kompong 
Kdei woman: "At that time it was not so hard working under the Khmer 
Rouge; we were afraid only of dying under the bombs.' Here as 
elsewhere, intensification of the US aerial campaign was accompanied 
by a significant hardening of communist policy. B-52 bombing of the 
area began in March 1973, and in that month, according to the 
woman, Kompong Kdei was forcibly evacuated by CPK forces and the 
market closed down; the town's one thousand families, now alleged 
to be 'upper class' (vanna kphuos). were sent into the forest to clear 
the land forfarming. Work was collective, in twelve-family groups, and 
the harvests confiscated to feed the increased requirements of the 
army. "They only left us with what we managed to hide away,' the 
woman recalls85.
In September 1973, thirteen battalions of Pauk's forces seized 
half of the city of Kompong Cham, and penetrated to within a hundred 
meters of the Lon Nol province governor's residence. When they 
withdrew, they took 15X00 townspeople into the countryside with 
them. (Four Khmer communist troops captured by the Lon Nol forces 
claimed that Vietnamese communist forces had offered fire support 
for the siege of the town, but, they said, the CPK commander had 
"refused this support at a critical stage of the fighting' because he 
preferred to deploy his troops "to escort civilian captives' rather than 
to pursue the battle for the town.)87
In February 1974, Pauk's forces were committed to a drive 
towards Phnom Penh, and thousands more peasants in the Northern 
Zone took the opportunity to flee into the Lon Nol-held province capital 
of Kompong Thom. Their accounts, particularly of low food rations, 
confirm other descriptions. "We were forced to work very hard, and 
got nothing,' a former village chief told journalist Donald Kirk soon 
afterwards. The death penalty was commonly applied, particularly for 
evasion of the CPK draft. The refugee continued:
In April of 1973 they stopped talking about Sihanouk... They 
said that he was "not the only man,' that he was "no good
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now," and that 'we do not need him any more'... If you still 
use his name and support Sihanouk, then you will be sent 
away, and you will never return... (We were told to) ‘support 
Khleu Samphan and no others.'88
The 'state' of Democratic Kampuchea had emerged fully grown from 
the Democratic Revolution in the Northern Zone. When that state was 
officially proclaimed by the Pol Pot regime in January 1976, Norodom 
Sihanouk was quickly replaced as Head of State by Khieu Samphan.
TH e NoRThEAST Z one
Because of its remoteness and sparse, mainly non-Khmer tribal 
populations, little is known about political developments in the Northeast. 
A defector reported in 1973 that for strategic reasons, the Zone was 
‘underthe direct administration' of Pol Pot's CPK Center89. The latter's 
cooperativization program may have been inimical to the various 
montagnard tribal populations there, and in combination with the US 
bombing and the local influence of Vietnamese-trained communist 
cadres, may have been responsible for a communist mutiny there in 
197390. Vietnamese sources claim that the Zone military commander 
and his Staff Assistant (both of whom had spent the 1954-1970 period 
in Vietnam), and the Deputy CPK Secretary of Rattanakiri province, led 
a popular rebellion in Voeunsai district in 19739’. They were unsuccessful, 
and the three withdrew to the Vietnamese border; in 1974 they were 
joined by another Hanoi-trained cadre,from Stung Treng92. At any rate 
the Northeast in general receded in strategic significance for the 
Center as CPK forces closed in on Phnom Penh.
But because of its importance as a staging point for Vietnamese 
communist troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Northeast Zone was an 
area of Kampuchea closely monitored by US forces. Moreover, after 
30 June 1970, congressional limitations on the bombing of Kampuchea 
restricted it to the interdiction of men and supplies en route to Vietnam. 
This restriction ‘was ignored from the start' (‘ I want this purpose 
interpreted very broadly,' Nixon said), and ‘thefalsification of bombing 
reports was now accepted as normal'93. But the procedure was to 
nominate the northeast, to be called Freedom Deal, as ‘a virtual free 
fire zone'94. Later, the area was extended to the whole of eastern 
Kampuchea, as far as the Mekong River. As Shawcross reports:
It was gradually pushed southward and westward Into more 
heavily populated areas, as the fighting spread. Bombing 
outside Freedom Deal was reported as being Inside, and 
bombing In populated areas Inside as being In wild, 
uninhabited places. The mlsreportlng meant that there was
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very little folbw-up or 'bomb damage assessment*, after 
mlssbns’ ®.
Nevertheless, the sparse population and jungle cover in the 
Northeast Zone did favour reporting by US agents crossing the border 
from Vietnam. The majority of Bomb Damage Assessments declassified 
by the US Government are reports on the Northeast Zone, and nearly 
half come from one district, Andaung Pich, of Rattanakiri Province, 
adjacent to Vietnam’6.
The majorUStargets in this Zone were undoubtedly Vietnamese 
communist troops (North Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong). This was 
apparent, for instance, in the US Army reports on the destruction of the 
province capital of Rattanakiri:
....on 27 April 1973, Ba Kev City, Cambodia, was In ruins. All
(Illegible) completely destroyed (Illegible) raid. The city had 
been abandoned and all civilians were believed to have 
moved to safer locations. The suspected NVA battalbn-slze 
base camp within the city had been completely devastated 
and no evidence of NVA presence remained In the city....
Installatbns/facllitles destroyed included two bunkers of an 
NVA bunker complex and an undetermined number of 
dwellings within the city67.
But as the bombing reached it speak in mid-1973, the civilian 
toll mounted. Villages were often bombed because they were near 
alleged military camps or convoys of Vietnamese or Khmer insurgent 
(Kl) troops. But civilian casualties frequently outnumbered military 
ones. In two such incidents in early August 1973, the reported casualties 
were as follows:
1. Seven houses destroyed, nine civilians kilted and 20 
wounded. Extent of communist military casualties unknown.
2. Eighteen houses destroyed, three civilians kilted and one 
wounded. One Khmer Insurgent killed and six wounded. One 
North Vietnam Army (NVA) soldier kilted9®.
Note that such statistics, according to Shawcross. are likely to 
underestimate civilian casualties.
On 3 August 1973, US aircraft bombed the village of Plei Loh in 
Rattanakiri province. According to an American agent who reported 
on the damage nine days later, 'the village was totally destroyed, with 
28 civilians and five VC guerrillas killed'” . He reported that about 30
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people had been wounded.
The next day, B-52s attacked Plei Lorn village in the same area. 
According to the Army's Bomb Damage Assessment dated 16 August: 
"At Plei Lorn village there were 23 houses. Two bombs fell on two houses 
killing twenty people, including children.'100 On 10 August, Plei Lom was 
bombed again, “resulting in 30 montagnards and an unknown number 
of guerrillas killed.',01
On the same day B-52s also struck nearby Plei Blah village: "As 
a result 50 montagnards were killed, 30 houses in Plei Blah village. 
Cambodia, and three houses in Plei Nhai village. South Vietnam, were 
destroyed. An unknown number of communist troops and cadre were 
killed.' It was later noted that Plei Nhai village was in fact located in 
Cambodia, not Vietnam. The US army report continued: “Becausethe 
strike took place so close to South Vietnam, the Communists intend to 
use this incident for propaganda purposes.'’02 However, not enough 
is known about the CPK internecine struggles in the Northeast Zone to 
conclude that they bore any relationship to political effects of the US 
bombardment of the Zone. The pattern is much clearer in what 
became the heartland of the Pol Pot regime — the Southwest Zone.
AfTERMATh: The S o u th w est Z one
The Southwest Zone saw the greatest convulsions in the 
revolutionary ranks in 1973. This was the year that the Mok-Thuch Rin 
tendency, closely allied with the Party Center, established its supremacy 
over Chou Chet, Prasith and their more moderate colleagues, and 
completely eclipsed the Hanoi-trained Khmer communists throughout 
the Southwest Zone.
TAblE 2.
COMMUNIST PARTy of KAMPUCHEA 
Sourhw EST Z one P a r ty  C o m m ittee, 1972-1974’03
P o st 1972 1974
Chairman Chou Chet (demoted 1973) ?
Secretary Mok Mok
Deputy- Prasith (killed mid-1974) Kang Chap (from
Secretary 26 August 1 9 7 4 -? )
Member Sangha Hoeun (killed 1973) ?
Member Thuch Rln Thuch Rin
Member Phouk Chhay (demoted 1973) ?
N.B. Chou Chet, Kang Chap, and Phouk Chhay were all arrested and executed In Democratic 
Kampushea In 1977-78. Mok and Thuch Rln remained Important leaden o f the exiled Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea In 1988.
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The first high-ranking victim was apparently Sangha Hoeun, a 
communist veteran and a member of the Southwest Zone CPK 
committee. A former monk from KompongSpeu, who had joined the 
communists in 1970, recalls:
In 1971-72 the revolution was good; the people were not 
worried atall. Sangha Hoeun was friendly with theVietnamese 
and never had any trouble with them. And the people liked 
Sangha Hoeun a lot because he sponsored theater 
performances with traditional national music. Also, there 
were plenty of Lon Nol soldiers who came to the liberated 
zones from Phnom Penh and the province capitals, to Join the 
revolution. Sangha Hoeun and Chou Chet re-educated and 
taught these people. I saw this; they did not kill them. ButMok 
did kill such people, and he became angry with what the 
other two were doing. There was a power struggle.
In 1973 the killings began. At first there were transfers of 
subdlstrict and Region cadre. Then Chou Chetand his followers 
fought with Mok's followers, at a combined Zone and Region 
meeting In our subdistrict, which I helped organize. The fight 
broke out over politics and theory. In the middle of the 
meeting. Chou Chet then left for the west to discuss the 
question of the execution of the Lon Nol soldiers. Phouk Chhay 
went with him. I was told they were transferred to Koh Kong.
Two weeks later, Sangha Hoeun wasarrested by Mok's troops.
At first they took him under guard to our village for a day and 
a night, and then to the Center or Zone (headquarters). Five 
trucks came to take his fol towers away toKompongChhnang.
In 1976. Democratic Kampuchea security personnel reported that 
Sangha Hoeun had been “smashed',04.
From across the Vietnamese border, the US analyst Kenneth 
Quinn reported that in 1973, Chou Chet “ had his authority and influence 
... reduced because of his pro-NVA and pro-Sihanouk stands and, in 
fact, was even ambushed and slightly wounded by the (CPK forces) 
once in late November while travelling with some NVA soldiers on 
Route 16.',0S
After his arrival in Kompong Chhnang, Chou Chet continued to 
stress solidarity with the Vietnamese at political meetings’06. A member 
of the CPK youth movement there also claims that, because Chet was 
an intellectual, he was in constant conflict with a "forest* revolutionary 
like Mok. Further, Chet and others like Phouk Chhay (and Koy Thuon in
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the North) appreciated Prince Sihanouk's appeal, even if to them he 
was only a figurehead. In fact, “the people believed in Sihanouk more 
than in the revolution'; problems arose when the Party began to 
criticize the Prince openly, and Mok's response was to impose his 
authority by force;
Mok was cruel ever since 1971-72. Unlike Chou Chet and 
Phouk Chhay, he was fierce, a killer. The killings began In 1973, 
as the bombs were falling. Also, some prisoners of war were 
executed, and others put In re-education centers. 1973 was 
the year the US began bombing (the area) with B-52s, so they 
had to fight back hard. The killings were In accordance with 
regulations. This was called 'strengthening the Democratic 
Revolution'. No one dared resist the changes.
I know for sure,from friends who worked directly with Mok, that 
he was the one who ordered the killings. They took place In 
the forest....
Mok had the power but he did not have much understanding 
of politics. Phouk Chhay was educating him (but) there was 
conflict between the 'forest resistance”, people like Mok, 
and the 'Internal (urban) resistance", people like Phouk Chhay 
who had recently arrived, since 1970. The conflict arose 
because the Internal group wanted to train Ihe forest group 
to Increase their capacity, and to assert their authority over 
them107.
Here again they seem to have lost out. The CPK Secretary of Region 31, 
Chan, was replaced in 1973 by Sarun, who was still loyal to the Party 
Centereight years later. A campaign criticizing Sihanouk was launched. 
and according to the local subdistrict cadre Mam Lon, there was a 
“change in the political line'. Lon was expelled from the Party in 
October, and soon afterwards one of his comrades in the youth 
movement was executed along with three other local officials10*.
Kenneth Quinn reports that local elections were no longer held 
in the areas newly seized from the Lon Nol government; from 1973, he 
says, village chiefs and subdistrict officials were merely appointed by 
CPK district committees. Buddhist festivals were reduced to two per 
year.and Muslim ones “totallyforbidden.' InKampotin July 1973, each 
Buddhist wat was ordered to supply ten monks to serve as infantrymen 
in the army's depleted ranks. Soon afterwards, in both Takeo and 
Kampot provinces, all but four monks in each wat were drafted, which 
Quinn notes "decimated the monk population' there. At the same 
time, towns in the area were evacuated, and in rural areas a “large-
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scale relocation process' was implemented — 20,000 people were 
moved out of their villages In two districts of Kampot alone. Quinn 
continues: “In parts of Takeo and Kampot, the Khmer Communists 
brought in a large numberof newcadresto implementthis programme, 
having lost faith in many older cadre whom they considered to be 
either pro-North Vietnamese or not tough enough to carry it out.'109
July 1973 also saw the defection to the Lon Nol regime of the 
Khmer communist military commander of Region 38 (Kompong Speu), 
who had undergone training in Hanoi in 1971. (Two Khmer veterans 
who had spent the years 1954-70 in Vietnam, also defected in 1973, the 
first to do so since 1971.)’10
Popular unrest was also mounting’ ’ ’. Quinn reports that fighting 
broke out between rival communist units in the Southwest in November 
1973. He cites three incidents in Kampot of popular and military 
reaction to attempts by CPK cadre to forcibly relocate the population 
and confiscate rice harvests. In one cast, dissident communist forces 
"rallied about 500 villagers to come to their aid, and, armed with 
scythes, machetes and hatchets, drove the KK (Khmer Krahom , or 
official CPK forces) off, killing nine and wounding twenty'. A fourth 
clash in the same area in December saw a hundred people killed and 
wounded, and by January 1974 "a large pro-Sihanouk force was 
reported maneuvering to gain control of all of Route 16 from Tani to Tuk 
Meas. as well as part of Route 205 each of Tani*. In March 1974, 742 
communist dissidents surrendered to the Lon Nol regime in the Southwest. 
They claimed to represent a total force of 10,000 who were ready to 
follow them if Lon Nol granted them operational autonomy to continue 
their fight against their CPK rivals. (They were refused.)
In Region 13, the imposition of the Democratic Revolution 
sometimes provoked assassinations of cadres by enraged, recalcitrant 
villagers. As one local CPK soldier tells it:
At first the Khmer Reds were popular, from 1970 to 1974. Their 
line was good, with no oppression. The people were prepared 
to follow them Into the socialist revolution. In July 1973 I 
enlisted because 1 believed what they said about liberating 
Kampuchea from oppressorsand Imperialists. But persecution 
began In 1973-74, when everything was collectivized. 
Communal eating was Introduced In May 1973, In groups of 
12 families. (Soon) people were eating banana leaves, sugar 
palm roots, coconuts, and finally weeds. Then there was 
nothing left at all. In the end the people rebelled, killing 
cadres In all villages. Here (Prey Pley village) one cadre was 
taken off and disappeared. So the Khmer Reds had to give 
In, and In 1974 private eating was once again allowed.
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But this district. Tram Kak, run by Mok's daughter Khom, was to be 
officially lauded by the Party as the first inTakeo to introduce communal 
eating, which of course resumed after victory in 1975. Meanwhile, in 
nearby Kong Pisei district (Region 33), two Region-level cadre were 
assassinated by their own couriers in 1974, after they had attempted to 
send out orders to implement the new measures. Although it is possible 
that Quinn underestimated the solid base of support that the CPK had 
developed among a minority of poor peasants in the Southwest, the 
thrust of his conclusion is undeniable: "In early 1973 when the KK 
entered the new harsh phase of their campaign In which all rules were 
strictly enforced and unpopular programs carried out, with stiff penalties 
for non-compliance, almost all popular feeling turned against them.'
Finally, and perhaps most important of all in the political sense, 
came the destruction of Prasith, the Southwest Zone Deputy Party 
Secretary who actually outranked Mok on the CPK Central Committee. 
He ran coastal Koh Kong province. An ethnic Chinese woman who 
was living there at the time recounts what happened to Prasith and his 
lieutenant Prachha. whom she calls the ’free Khmer Rouge':
In late 1973, the Vietnamese....were told to go back to their
country and we saw no more of them.
In 1974, hard limes began. Zone and Regional armed forces 
from Kompong Sella arrived In Koh Kong;.... Prachha was 
arrested and taken away. They said he was going to study, 
but actually they killed him. Everybody In Koh Kong was 
afraid, because their leader had been taken away. Prasith
disappeared about the same time.... It got harder and
harder. The Khmer Rouge began killing people; people who 
did anything wrong were taken away and shot. In 1974 they 
recruited every youth 16 years old or more Into the Army....
Some who didn't go were killed.
According to Lon Nol intelligence, which confirms this account of 
Prasith's execution. CPK Center member Vom Vet assumed control of 
In mid-1974.
There was one exception. About 200 of Prasith's followers 
escaped arrest and fled into the Cardamom mountains along the Thai 
border, where they initially set up five small bases, each of platoon 
strength. Led by Sae Phuthang, these people held out for the next six 
years. Abandoned by the Vietnamese communists, they constituted 
no real threat to the CPK regime, but were occasionally aided by 
ethnic Khmers and local Thai officials across the border. With the
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overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979. a hundred of them 
emerged to participate in the formation of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea. Sae Phuthang became Deputy Secretary of the ruling 
People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, and two of his lieutenants 
became Party Secretaries of Koh Kong and Kampot provinces.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that B-52 bombardment was at times a 
devastating weapon against massed forces, and that CPK and NVA 
units suffered enormous casualties from it. Table 3 summarizes 
declassified assessments by the US Army of major damage done to 
communist units in eastern Kampuchea during air strikes in 1973. These 
assessments are striking for the high killed-to-wounded ratios claimed, 
recalling Shawcross's point about the fabrication of reports. But they 
are not inconsistent with the claim of General John Vogt, Commander 
of the US Seventh Air Force. that 16,000 Khmer insurgents were killed by 
US bombing in 1973"2. If this is the case, the 1973 bombing postponed 
the revolutionary victory for a crucial two years.
On the other hand, it is apparent that on many occasions CPK 
and other “Khmer insurgent' forces did avoid casualties by digging air- 
defence shelters. One report to the US Army in July 1973 stated: “In 
headquarters areas, many of the shelters are of solid construction and 
able to withstand bombs. In frontline areas, shelters are often built 
under bamboo groves and are relatively safe, barring a direct h it.' But 
for civilians the effect was much more devastating. The same report 
continued:
Civilian reaction to US air strikes: Most houses In the combat 
zone have been totally destroyed, either by US bombs or by 
the communists themselves. Civilian reaction to the 
devastation Is mixed; but an objective appraisal seems to be 
that the US. Cambodian government and the communists 
are equally responsible (sic). It Is a fact, however, that the 
civilian population fears US air attacks far more than they do 
Communist rocket attacks or scorched-earth tactics'13.
According to the historical division of the US Department of 
Defense, more than 11,000 Khmers were killed by US bom bing"4. This 
seems a serious underestimation, perhaps because of the difficulty 
and fabrication involved in the monitoring of casualties in areas distant 
from the Vietnamese border. The evidence of survivors from many 
parts of Kampuchea suggests at least tens of thousands, probably in 
the range of 50,000 to 150£00 deaths, resulted from the US bombing 
campaigns in Kampuchea from 1969 to 1973.
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TAblE J.
DEcUssifiEd US Boivib D amaqe Assessm en ts:
EffECTlvE Ain Sm lkES A qaIn st CommunIs t  T roops In Eastern  KuMpudtEA, 1977
D a t e  o f PIacx Z one Killed Wounded CIvIIIan CasuaLt Ics,STRlkc Damaqc
3/23/73 Kampot SW 30 dead or seriously wounded
4/26/73 Memut E 100 VC 
and Kl
150
4/29/73 Memut E 70 VC 200
4/30/73 Kompong E 40 VC 35 Kl "V ery m any houses o f
4/73
Cham 60  Kl Cambodian people ' were 
destroyed In ttie  B-52 strike. 
Including 'thew este rn  h a lf' 
o f Ml Sa tu rn  v illa g e  
'com pletely destroyed.'
Takeo SW 1000
5/73 Neak E 2000
Luong
6/13/73 Phnom SW c.1000
Penh
7/22/73 Komchay E 37 NVA
Meas 30  Kl
8/5/73 Rattanakirl NE 105 Kl 100 'No civilian damages...reported.*
8/6/73 Romeas E 100 30
8/7/73
Hek
Kompong E 425 500 'Dead cMlons were buried In the
Trach 'se riously ' viclnlty...500 meters northeast of Phum So* Dong."
8/8/73 Rattanakirl NE 5 VC
10/8/73 Romeas E 113 Kl 30 Kl
Hek
8/12/73 Svay Rieng E 25 NVA over 30 ’ 2000 Cam bodian nationals
Vietnamese crossed the  Cam bodia/
and Khmen Vietnam  border fo r re fuge ' 
from  the bombing.
8/11/73 Takeo SW C .300 Kl killed or wounded
8/12/73 Tbaung E 50 70 Those killed and wounded
Khmum 'se riously ' Inc lud ed  'C a m b o d ia n  
c iv ilia ns' (exact num ber
8/15/73 Andaung NE 40 NVA
Plch
T otaLs : C.5/100 C. 1,300 Unknown
Sources: US CIA and Department of the Army, documents declassified 
19 February and 7 April 1987.
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What was achieved? The Khmer Republic, the intended 
benefactor of the bombing, may perhaps be given the last word on 
the matter. On 28 July 1973. the J-2 intelligence section of the Khmer 
National Armed Forces reported on the 'Enem y Outlook after 15 
August 1973*.ltnoted: 'The American bombing halt can only favorably 
influence the morale and the behavior of the enemy.'  But it went on 
to make a devastating criticism of the bombing's effect on the armed 
forces of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic:
On the other hand. It will have a sad effect on the state of 
mind and the attitude of our own forces who have been 
accustomed for the last six months to benefit from the unlimited 
support of the air force and will have great difficulty In doing 
without It. In effect, too often air Intervention had been called 
In when ground action would have been sufficient. They 
depended on this support so much that certain units, already 
little Inclined to go beyond the limits of their quarters, no 
longer adventured on the terrain If alrsup port was not assured.
This tendency at all levels, and particularly at the basic units 
level, of considering the bombing 'as an end In Itse lf.'  has 
seriously compromised the fighting capability of many units.
Because of this, our troops were not able to take advantage 
of the air Intervention which, logically, should have enabled 
them to pull themselves together and retake the Initiative 
starting at the end of January',s.
For his part. Henry Kissinger has staunchly defended the US role, 
claiming in 1979 that 'W e destabilized Cambodia the way Britain 
destabilized Poland in 1939."" 6 He states in his memoirs: 'Itw a sH a no i 
— animated by an insatiable drive to dominate Indochina — that 
organized the Khmer Rouge long before any American bombs fell on 
Cambodian so il.'” 7
Five years earlier, however, Kissinger had had a more perceptive 
view. In an April 1974 cable to the US Embassy In Phnom Penh, he had 
written:
In the areas such as southeast and southwest Cambodia 
where there has been a Khmer Rouge organization since the 
1940s, we could assume that at least the political organization 
If not the military Is dominated by Khmer Rouge who not only 
had little training abroad but probably resent and compete 
with the better-trained men from North Vietnam. It Is not 
happenstance that there Is significant conflict between the 
VC/NVA and the Khmer communists In these areasof southern 
Cambodia so close to South Vietnam.
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’ Nevertheless/ Kissinger added,
a Titolst Cambodia which Is Independent and doctrinaire 
would be dangerous to Its neighbors as a sanctuary for 
communist rebels. The Khmer communists, such as Saloth Sar 
(Pol Pot), Koy Thuon and Khleu Samphan are probably 
xenophobic both when It comes to Vietnamese and the local 
Chinese Inhabitants. One objective of a Cambodian 
communist regime would be to expel or severely control 
these groups.
By 1974,then, Kissinger was aware — largely through the reports 
of Kenneth Quinn — of the existence of the chauvinist Pol Pot tendency. 
But he was as yet unsure that the CPK Center played the dominant role 
in the Khmer Rouge movement. He noted that ’our lack of precise 
knowledge of the insurgency makes it difficult to describe the decision­
making process and identify the decision-makers':
Convincing arguments can be made that the Insurgency Is 
less a centrally controlled communist rebellion and more an 
Insurgency with several regional bases. It Is difficult to say 
whether one can go so far as to describe It as warlordlsm, but 
It does square with Cambodian tradition, and the nature of 
this particular war. A factlonallzed Insurgency with a veneer 
of central control does explain certain past anomalies In 
Insurgent operations and apparent conflicts. The insurgents 
no doubt have a central committee and If the Communist 
Party Is as advanced as It should be after 25 years of existence 
there probably Is a presidium made up of little known leftists 
such as Saloth Sar. Nuon Chea, Koy Thuon, Non Suon, and 
more prominent French-trained Individuals such as Khleu 
Samphan, leng Sary, Son Sen, Hou Yuon and to a lesser extent 
TtvOland Phouk Chhay. These men In our view wield the real 
power” *.
How true this last sentence was to prove. Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Khieu 
Samphan, leng Sary and Son Sen still make up the Khmer Rouge 
leadership in 1988 (having purged and executed the other five second- 
level figures on Kissinger's lists, between 1975 and 1978)” ’.
The tragedy of Kisslnger'slndeclsionastowhetherthe insurgency 
was regional. and factlonallzed with only ’a veneer of central control, ' 
or whether ’the real power* was wielded by the central presidium 
headed by Pol Pot, is that the former was largely true In 1972; the latter 
was largely true In 1974; and Klsslngerand Nixon were largely responsible
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for what had happened in between.
The year 1973 was a watershed in Kampuchean history. The 
massive bombardment of that year had several major effects. First, it 
decimated and even destroyed a number of CPK regular units. (The 
casualties were particularly heavy among Southwest Zone units during 
the siege of Phnom Penh in July 1973’20, and this may have helped tip 
the balance of power there in the CPK Center's favour.) Second, the 
bombing caused enormous losses of Khmer civilian life and property. 
Third, these drove a large number of new recruits into the revolutionary 
ranks, recruits who were often motivated as much by a desire for 
revenge as by positive political or social goals. Such people were an 
asset to the Pol Pot group.
In one case, CPK cadrestold young survivors of US bombardment 
that "the killing b ird s' had come “from Phnom Penh' (not Thailand or 
Guam), and that Phnom Penh must be made to pay for its assault on 
rural Kampuchea121. On the day the bombing ended, 15 August 1973, 
CPK propaganda leaf lets found in bomb craters in Rattanakiri attacked 
the “Phnom Penh w arriors' who were, they claimed, soon to be 
defeated122.
The popular reaction to the bombing was cleverly manipulated 
by the CPK Center. This was probablyfatal for relatively moderate CPK 
leaders like Prasith, who was overwhelmed by fanatics and killed just as 
Chou Chet and Phouk Chhay also lost out to Mok and Thuch Rin in the 
crucial struggle for control of the Southwest Zone at this time. It Is clear 
too, that Koy Thuon's position in the North, in relation to the Zone military 
commander Ke Pauk, was severely undermined by the Impact of the 
bombing there. Had all these people been able to hold their ground, 
the history of Kampuchea in the remainderof the 1970s might well have 
been different.
The Pol Pot leadership of the Khmer Rouge can in no way be 
exonerated from responsibility for committing genocide against their 
own people. But neither can Nixon or Kissinger escape judgement for 
their role in the slaughter that was a prelude to the genocide. Worse, 
but for that extreme example of US militarism, the Pol Pot group may 
have been denied their opportunity. It remains to be hoped that they 
w ill not get another one.
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T h E  iN flA TiO N A Ry IM PA C T o f  t H e  V iETN A M
War*
Tom RiddEll
It is more than fifteen years since the US w ithdrawal from the 
Vietnam War. Enough time has passed to sort out the historical record 
concerning the war and its economic impacts. Like all wars, though, 
there w ill continue to be controversy over interpretations of it and its 
effects. There is widespread recognition of the economic costs of the 
war and its responsibility fo r stim ulating inflation in the 1960s. The 
increased spending fo r the war during the economic prosperity of the 
m id-1960s produced pressure on prices. Because economic 
policym akersfailed to institute corrective policies, inflation accelerated 
by the late 1960sand laid the basis fo rthe inflationary spira l of the 1970s. 
The economic consequences of the Vietnam War were among the 
m ajor factors in creating the economic difficulties faced by the United 
States during the 1970s.
In the 1980s. however. President Ronald Reagan sought to 
reinterpret the history of the war. He labeled it a "noble cause ' and 
tried to jettison the "Vietnam  syndrom e'.the critical reevaluation of US 
foreign policy that suggested caution toward m ilitary intervention. 
Some econom ists, also echoing positions from the war years, have 
recently suggested theirow n revisionist version of the economic impact 
of the war. They argue that the economic burden of the w ar was triv ia l, 
that it produced only m inor inflation in the 1960s, and that it cannot be 
held responsible fo r the inflationary spiral of the 1970s1.
In th is article, I w ill confront th is challenge and reexamine the 
economic consequences of the Vietnam War and whether it caused 
an acceleration of inflation in the late 1960s. Such analysis should 
contribute to our understanding of recent economic history and of the 
possible economic effects of m ilitary expansions — which could 
presumably inform current and future economic policy.
*A previous version of this paper was presented at a Presidential Conference on 
"Lyndon Baines Johnson: A Texan In Washington' at Hofstra University In April 1986, and 
appears In Firestone, Bernard J.; Robert Vogt, eds. Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses 
of Power (Greenwood Press) forthcoming.
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INflATiON iN TtlE 1960s
Table 1 presents data on various measurements of annual rates 
of inflation from 1960 to 1971. This data demonstrates the source of the 
conclusion by most professional economists and the public that the 
acceleration of inflation was linked with the Vietnam War.
For the period 1960-1964. the Consumer Price Index, the 
Producer Price Index and the GNP deflator all show relatively low and 
stable rates of inflation In a range of less than 1 percent to less than 2 
percent. The average annual changes in these three different measures 
of price increases were barely above 1 percent. This trend continued 
the low rates of inflation experienced in the late 1950s. But with the 
escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, there was an acceleration in the 
rates of increase in all of these measures of price levels.
From December 1964 to December 1965, the unadjusted CPI 
increased by 1.9 percent, up from 1.2 percent the previous year. This 
was followed by an increase of 3.4 percent in 1966,3 percent in 1967, 
4.7 percent in 1968, and 6.1 percent in 1969. A sim ilar pattern of 
accelerating inflation emerges in the year-to-year, adjusted CPI 
changes. The annual percentage increases in the GNP price deflator
TAblE 1
INflATiON D u r Inq t He VIETNAM War PERiod, 1960 TO 1971










C hange In 
P r o d u c e r  
Price Index, 
December to  




t o - Y e a r ,  
Adjusted
Annual
Change In GNP 
Implicit Price 
Deflator
1960 1.5 1.6 1.8 0.8 1.6
1961 0.7 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.9
1962 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.3 1.8
1963 1.6 1.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.5
1964 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.4 1.5
1965 1.9 1.7 3.3 1.7 2.2
1966 3.4 2.9 2.2 3.2 3.2
1967 3.0 2.9 1.6 1.2 3.0
1968 4.7 4.2 3.1 2.8 4.4
1969 6.1 5.4 4.8 3.7 5.1
1970 5.5 5.9 2.2 3.5 5.4
1971 3.4 4.3 3.2 3.1 5.0
Source: Economic Report o f the President. 1962: 237.295.302.
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also accelerated from 1965 to 1969 — 2.2 to 5.1 percent. In the two 
series for producer prices, there were marked jumps in the annual rates 
of change in 1965 and 1966, a slowdown in their rate of increase in 1967 
(due to “growth recession'), and renewed acceleration in 1968 and 
1969.
Walker and Vatter contend that the data on inflation don't 
demonstrate an acceleration in inflation until 1968. They base this 
conclusion on an analysis of quarterly changes in annual rates for the 
CPI and the PPI and on the assertion that changes in the price indices 
of less than 3 percent are not significant2.
First of all, the quarterly data on the rate of inflation during the 
period of the Vietnam escalation can be used to measure short-run 
movements in prices and don't necessarily show inflation. But I would 
argue that quarterly data do not provide adequate information on the 
trend in the rate of inflation in the period prior to the escalation, during 
it, and after it. The relevant period is not simply the escalation but rather 
the period surrounding increased spending for the Vietnam War. For 
this more extended time frame, the changes In the annual rates of 
inflation are superior. When economists measure inflation over five to 
ten year intervals, they rely on the annual changes in price indices. 
Secondly, Walker and Vatter refer to a statement in an introductory 
economics textbook about a 2 to 3 percent margin of error in the CPI 
and conclude that any change in it of less than 3 percent amounts to 
“no inflation'3. They transpose this range of uncertainty to 3 percent as 
the standard and use it as an absolute test of the existence of inflation. 
The fact that the CPI is based on a survey and has a margin of errordoes 
not mean that it cannot be used to identify patterns of change in 
consumer prices. It is a consistently measured series over time, and 
economists rely on statistical technique to ensure its ability to reflect 
trends in the prices of goods and services. If economists were not 
allowed a 3 percent margin of error, there is not much that we could 
say about the economy with any degree of confidence.
T I ie  TirviiNQ ANd Im pa c t o f t Lie  V ietnam  W ar E scaLa t Ion
Both economic theory and history suggest that wars usually 
have an inflationary impact. During all of its major wars, the United 
States has experienced increased rates of inflation4. The connection 
between war spending and inflation is based on both conventional 
micro-and macro-economictheory. Increased war spending stimulates 
the demand for labor and raw materials used in war production. 
Increased price pressures develop for these factors of production in 
proportion to the tightness of their markets. These price increases can 
then spread from market to market. The macro-economic effect
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T aM e 2
The EsTiMATEd Incremental ANd F u ll Co s ts  o f D Ir e c t  
A merican MillTARy InvoIv em en t In iNdo-ChiNA, F IscaI  Y ears
1 9 6 5 -1 97 5
(Billions of Current Dollars)
Fiscal Year’ Incremental Costs0 Full Costs0









1974 4. l d 5.0*
1975 2.0d 2.5d
Totals: $114.3 $143.8
'The  US Government Fiscal Year fo r all these years was from  July 1 through June 30, e.g.. Fiscal Year 
1965 was from  July 1,1964 to June 30,1965.
°Full costs cover all forces, baseline and additional, and equipment and materials used In the war. 
Incremental costs cover the added costs o f fighting the war over and above the normal costs o f 
operating the baseline force In peacetime. These are the two methods o f cost accounting fo r the  
war supplied by the Pentagon.
“The figures fo r Fiscal Year 1965 are most Ikely too low to cover the buildup o f troops In 1964-1965 and 
the stepped-up air activity In response to  the G ulf o f Tonkin Incident (August 1964) and the Plelku 
attacks (February 1965). Some o f this may have been financed with the funding fo r military assistance 
fo r South Vietnam. Or It may have Involved the use of already existing baseline forces. However, this 
activity stfl had a cost and should, a t the very least, be Indicated In the fu ll cost o f the war. Some 
baseline forces were diverted to Vietnam fo r the 1964-1965 buildup —  the ships that were In the Gulf 
o f Tonkin, the aircraft tha t was a t Plelku, and the planes tha t retaliated against the North as a result 
o f both o f these Incidents—and probably accounted fo r costs In excess o f $ 100 million. Consequently, 
the cost figures largely derived from Department o f Defense accounting which are presented In this 
table must be regarded as conservative estimates o f the actual costs o f the war.
•These are estimates based on the original and revised budget submissions o f the Departm ent of 
Defense. They reflect the combined effects o f the US response to the Spring 1972 Offensive o f the 
North Vietnamese, the US bombing o f North Vietnam In December 1972, and the ceasefire obtained 
a t the end o f January 1973.
•Estimates based on the costs o f US military assistance to Indo-Chlna and the continued presence of 
US air and naval forces In Southeast Asia.
Sources: Riddell, Tom. A Political Economcy o f the American War In Indo-Chlna: Its 
Costs and Consequences, unpublished dissertation (Washington, DC: The American 
University) 1975: 98-99; and, US Department of Defense (Comptroller), The Economlcss 
o f Defense Spending (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Oflce) 1972: 149.
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results from the stimulation of aggregate demand in the economy as 
a whole. Government spending to prosecute the war effort is added 
onto total spending in the economy. The new spending creates 
demand for war goods, as well as higher incomes throughout the 
economy that w ill be spent on non-military goods and services. The 
increased demand for both military and consumer products contributes 
to inflationary pressures in the economy. The inflationary impact of the 
war w ill depend on the state of the economy, the manner by which It 
is financed, and wartime economic policy. If the economy is close to 
full employment, ceteris paribus, increased war spending will have a 
larger inflationary impact. If the war is financed by printing money or 
by the Federal Reserve lending directly to the Treasury, there w ill be 
higher inflation. If the government does not increase taxes (or decrease 
non-military spending) to pay for the war. its inflationary impact w ill not 
be checked.
The issue here is whether the Vietnam War caused increased 
inflation in the 1960s. The analysis w ill rest on an Investigation of the 
impact of the war (taking into account the magnitude and timing of 
the buildup for the war), the state of the economy at the time, how it 
was financed, and wartime economic policy.
To examine the impact of the war, we must identify the period 
of time when the war made extra demands on the resources of the 
society. Walker and Vatter have determined that the escalation 
period was 1966-1967 when national defense purchases of goods and 
services as a percent of GNP increased5. There are two problems with 
this definition — one of substance and one of measurement.
The US involvement In the war was an unusual event in the 
history of the country; it was an extraordinary occurrence. In this light, 
the effect of war spending lasted for the entire period of time during 
which It was making an extra claim on the society's resources. Table 
2 presents information on the annual costs of the war from Fiscal Year 
1965 to FY1975. The full costs of all forces, equipment and materials 
used in the war amounted to over $140 billion; and the incremental 
costs of fighting the war over and above the normal costs of using 
baseline forces in peacetime were over $110 billion6. While It is true that 
the war placed accelerating demands on resources during the 1966­
1967 period, it is also true that the war made an extra claim on 
resourcesthroughout itstenure (subject to countervailing fiscal policies). 
Walker and Vatter focus only on the period of escalation. Whether 
inflation Is engendered by an escalation is certainly a relevant question; 
but It Is not the only question in determining the Inflationary Impact of 
a war.
Furthermore.from an examination of the data that they present.
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as well as Table 2. it is possible to identify a different and longer period 
of escalation. Table 2 shows war spending increasing in every Fiscal 
Year from 1966 through 1969. Walker and Vatter note that defense 
purchases as a percent of GNP began to increase in the 3rd quarter of 
1965 (at 7.1 percent), continue to increase in every quarter to the 2nd 
in 1967 (9.0 percent), and then decrease in the 3rd quarter of 1967 (8.6 
percent). This brought the “escalation* to a close. However, there are 
two Important qualifications to this dating of the escalation. From the 
4th quarter of 1967 to the 2nd quarter of 1968, defense purchases go 
back up to 9.0 percent of GNP. The dating by Walker and Vatter of the 
end of the escalation seems to be at least questionable and certainly 
arbitrary. Based on these figures, it could be argued that the escalation 
lasted Into 1968; only after the second quarter of 1968 were there 
consistent decreases in defense purchases as a percent of GNP7. In 
fact, one could argue thatthe escalation lasted until defense purchases 
as a percent of GNP went back to their pre-war level. By this criterion, 
the escalation would last until the 3rd quarter of 1970 based on 
quarterly data and 1971 on annual data (itw as 7.2 percent in 1965.9.0 
percent in 1967,7.5 percent in 1970, and 6.6 percent in 1971).
The history of the war itself also substantiates the conclusion 
that Walker and Vatter have incorrectly specified the timing of the 
escalation. Spending on the war reached Its peaks in FY1968 and 
FY1969. Recalling the Initial escalation of direct American m ilitary 
involvement In the war, the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place in August 
1964 and was followed by an intensification of US bombing of North 
Vietnam and by a massive increase in the number of US military 
personnel in Vietnam. From August 1964 to May 1965 (during FY1965). 
an additional 50,000 troops were sent to Vietnam.
At the end of July 1965. President Johnson announced that the 
administration needed additional funds to wage conflict and that a 
furthersupplemental appropriation would be required in January 1966. 
By the end of 1965, 100,000 people were added to US forces in 
Vietnam, bringing the total to more than 180XXX). By the end of 1966, 
there were 385XXX) US military personnel in Vietnam. The number 
continued Increasing until the end of 1968 when the total reached 
538XXX)8. The timing of the escalation has much longer boundaries 
than 1966-1967.
The Economic  Im pact  of tHe War
To adequately measure the economic Impact of the war and 
the effectthat It had on Increasing Inflation, It Is necessary to supplement 
national defense purchases of goods and services with other indicators 
of defense activity.
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Table 3 presents some data that w ill help to measure the 
economic impact of the Vietnam War. National defense purchases 
record payments made by the federal government to individuals and 
businesses; It is a final indicator of defense activity in the economy. 
Progress payments outstanding represent early payments by the 
Department of Defense to contractors for work in progress; it is an 
Intermediate indicator of defense activity. The other measurements in 
Table 3 are all advance indicators. They measure the volume of 
commitments and contracts that DOD makes with the private sector 
for military goods and services. Military prime contracts, gross obligations 
incurred, and manufacturers' new orders all register activity undertaken 
in the private sector at the behest of the federal government and in
TAblE 5
iNdicATORS o f D e Fense A cTiv iTy , A nnuaI  A m o un ts  
B illioNS o f Cu r r e n t  D oU ars, 1964 t o  1970
Year
N a tio na l D e fense  
Purchases o f Goods 
and Services
Defense Departm ent 
Military Prime Contract 
Awards
Defense Departm ent 
G ross O b lig a tio ns 
Incurred, Total
1964 49.0 26.6 55.0
1965 49.4 29.9 58.3
1966 60.3 40.2 73.2
1967 71.5 42.4 81.8
1968 76.9 42.3 87.0
1969 76.3 35.2 81.3
1970 73.5 33.5 80.0
D e fense  D e p a rtm e nt 
Gross Obligation Incurred. 
Procurement
Manufacturers’ New 
O rd ers, D e fnese  
Products Industries
Defense Departm ent 
Progress Paym ents 
Outstanding
1964 15.6 27.4 3.2
1965 16.6 32.2 3.9
1966 23.6 39.1 5.5
1967 26.5 44.9 7.5
1968 28.3 46.7 8.5
1969 20.9 43.1 9.8
1970 20.1 42.9 9.4
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Defense Indicators 
(November 1972): 36; (October 1976): 31; (October 1977): 31,33; and. (Novemberr 
1977): 31,33.
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advance of actual payment for the work completed. Consequently, 
during periods of military buildups, the advance Indicators are the first 
to signal the impact of the increased demand for military goods and 
services in the economy9.
An examination of the relative changes in these measurements 
of defense activity compared to changes in GNP during the period 
1965-1969 provides information about the timing of the impact of 
Increased military spending on the economy. Table 4 presents the 
annual rates of change for these defense indicators. All of the 
indicators, with the exception of gross obligations incurred, total, 
decreased in 1964. In 1965, along with the escalation of the war. all of 
the indicators increased. The advance indicators all increased by 
much more than national defense purchases, which increased by only 
.8 percent. Military prime contracts (12.5 percent), manufacturers' 
new orders in the defense products industries (17.5) percent, and 
progress payments outstanding (21.9 percent) all increased at a rate
TAblE 4
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Departm ent of 
Defense. Gross 
O b l i g a t i o n s  
Incurred
1965 8.4% .8% 12.5% 17.5% 6.0%
1966 9.4% 22.1% 34.0% 21.4% 25.5%
1967 5.8% 18.6% 5.5% 14.8% 11.8%
1968 9.2% 7.6% - .3% 4.0% 6.3%
1969 8.1% -.8% -4.8% -7.7% -6.6%
D epartm ent o f 
D e fense , G ross 
Obligations Incurred, 
Procurement
Defense Departm ent 







Source: Economic Report of the President. 1983: 233 for GNP growth rate. All others 
from Table 3. Percentage changes all calculated.
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significantly in excess of the growth rate of current GNP (8.4 percent). 
The other advance indicators registered increases only slightly below 
the increase in GNP. In 1966,thepaceofthebuildupaccelerated. The 
annual rates of increase in all of the indicators were larger than the rate 
of increase in GNP — with the increases in most of the advance 
indicators being the largest of all. The buildup slows down somewhat 
in 1967, but the rate of increase of defense purchases, manufacturers' 
new orders, gross obligations incurred, and progress payments 
outstanding are all larger than the growth rate of the GNP. In 1968, the 
indicators (with the exception of progress payments) showthe beginning 
of the end of the escalation period. Military prime contracts actually 
decrease; and defense purchases, manufacturers' new orders, and 
gross obligations incurred (total and procurement) continue their 
increase but at a rate below that of GNP. The indicators fo r 1969 
(except progress payments) all decrease.
The leading indicators point to the acceleration of defense 
activity in 1965. This activity took place primarily in the private sector as 
m ilitary contractors expanded their inventories and their demands for 
raw materials and personnel. The impact of the escalation was 
intensified in 1966 and 1967; in fact, increased military purchases 
accounted fo r 16.8 percent and 25.9 percent respectively of the 
increases in GNP for these two years. The end of the escalating 
economic effect of the war is somewhat more problematic. The 
leading indicators indicate a deceleration in 1968; but the data on war 
spending (Table 2) show a continued increase through FY1969. Although 
it is not an inarguabie proposition, I would date the period of escalation 
from 1965 through the 2nd quarter of 1969. This was the period during 
which m ilitary activity in the private sector and actual spending for the 
war was increasing.
ThE Inflationary Im pa c t o f t He V ietnam  W ar
The general effects of wartime escalations— Increased demand 
for resources, a stimulus to aggregate demand, and the timing of the 
impact — all lend support to the hypothesis that the war stimulated 
inflation in 1965.1966, and 1967.
The war increased demand for raw materials, metals, and 
Industrial products. The impact on prices is indicated in a comparison 
of the wholesale price indices for all commodities, metal and metal 
products, and machinery and equipment. Forthe period 1960-1964.all 
ofthese indices declined or increased minimally. In 1965 and 1966.wlth 
the beginning of the war. all showed substantial increases. From 1965 
through 1968, the wholesale price index for all commodities increased 
by 8.2 percent. The index for metals and metal products increased by
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9.2 percent, and the index for machinery and equipment increased by
11.2 percent. Tightened labor markets due to economic expansion 
and the drain of the military draft led to accelerated wage increases 
after 1965. The annual increase in average hourly compensation 
averaged just under 4.0 percent for the 1960-1965 period. But in 1966 
average compensation increased by 6.1 percent; and the average 
annual increase through 1971 was about 7 percent. The bargaining 
position of labor unions reflected tight labor markets. From 1961 to
1964, negotiated settlements produced average annual increases in 
hourly wages of about 3 percent. But, beginning in 1965, the annual 
Increases in negotiated wages began to accelerate. The increase in 
1965 was 3.7 percent and accelerated to an average annual increase 
of 6.6 percent from 1966 through 1970. In addition to these price and 
wage pressures from the extra demands of the war, the context of the 
economy, the financing of the war, and wartime economic policy 
contribute toan interpretation of the culpability of the warin stimulating 
Inflation throughout the economy.
H ie  S t a t e  o f t Iie  E conomy
The closer the economy is to full employment, the more 
Inflationary the impact of a war is likely to be. Table 5 contains data on 
the general state of the economy for 1964-1970. In 1965, the ratio of 
actual to potential GNP was 100.1 and remained above 100 through 
1969. Actual GNP is the current value of output in the economy and 
potential GNP Is the value of output if all the resources of the society 
were fully employed. If actual output exceeds potential output, the 
economy is operating above its capacity to produce goods and 
services. Sim ilarly, the unemployment rate was relatively low, given 
post-W orldW ar2 experience, and had been decreasing since 1961. In
1965, the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing was at its highest 
level since World War 2 (In excess of rates during the Korean War). 
These data Indicate an economyoperating near or above its capacity 
and In which unanticipated increases In aggregate demand could be 
expected to stimulate Inflationary pressures. The war, moreover, 
coincided with both the 1964tax cutto stimulate the economy and the 
launching of the war against poverty. From 1965 to 1969, actual GNP 
exceeded potential GNP, the capacity utilization rate for manufacturing 
remained In the high 80s, and the unemployment rate continued to 
decrease to 3.5 percent (the lowest it had been since World War 2 
except for the Korean War years). The war escalation took place in an 
expanding economy. It was in this context that the extraordinary 













1964 98.2 5.2 85.6
1965 100.1 4.5 89.6
1966 102.1 3.8 91.1
1967 101.2 3.8 86.9
1968 101.9 3.6 87.1
1969 101.0 3.5 86.2
1970 97.2 4.9 79.3
Sources: Actual/Potentlal GNP from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Survey of Current Business (April 1982): 25. Unemployment rate and capacity 
utilization rate from Economic Report of the President (1982): 266, 283.
FiNANciNq tMe W ar
But to demonstrate that the warwas a source of inflation, it must 
also be shownthatthe mannerin which itwasfinanced accommodated 
increased war spending and that wartime economic policy did not 
take purchasing power away from other sectors of the economy. 
Revisionists have argued that during the war “tax increases' did 
reduce inflationary pressures,that otherfederal spending was reduced, 
and that monetary policy was not excessively expansionary'0. They 
identifytwo sources oftax increases during the period 1965 to 1968. The 
first was the combination of increasing tax collections in a progressive 
tax system during a period of rising incomes and scheduled increases 
in social insurance taxes. The second was the 1968 surtax passed by 
Congress to help finance the war and relieve inflationary pressures in 
the economy. However, the surtax w asn't passed until July. 1968 and 
after that federal taxes' share of GNP actually decreased. Until the 
passage of the surtax, tax rates did not change during the first three 
years of the war; and there was no significant decrease in personal 
consumption expenditures and disposable personal income as a 
percent of GNP, which would signal the contractionary effect of 
increased ta xe s". Also, the impact of increased social insurance taxes 
is not so clear.
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Walker and Vatter argue that the increases in social insurance 
taxes were in excess of increased social insurance benefits and 
consequently that this “is unequivocally anti-inflationary'12. They are 
correct in arguing that social insurance tax collections were increasing; 
they increased their share of total federal receipts from 19.1 percent in 
1965 to 23.0 percent in 197013. Social insurance contributions account 
for about 80 percent of federal trust funds receipts, and throughout the 
duration of the war these trust funds experienced surpluses. These 
surpluses are anti-inflationary only if they are not made available to 
other agents of demand in the economy. However, they were made 
available to the Treasury through the only thing that the Social Security 
Administration,for example, is allowed to do with its surpluses: purchase 
US Treasury securities. The amount of federal debt held by other 
government accounts actually increased more than the amount of 
debt held by the Federal Reserve during the 1965-1969 period. From 
December 1965 to December 1969, total federal debt increased by 
$47,3 billion. The Fed's holdings increased by $16.4 billion, the private 
sector increased its holdings by $1.5 billion, and other government 
agencies increased their holdings by $29.3 billion14. This fact diminishes 
the potentially anti-inflationary impact of increased social insurance 
taxes.
In fact, the contribution of the federal trust funds surpluses 
helped to finance increased war spending. When the Fed lends to the 
Treasury, it creates money. When other federal agencies lend funds to 
the Treasury, it does not directly create money because it merely 
transfers purchasing power from the public to the Treasury. However, 
if the receipts were withheld from circulation, it could have a 
contractionary effect on the money supply. Walker and Vatter present 
data to show that the possible monetary impacts of the war were 
minimal and that there was no excessive money creation in the 
escalation period15. In addition to their neglect of the increase in 
federal debt held by government agencies other than the Fed, the 
data on the growth of the money supply could be interpreted in a 
different way. From 1960 to 1964, the money supply had been 
increasing at an annual rate of less than 3 percent. However, with an 
increasing federal debt, the rate of increase of M1 accelerated to 4.7 
percent in 1965. In 1966, as a result of a Fed decision to tighten up on 
monetary policy in response to the inflationary effects of the war, M 1 
grew at a rate of only 2.5 percent. When the Fed's attempt at 
contraction was abandoned, money supply growth took off to rates of 
6.6 percent in 1967 and 7.7 percent in 196816.
Walker and Vatter also argue that federal non-defense 
purchases helped to reduce the inflationary impact of the war because
54 Vietnam Generation
they decreased as a percent of GNP during the escalation. Regardless 
of the period of escalation, they are correct. But the contribution to 
reduced aggregate demand was minimal, the GNP share of federal 
non-defense purchases decreased from 2.6 percent to 2.4 percent — 
a 7.7 percent fa ll in its share, whereas the share of defense purchases 
increased during the war buildup by 28.2 percent.
There is one additional factorthat must be analyzed in assessing 
the inflationary impact of the war: the role of wartime economic 
policy, or, rather, the failure of economic policymakers to institute any 
effective constraints on aggregate demand. As Keith M. Carlson, 
writing in the Federal Reserve BankofSt. Louis Reviewin February 1967, 
pointed out:
At times of high employment and near-capacity levels of 
output, a resource transfer from civilian to military use is 
normally effected by either tax Increases or a system of 
Government controls. Neither route was followed with respect 
to the Vietnam buildup in late 1965 and 1966. Instead a price 
mechanism was utilized to effect the resource transfer, l.e., 
the Federal Government bid away goods and services from 
civilian use for the war effort.
Overall price Increases thus operated as a silent tax 
In the absence of more restrictive fiscal or monetary actions'7.
The question thus becomes: what was the economic policy response 
to the war and why did it fail?
The Economic Policy Failure During the War
There are two questions relevant to an assessment of economic 
policy during the war. One concerns the awareness of policymakers 
to the inflationary effects of the war. The other concerns the lack of an 
effective policy to counter those impacts. Both economic theory and 
history suggest that wars induce inflation. In all its previous wars, the 
United States adopted a variety of measures to dampen inflation. 
These have included increased individual and corporate income 
taxes, excise taxes, wage and price controls, and rationing18.
In the case of the Vietnam War, there was a failure to adopt 
appropriate and sufficient wartime policies to reduce inflationary 
pressures. Th isfa ilu rew asp rim arilya resu lto fthepo litic so fthew ar. The 
war escalated slowly and was initially referred to as the Vietnam 
“conflict*. Initial cost estimates for the war were outrageously low. 
President Johnson was reluctant to engage in a public debate about 
economic restraint due to the war and, concurrently, about the war 
itself. Furthermore, Johnson wanted to preserve his commitment to the
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Great Society from any budget restraint associated with increased 
spending for the war19.
The war began without a formal declaration. The administration 
introduced increased numbers of troops into Vietnam gradually. And 
it consistently underestimated war costs in its budget submissions to 
Congress. Johnson decided on a path of slow escalation, but one 
which included flexibility20. During Fiscal Years 1965,1966,and 1967,the 
original budget requests for the war were eventually exceeded by 
more than 100 percent in supplemental requests for funds21. Since 
there was no 'w a r' and since the original requests fo r funds did not 
foresee a massive increase in spending for the war, the Johnson 
administration did not need to introduce any comprehensive wartime 
economic policy measures.
Nevertheless.there were a number of responses to the increased 
inflationary pressures brought about by prosperity and the effect of the 
Vietnam escalation. Table 6 contains a summary of policy measures or 
proposals to restrain demand in the economy from 1965 through 1968. 
One of the first instances of an administration concern with the 
inflationary effects of the war was a December 1965 CEA 
recommendation to Johnson that he consider a tax increase to help 
pay for the war22. But Johnson refused because he d idn't want to 
adopt wartime economic measures for fear of touching off a debate 
on the war of losing some of his Great Society programs23. Throughout 
the remainder of 1966 and 1967, mild policies of restraint were utilized. 
Johnson relied on the CEA's wage-price guideposts and patriotic 
appeals to dampen inflationary wage and price movements. 
Scheduled reductions in federal excise taxes on telephone service and 
automobiles were rescinded and collections of some federal taxes 
were accelerated. In his Economic Report of the President for 1967, 
Johnson suggested that he might call for an income tax surtax to 
restrain the economy. Finally, in August 1967 he form ally proposed a 10 
percent surcharge on income taxes. Congressional hearings were 
held on this proposal in August, September, and November 1967 and 
in January 1968. In these hearings, virtually all of the administration 
officials and others who testified acknowledged the responsibility of 
the war in making the surtax necessary. But the proposal stalled over 
congressional desires to cut non-defense federal spending and 
Johnson's unwillingness to compromise over his Great Society programs. 
In early 1968,the economic environment deteriorated with accelerating 
inflation, a massive increase in the budget deficit, and an international 
monetary crisis. At this point, congressional leaders and administration 
officials worked out a compromise that called for the income tax 
surcharge in return for a commitment to cut non-defense federal
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T A blE  6
E conomic Policy R esponses to  t Iie  Im pact of ThE Vietnam  W ar,
1969 to  1968
Date Policy Action
December 1965 Federal Reserve raises discount rate from 4% to 4 1/2%.
January 1966
Council of Economic Advisers sends tax Increase request 
to Johnson, which he rejects.
President Johnson proposes accelerated corporate and 
individual Income tax collections and a revision of the 
scheduled eliminations of the federal automobile and
March 1966
telephone excise taxes.
Johnson holds meetings with Congressional and business 
leaders In which they back his reluctance to raise taxes to 
finance the war.
September 1966 Federal Reserve sends letter to commercial banks urging 
restraint In business loans.
Johnson announces restraint on federal non-defense 
spending and requests a 16 month suspension of the 7% 
investmenttax credit and of accelerated depreciation on 
business construction.
Fall 1966 Administration falls to release a Midyear Review of the
January 1967
Budget.
Johnson proposes a 6%Income tax surcharge on corporate 
and Individual Income.
March 1967 Johnson requests the relnstltution of the 7% Investmenttax 
credit.
August 1967 Johnson firms up his tax surcharge request and asks for a 
10% surcharge on Income taxes.
January 1968 Johnson proposes broad series of measures to directly 
control Increasingly difficult balance of payments 
problems.
March 1968 Johnson holds another series of meetings with business 
leaders In which the economic Impact of the war is more 
forthrightly discussed than previously.
Johnson with draws from the approaching 1968 Presidential 
election and announces steps to negotiate an end to the 
war.
June 1968 Congress finally enacts the 10% income tax surcharge to 
help finance the Increasing costs of the war.
Sources: Economic Report o f the President. 1965 to 1970; and, Riddell, A P o litlc d  
Econom y o f the Am erican W ar In Indo-Chlna: 333-334.
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spending by $6 billion in the FY1969 budget. The surtax fina lly became 
law on June 28,1968.
Some measures of economic restraint were used during the 
escalation period, but they were inadequate. Why? The war was 
escalated slow ly and by stealth. W ithin the adm inistration, there were 
predictions and plans fo r a much longer and costlier war. Yet, in public, 
the posture was confidence in a contained, successful and "cheap* 
conflict. As Johnson himself quotes one of his major advisers, McGeorge 
Bundy, in his memoirs: "A t its very best the struggle in Vietnam w ill be 
long. Itseem sim portanttousthatthisfundam enta lfact be made clear 
and our understanding of it made clear to our own people.... fTjhere 
is no shortcut to success in Vietnam. *M This evaluation of the reality of 
US involvement in Vietnam and where it was likely to lead was not 
shared with the public (at least not until the publication of the Pentagon 
Papers). Consequently, there was no public reason to ask fo r typical 
wartime economic measures. The lack of adequate economic policy 
measures and a war stim ulus that was larger and would last longerthan 
was admitted in public went hand in hand. As W alter Heller (Chair of 
the Council of Economic Advisers during the Kennedy adm inistration) 
has put it, there was “an unwillingness to loose the flood of debate on 
Vietnam for which a tax proposal would provide the tempting 
occasion'25. And Lyndon Johnson wanted very much to protect his 
Great Society:
We are a rich nation and can afford to make progress at 
home while meeting our obligations abroad — In fact, we 
can afford no other course if we are to remain strong. For this 
reason, I have not halted progress In new and vital Great 
Society programs In order to finance the costs o f our efforts In 
Southeast Asia26.
Throughout 1965,1966, and 1967, it would be guns and butter 
both. Not until late 1967 and 1968 did the debate about the war and 
wartime economic policy get the public airing it deserved given the 
economic impacts of the war. In fact. Johnson him self reaped the 
harvest of secrecy when he renounced the Presidency in March 1968 
as a result of the political and economic ramifications of his conduct 
of the war.
Charles Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget during 
the Johnson adm inistration, summarized th is policy fa ilure in 
congressional testim ony in 1970 on the economic effects of the war:
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... our earlier inflation Is in part due to the fact that we wouldn't 
cover the financial costs of the war In taxes and finally In turn, 
one of the reasons we wouldn't cover the financial cost of the 
war in taxes was because It was basically an unpopular war....
CDhe Inflation that we are trying to stop originated from a 
combination of the Vietnam war on the one hand and our 
political inability to finance it on the other27.
The Vietnam Warstimulated inflation in the mid- and late-1960s. 
This result was a combination of the economic Impact of the war, the 
state of the economy at the time, the manner in which the war was 
financed, and the conduct of economic policy. Given the structure of 
the economy and the institutional power of large corporations and 
labor unions .this inflation produced further cost-push sources of inflation. 
This inflationary experience laid the foundation for the increased 
difficulties with inflation in the 1970s — the price-wage spiral, the 
productivity crisis, energy price increases, excessive monetary growth 
and easy credit, and so on.
ConcIu s Ion
Walker and Vatter concluded in their analysis that the Vietnam 
War was an “economically trivial event' and posed the question of 
what the effect would be if the nation really engaged in a massive 
military escalation. “The profession needs to tell the nation that the 
economic barrier to war, its appalling economic costs, has been 
destroyed by the tremendous size of our economy. Consequently, 
we'd better erect stronger political and social barriers or we will have 
more w a r.'28
I have shown that the Vietnam War was by no means a trivial 
economic event. It increased the percentage of the nation's resources 
going to defense purposes by only 2 percent of GNP, but it also lasted 
for almost a decade and cost the Treasury almost $150 billion. It 
induced accelerated inflation. The nation continues to bear the 
economic costs of that war in interest payments on the debt incurred 
during the war, programs for Vietnam veterans, and lost output from 
disabled and disoriented veterans. There were and are economic 
burdens of the Vietnam War — to go along with the political, social, 
and cultural upheavals it unleashed in the United States in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It is a lesson that economists bear a responsibility for 
sharinglt is also a lesson that has relevance to the current massive 
peacetime military buildup of the Reagan administration Through 
FY1990, this escalation calls for military spending of almost $2.7 trillion29. 
The defense share of GNP w ill increase from 5.6 percent to 7.1 percent 
ofGNP. Butthat 1.5 percentshare of GNPinvolvesa significant amount
Inflationary Impact 59
of spending and the opportunity cost is always the other things that 
those resources could have been used for — education, tax cuts, 
public works projects, job training programs, etc. There is still a choice 
between guns and butter. Toarguethatthisbuildupistrivia lm inim alizes 
the burden that it places on the country's resources. The revisionist 
position on the economic effects of the Vietnam War also feeds into 
recent attempts to undermine the "Vietnam syndrom e' and to pursue 
more aggressive interventionist foreign and military policies like those 
of the Reagan administration in Central America and the Middle East. 
Walker and Vatter are correct to urge strong political and social 
barriers to the pursuit of war. But US citizens also need to be aware of 
the substantial economic burdens associated with military buildups in 
times of war and peace.
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In Cold Blood: Vietnam iN TEXTbooks
DAvid IM. B erm a n
iNTROduCTlON
In May 1967, in the central highlands southwest of Pleiku, 7200 
Jarai tribesmen were moved from eighteen villagesacrossthe la Drang 
Valley into the Edap Enang resettlement center. Their former home 
became part of an enormous free fire zone. By the end of the war in 
1975 approximately one-third of the one million Montagnards, com­
prising at least thirty different tribal groups including the Jarai, and 
inhabiting almost one-half the land area of South Vietnam, were 
casualties of that war. 85 percent of their villages were destroyed, 
abandoned, or forcibly evacuated'. No textbook examined in the 
following study even mentions the existence of indigenous tribal popu­
lations in Vietnam.
In March 1968, in the village of Son My, located in Quang Ngai 
province, American soldiers slaughtered between 400 and 570 civilians 
in what has erroneously become known as the My Lai massacre2. This 
atrocity was apparently not unique: "By the time the Americans 
departed more than one million South Vietnamese civilians had been 
war casualties, with approximately 200000 killed and 500,000 seriously 
wounded by either allied or communist action'3. Of the sixteen texts 
examined in this study which were published after the assault on Son 
My, only fw oreferto the “My Lai massacre' while only s/xof the 22 make 
any reference at all to civilian casualties.
In January 1971, Kerry Ryan was bom to Maureen and Michael 
Ryan. She had 22 birth defects, including two vaginas, two cervixes, 
two uteruses, four ovaries, and no rectum. In March 1979, almost 
twelve years after Michael returned from Vietnam, and some eight 
years after the birth of their daughter, the Ryans, along with nineteen 
other couples, filed a class action suit on behalf of “all 2.8 million 
veterans who served in Vietnam ' against six American manufacturers 
of defoliants and herbicides sprayed in South Vietnam. The suit was 
eventually settled out of court for $ 180 million dollars4. While “attorneys 
estimated that as many as 400X1 veterans may eventually become ill 
or die from effects' of toxic herbicides, more than 200,000 claims for 
injuries were filed under the settlement including “60,000 claims of birth 
defects among veterans' children and 24,000 miscarriages by veter­
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ans' w ives'5. No textbook examined in this study published after 1972 
mentioned Kerry Ryan, and no textbook published after 1979 men­
tioned the class action suit. Of the 22 textbooks reviewed, only one 
mentioned veterans poisoned by dioxin, American and Vietnamese 
children born with birth defects, or aerial spraying of toxic chemicals 
during the war.
Textbooks do not mention the Iron Triangle, orthe Ho Bo Woods, 
orthe Street Without Joy. They do not discuss the strategies of generals, 
the tactics of field commanders, the “pacification' programs devised 
by Diem and his American supporters. They studiously avoid the topic 
of the CIA, orthe role that organization played in fighting and funding 
the war. They neglect to explain the secret bombing and land 
operations in neutral Laos and Cambodia. They fail to discuss the legal 
questions of American intervention, orthe decisions of the World Court. 
They decline to concern themselves with Vietnamese prewar and 
wartime culture, or to explain the wet rice farming techniques of 
lowland villages and the slash and burn cycle of highland tribes. They 
do not consider the 1.2 million ethnic Chinese, the Khmers, and the 
Chams of Vietnam to be worth notice. They do, however, occasionally 
report casualty statistics — American casualties, both dead and 
wounded, and sometimes even the casualties of our South Vietnam­
ese allies (though the casualties of the international forces, the Kore­
ans, the Australians, the New Zealanders, and the Thais, go unnoted). 
More rarely still, there appear casualty figures for Vietnamese civilians, 
NLF and NVA fighters.
Many of the most important aspects of the war are ignored or, 
at best, treated in a blatantly superficial manner. Textbooks present 
the events of the Vietnam War without connecting casualty statistics 
to their human costs, and thus ultimately obscure their impact and 
effect. “We fought the Vietnam War “in cold blood,' Colonel Harry G. 
Summers, Jr. has written.
This cold-blooded approach to war was not unintentional. It 
was an outgrowth of the limited war theories that reduced 
war to an academic model. As we go back and read the 
writings of the political scientists and systems analysts on 
limited war, they are noteworthy for their lack of passion. The 
horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of the battlefield 
are remarkably absent.... The academics could be excused 
for this omission, but we in the military knew better. It was the 
Job of those of us who had seen war firsthand to add this 
missing dimension to their academic theories6.
Can academics really be excused for “this om ission'? When we 
reduce warfare to a theoretical model we conceal its violence from
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our students, some of whom will go on to fight the next war, ignorant of 
its costs. Academics treat Vietnam as a limited war, for which limited 
coverage is appropriate. Remarkable for its 'lack of passion,' our 
educational writings on the war are consistent with the political tone of 
textbooks 'su ita b le ' for distribution to high school students whose 
minds are in the process of being shaped to inherit the ideology of the 
patriotic American community.
The narratives of the Vietnam War which appear in textbooks 
are the results of a process of remaking history in the image of the myths 
upon which a culture depends. The image of this war was frequently 
more important than the reality. Inthewordsof John Heilman: 'American 
leadership would most consistently define the war in Vietnam as a test 
of American' w ill', in effect a symbolic war in which the true terrain was 
the American character and the ultimate stakes world history.' 7 South­
east Asia, like other earlier 'frontie rs'
became symbolic landscapes, separate yet connected, 
possessing a moral geography in which Americans perceived 
themselves achieving their identity and working out their 
special destiny... When they thought about Indochina, 
Americans generally saw themselves entering yet another 
frontier, once again 'western pilgrims' on a mission of 
protection and progress*.
Ourethnocentrism blinded us so that we could not discern the political 
landscape of Vietnam, its long history of nationalistic revolt, its aversion 
to China. Instead, we asked the wrong questions: 'How  was it possible 
for the Vietnamese to fail to realize that the ideas of Democracy and 
God are more important than life ? '9
National mythology justifies the war in Vietnam as a war for a 
noble cause; but this mythology is unable to encompass the savage 
and painful conflict in which American sons died inglorious deaths for 
obscure reasons. Texts which prefer to deal in comfortable myths, and 
thus fail to confront the political and cultural realities of Vietnam must 
also fail to question the fundamental premises upon which the war was 
fought. Questioning premises, of course, is not what texts are for: 
general texts support the mythology which is accepted by our local 
communities as an ideal for enculturating our children in local public 
schools. History of a Free People10, America: The Glorious Republic1 
or The American Dream12 — the titles themselves couched in the 
romance of the American myth — can hardly be expected to deal 
honestly with the pain and torment of the Vietnam War.
The intent of this essay is to explore these texts in terms of their 
failure to confront 'the  horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of 
the battlefield'.  I w ill examine the methods by which they conceal the
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“missing dimension' of the Vietnam War from the adolescents for 
whom these texts are written. I hope to accomplish this at the expense 
of the national mythology which serves as the foundation for social 
studies education at the secondary level in the American public 
schools.
P revio us STudiEs
In an article on textbooks and Vietnam, Dan B. Fleming and 
Ronald J. Nurse suggest that “the changing perspective of a nation 
and its people over time is mirrored in the writing of history', and they 
proceed to examine ten US history texts published in the late 1970s vis­
a-vis early 1970s texts to support this view13. Fleming and Nurse admit 
that these texts “offer a too sketchy account of the Vietnam War' but 
suggest that their deficiencies are not the result of “distortion, dishon­
esty, inaccuracy, or bias'. Rather, they assert, “the neglect of certain 
key topics' is part of a normal selection process which can be “ex­
plained, in part, by the limitations of space available to the authors, 
which is an inherent problem for all survey textbooks'14. In a similar 
article published six years later, the authors review another twelve texts 
published between 1982 and 1986 and note an “improved treatment 
of the war in Vietnam.... Just as the American public appears to be 
taking a new look at the war in Vietnam, so history textbooks seem 
gradually to be presenting a new ’t ru th ". They remark once again that 
“because of space limitations, survey texts seldom satisfy anyone in the 
depth of the coverage of a specific topic', suggesting that teachers 
need supplementary materials to teach Vietnam15.
An earlier analysis of 28 high school textbooks and their treat­
ment of the Vietnam War by William L. Griffen and John Marciano 
proposes, however, that the “neglect of certain key topics' is a 
product of other than natural selection, and that such choices prede­
termine the perspective a student will take on the Vietnam War. Griffen 
and Marciano direct their work “to all Americans who at some time in 
their schooling become miseducated by dishonest textbooks and do 
not want more of the same visited on their children'15 They take as their 
subject the process by which “the Vietnam War was explained to 
American students'17, and they suggest that “through their pretensions 
of neutrality and objectivity and through their suppression of data and 
alternative views, textbooks further the hegemonic process by estab­
lishing the ’parameters which define what is legitimate, reasonable, 
practical, good, true and beautifu l"18. Griffen and Marciano assert 
that the
twenty-eight textbooks examined the most bitter conflict in
recent American history without calling Into question a single
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fundamental premise surrounding the conflict.... American 
hlgh-school students, teachers, and parents could read these 
textbooks without considering the possibility that they lived In 
a nation that had committed the most blatant act of 
aggression since the Nazi Invasions of World War 2” .
Though Fleming and Nurse are correct in asserting that space 
limitations prevent the author from addressing all important aspects of 
the Vietnam War in a text, they seriously underestimate the importance 
of paying attention to exactly which key topics the author chooses to 
"neglect'. This essay will explore the question of the "truths' presented 
in textbooks, and attempt to explain the nature of the "distortion, 
dishonesty, inaccuracy' which Nurse and Fleming dismiss. The truths in 
these texts are presented within a cultural context; they are so deeply 
rooted in the American ideal that the fundamental questions which 
can be raised to test the validity of this ideal go unasked. These texts 
are often misleading in regard to political events and historical devel­
opments, as Griffen and Marciano have noted. The textual narratives 
which will form the basis of the students' knowledge about the Vietnam 
War universally fail to acknowledge the human cost of warfare. When 
the horror, bloodshed, and destruction of the battlefield are absent, 
the premises which involved us in that controversial war go unchal­
lenged. "In short, integrity in the search for truth is not the aim of the 
textbook business. Profit is the aim, and profit, when you are serving a 
quasi-monopoly, is made by satisfying bureaucrats and politicians and 
by offending as few vocal and organized interests as possible.'20
There are good books about Vietnam that "make the imper­
sonal economic and political convolutions of Vietnamese history 
understandable, they always draw the reader back to the man on the 
ground who has to live with the consequences of those forces'2'. It is 
the failure of textbooks to make this very connection — between the 
analysis of political and historical events and the consequences of 
these events for the American and Vietnamese "man on the ground' 
— which deprives textbooks of life and realism, a choice made by 
publishers in a premeditated fashion. "(Bernard) Fall's books (about 
Vietnam) remain popular with American soldiers today because they 
ring true,' writes Kirkpatrick22. This essay presents the conclusions of an 
analysis of 22 US history textbooks and theirfailure to “ ring true '; a failure 
which suggests that the reality of warfare in general, and in Vietnam in 
particular, is diluted for consumption by high school students because 
academicians are more interested in creating a political and historical 
approach consistent with a curricular pattern organized in the effi­
ciency model than they are with presenting stimulating narratives of 
the Vietnam War. The efficiency model promotes organizational
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stability, efficiency, and propriety of the community, the school, and 
the classroom at the expense of controversy and creativity. Teaching 
the Vietnam War in any critical manner could lead students to chal­
lenge community ideals, and thus disrupt the orderly dispensation of 
knowledge from teacher to student. Textbooks, seen within this con­
text, represent the imposition of a particular political and historical 
framework upon the reality of warfare as seen in human terms. “In most 
texts,' wrote Frances FitzGerald, “the reporting on the (Vietnam) war is 
no more accurate than their predictions about it were... the texts are 
neither hawkish or dovish on the war — they are simply evasive.'23
Text books, H me, an<J V ietnam
The organizational framework of both course and text is the 
curricular block of the unit or chapter heading: “The American 
Revolution', “The Civil W ar', “World War T ,  “World War 2 '. Wars are 
often the chronological benchmarks by which time is measured and 
topics are organized. Vietnam — a “limited w ar' — seldom achieves 
the status of unit or chapter heading, and is relegated to sub-units or 
sub-paragraphs. In the text America is{ 1984), mention of Vietnam can 
be found in the large unit called "Change', under the chapter 
heading of “Years of Hope and Tension', under the section heading 
“The Strain of Intervention'24. Our Land. Our Time (1985) places 
Vietnam in a unit called "New American Frontiers', in a chapter titled 
“The Vigorous Sixties', under a section heading entitled “Vietnam 
Involvement'25.
A People and a Nation (1981), features a section entitled "The 
Disaster in Vietnam'. This section is part of a chapter entitled ‘An Age 
of Crisis' which in turn is a part of a unit entitled “Crisis'. "C risis' spans 
the post-World War 2 era through the Carter administration. The 
“Disaster' section is five pages long, and includes over two pages on 
the antiwar movement and the 1968 Presidential election, complete 
with pictures and maps26. The Paris Peace Talks and the fall of South 
Vietnam are treated in the following section on foreign policy27. A 
People and a Nation avoids discussion of the nature of the war, and 
offers the student only the statement that “people disliked a war so 
prolonged, so costly, so unsuccessful, so ruthless and dirty, whose 
dreadful consequences they could see projected nightly on televi­
sion '28. If the reader is curious about the nature of those “dreadful 
consequences', he or she will find little food for the imagination. The 
text is deliberately vague and general, perhas so that the student 
cannot read, see, or feel just how “ruthless and dirty' the war was.
In a text called Our American Heritage (1983), the unit contain­
ing mention of the Vietnam War is entitled ‘Change and Continuity in 
America'. Chapter headings in this unit include ‘The Cold War and
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Beyond'. “Domestic Affairs 1945-1960', and “Only Yesterday: The 
1960s to Today'. A sub-section entitled “From the Vietnam War to the 
Present' is part of the “Cold War' chapter and occupies slightly over 
three pages29. 'From the Vietnam War to the Present' is similar in 
content to the “Disaster' section in A People and a Nation. The text 
explains that “one principle of American strategy during the cold war 
was to avoid a land war on the vast Asian continent (but) as cold war 
tensions eased in the 1960s, the United States departed from this 
principle — with disastrous results'30. The disaster is defined strictly in 
political terms: “Vietnam was finally united and independent, but 
under Communist control'31.
Designed for middle and junior high school students, America 
Is discusses Vietnam in a four page sub-section called the “Buildup in 
Vietnam'. The text contains an undated map of the “War in Vietnam' 
with a main United States supply route extending from Quinhon (sic) 
along the central Vietnamese coast. Another sub-section entitled 
“The Search for Peace,' describes the consequences of the war:
the last American troops left Vietnam. But the war there still 
went on. While many Americans were saddened by this, they 
were glad the United States was out of the war. During Its 
Involvement, some 46,000 Americans had been killed, and 
more than 300X100 others had been wounded32.
The student who sought to understand the reasons for the loss of 
American lives in Vietnam would find only this passage to justify our 
involvement:
In August 1964, after an attack on American warships by 
North Vietnamese gunboats... the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution... 
allowed the President, as commander In chief, to use any 
measures necessary to halt an attack on American forces, 
stop North Vietnamese aggression, and aid any SEATO 
member who asked for help In defending Its freedom33.
While America Is does note the existence of a difference of 
opinion between hawks and doves, and describes some protests 
against the war, it still presents the American role in the Vietnam War as 
unquestionably defensive, waged against “a group of Vietnamese 
communists called the Vietcong (sic) who were well established in 
South Vietnam'34. Students are provided with no opposing viewpoints; 
they are intended to accept the premise that the United States was 
legitimately defending the cause of freedom by putting a stop to 
Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. When the antiwar move­
ment is described, the context of the discussion is framed by the
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premise that the war is just, and that the ideology upon which the 
intervention was based is justified as well.
The texts of the 1960s foreshdow the arguments of the texts of 
the 1980s. American texts take a consistent approach to Vietnam, 
failing to address significant issues of foreign policy, ideology, and 
social convention. They are united by the chauvenism which gener­
ates rationalizations in order to justify US involvement in Vietnam. “To 
have been an editor of one of the mass-market texts in the mid-sixties 
must have been a nightmare... because of the Vietnam War,' writes 
FitzGerald. “The problem for editors then was to find a compromise 
formula that would not offend anyone, when there was no compro­
mise position and no way to avoid the whole subject. ' 3S The editors of 
such texts deliberately sought the lowest common denominator, and, 
in the process, managed to avoid portraying the war in a manner 
which cast doubt on American myths. Though these 1960s texts 
included brief narratives of our involvement in Vietnam, they failed to 
question anyfundamental premises. Even when cataloging the voices 
of dissent, these texts fail to examine the legitimacy of the arguments 
of antiwar protestors, or to explore some of the more unsavory conse­
quences of American involvement in Vietnam.
In 1966, when the number of American troops had reached 
200,000, Land of the Free failed even to mention Vietnam36, while The 
Making of Modem America devoted only four paragraphs on three 
separate pages to the subject37. The Making of Modern America 
provides the following narrative of the Vietnam War: “North Vietnam­
ese Communists aided guerrilla forces in South Vietnam in an effort to 
overthrow the pro-Western government.... The United States in turn' 
sent 10,000 support personnel because, “in the opinion of President 
Kennedy, the preservation of the independence of South Vietnam was 
one of the 'vital interests' of the United States.'38 Eventually, “American 
ground forces took a more active part in fighting the Communist 
guerrillas,' while “President Johnson repeatedly expressed a willing­
ness to enter into 'unconditional discussions'. But the North Vietnam­
ese government insisted on complete withdrawal of American forces 
before any discussions could take place.'39
Rise of the American Nation (1966) devotes a portion of two 
pages to Vietnam and offers a somewhat more detailed, as well as 
more balanced, discussion of the war. Nevertheless, this text also falls 
easily into the rhetoric of the era when it notes that “over and over 
again the President urged North Vietnam's leaders to cease their 
aggressive actions and to meet around a conference table. 'We 
remain ready... for unconditional discussion"60. History of a Free 
Peopled 1967) notes that “President Johnson... repeatedly made public 
offers of negotiation.... But Ho Chi Minh, president of North Vietnam,
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made the impossible condition that the United States withdraw all 
troops before negotiations could begin'41. The American Nation 
(1966), spending less than a paragraph on the escalating war in 
Vietnam, asserts that "some diplomatic accommodation was desir­
able,' perhaps because “the mere mass of the Chinese — 700 million 
persons — seemed to compel their recognition, in the formal diplo­
matic sense and in the larger sense of coming to grips with their 
significance'42. In other words, Vietnam was to be understood within 
the context of cold war politics: “the implacable hostility of the ever- 
more-powerful Chinese communists (now masters of the atom) loomed 
like a thunderhead in the heavens, a constant threat to the free 
world...' and to Vietnam43.
By the end of 1966 the number of American troops in Vietnam 
had reached 400,000, with a casualty toll of about 5,000 Americans 
killed and 16,000 Americans wounded. The impact of the war was, by 
then, felt in at least one textbook. History: USA( 1967) devoted two full 
pages to Vietnam under a section entitled “Shadows from Abroad 
Cloud the Visions of a Great Society'44. In hindsight, the most remark­
able inclusion in this text are the casualty figures: 1,484 KIAs with 7,337 
wounded by January 1 1966. These figures are absent in most other 
texts, even by the 1980s. And the text makes a gesture in the direction 
of exposing the complexity of the American war in Vietnam by includ­
ing a statement made by one general, who said that “ 'a soldier has to 
be much more than a man with a rifle.... He has to be part diplomat, 
part technician, part politician — and 100% a human be ing"45. If this 
assertion had been companioned by an explication of the difficulties 
of fighting a war in an alien environment, and of working with a 
population whose language and ways are not comprehensible, some 
good questions might have been raised. But the next sentence denies 
complexity and appropriates the general's meaning: “... put another 
way, the object of American policy in Vietnam was to help the South 
Vietnamese people hold off the communist invader from the north, 
while enabling them to work toward the establishment of a sound and 
effective political system....
Meanwhile, the very presence of a huge US military buildup In 
the poverty-stricken nation was providing a dramatic boost 
to the local economy and significant progress toward 
eradication of the ancient lllsof hunger, disease, and Illiteracy.
Should America succeed In this venture, the people of South 
Vietnam could well be launched toward their own form of a 
great society46.
Underneath the quoted passage, on the very last page of the 
text, is a section entitled “An American Soldier in Vietnam', which
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includes a picture and a citation for Pfc. Milton Lee Olive III, who threw 
himself on a grenade and was posthumously awarded the Congres­
sional Medal of Honor. A section on the previous page, entitled ’GIs 
Around the W orld ', explained that ’the American Gl was indeed a 
world traveler, and his presence either at home or abroad was clear 
evidence of America's intention to use the full force of its resources in 
the cause of freedom and national security'47. Olive is connected, by 
the text, to an American warrior tradition; he was in Vietnam because 
the communists simply would not listen to reason: ’ President Johnson 
offered to meet Communist leaders ’anywhere in the world' to arrange 
a cease fire in Vietnam, but his appeals fell on deaf ears. He also 
offered to launch a one billion dollar ’Marshall Plan for Southeast Asia,' 
but the Communists gave him no encouragement.'48
What is striking about the texts of 1966 and 1967 is not their 
inability to accurately report on facts and events in the public domain, 
but their remarkable facility for obscuring the significance of the 
escalation, as well as their failure to question the purpose of that 
escalation. The information necessary to construct a critical inquiry into 
the war was certainly available — the casualty figures in the Allen and 
Betts' text attest to that. The insistence of these texts that increasing 
American involvement in Vietnam would have as its chief effect the 
provision of "a dramatic boost to the local economy' resulting in a 
Vietnamese “great society' reflects a refusal to deal with difficult 
issues. American insistence on imposing its own image upon ’a world 
qualitatively different from its own'49 is indicative of the ethnocentrism 
with which we often approach the Vietnam War — as it was fought, 
and as it is taught.
The 1960s texts reviewed in this paper rationalize .without ex­
ception, American involvement in Vietnam as a legitimate enterprise; 
they view it within the context of the Cold War era, and accept that 
intervention was necessary to contain communist expansion. These 
texts were read by young American men who were soon on their way 
to fight in Vietnam; young men who should have been exposed to 
argument over the complex issues that the war revolved around, so 
that they could make intelligent and informed decisions about their 
involvement in that war. But crucial information was withheld from 
them because it did not reflect the mythology of equality and justice 
which pervaded these textbooks at the expense of the scholarship or 
real argument.
Men from lower to middle income families, who were high 
school dropouts, or high school graduates without college educations 
were much more likely to serve in the military, to serve in Vietnam, and 
to see combat action than their better educated, wealthier peers50. 
The likelihood of military service in Vietnam decreased as income and
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education increased. In his detailed study of Pittsburgh area Vietnam 
War casualties, for example, Thomas Richard McIntyre documents 
that, during the escalation phase of the war,
casualty status was largely confined to areas marked by 
lower to middle Income levels, normal educational 
achievement levels and predominantly blue collar 
employment. In short, such data would apparently confirm 
the distinctive 'working class' character of the casualty 
profile associated with America's Ill-fated Vietnam War effort61.
In the deescalation phase, marked by a declining attrition rate, ’the 
social demography of the casualty distribution remained virtually 
unchanged despite pronounced changes in strategy*. Vietnamiza- 
tion "did not reallocate the diminished combat burden more equita­
bly.... It was still lower and working class American troops, albeit fewer 
of them, who suffered the more severe risks of combat....'52.
Among this generation, fighting for one’s country was not a 
source of pride; it was misfortune. Going to Vietnam was the 
penalty for those who lacked the wherewithal to avoid It....
Poorly educated, low-income whites and poorly educated 
low-income blacks together bore a vastly disproportionate 
share of the burdens of Vietnam53.
Texts address (or fail to address) these issues in various ways. The 
Free and the Brave (1977) explains that "most of those who did serve 
were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one,* describing a 
system which allows men of eighteen to go to war, but does not 
consider them "old enough to vote*. The text admits that "antiwar 
protesters pointed out that this was unfair,* but is quick to detract from 
their credibility by stating that these same protesters enjoyed the luxury 
of dissent while others served in their places in Vietnam54. As the men 
from Vietnam "started coming home, the American people tried to 
heal the wounds caused by the conflict,* insists The Free and the 
Brave55. Under a heading entitled "Aggression in Vietnam,' America: 
ItsPeople and Values^ 1975) states that "theVietCong received weap­
ons and supplies from Communist North Vietnam, from Communist 
China, and from the Soviet Union,* noting that President Kennedy 
faced a tough decision because "the United States had promised to 
help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist attack*56. This 
text neglects to discuss, in the following section entitled "American 
Troops in Vietnam*, the fundamental inequity in the composition of 
troop units; nor is there any mention of the casualties taken by these 
units in defense of "American national security*. The Pageant of
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American History (1975) declares that as the situation worsened in 
1967, "more draftees were sent to Vietnam'57. But there is no discussion 
of the racial or class composition of these troops, and never a mention 
of draft programs such as Project 100X00, though the text later ac­
knowledges this omission in a two-line follow-up tacked on three pages 
after the larger discussion of the war. The Pageant rather sheepishly 
admits that "the draft itself was upsetting the lives and careers of the 
nation's youth,' and that "the poor, and especially the blacks, were 
too often drafted. The more fortunate college students were deferred 
until they finished their studies'58. The text neglects to mention that 
most college students missed out on Vietnam altogether. (This text also 
devotes a sentence to "the bombing and the burning — often of 
innocent women and children' during the course of the war, and 
includes a paragraph which cites the "disclosures of American atroci­
ties committed against North Vietnamese at My La i'59. This last tidbit 
moved FitzGerald to remark that the author or his editors had " in effect 
moved the village and credited Lieutenant Calley with a single­
handed invasion of North Vietnam'.)60
By the 1980s, as the war passed from contemporary event into 
history, one might have thought that texts would begin to offer serious 
reflections on Vietnam, putting forward assessments of the war's 
impact on American and Vietnamese society. But although these new 
texts offer a slightly more detailed description of the political machina­
tions of the Vietnam War era, the majority of the 1980s texts are worse 
than their predecessors in their failure to consider the human dimen­
sions and social consequences of the war in Vietnam.
These texts dutifully note American (and, occasionally Viet­
namese) casualties of war, but fail to pursue the implications of these 
casualties. The seventh edition of The American Pageant (1983) 
remarks that President Kennedy “had ordered more than 15,000 
American men into the far-off Asian slaughter pen' by the time of his 
death in 1963, and later mentions the death of 50X)00 Americans and 
the wounding 300,000 more61. But the term “slaughter pen' seems to 
have meaning only in the numbers of Americans who were injured, 
although "many Americans also felt pangs of conscience at the 
spectacle of their countrymen burning peasant huts and blistering 
civilians with ghostly (sic) napalm'62. Rather than being exposed to a 
serious treatment of the suffering of war, and an exploration of the 
context in which this suffering took place, the reader is treated to 
"cute ' section headings such as ‘Vietnam Vexations', “Vietnamizing 
the Vietnam W ar', and “Cambodianizing the Vietnam W ar'. This text 
includes the famous photograph of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the 
National Police Chief (who is referred to merely as a ‘South Vietnamese 
police chief') executing a Viet Cong soldier. The caption for this photo
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is "Justice on a Saigon Street, 1968', and the authors never bother to 
contextualize the image63.
The American Dream makes reference to "an additional 15 XXXD 
Americans (who) died in the war that was being 'V ietnam ized", 
followed by a sentence in parentheses: "(By 1971 about 51,OCX) 
Americans had died in the war.)'66 It is curious that the author of a 1980 
text failed to update the casualty figure. The mention of casualties 
other than American KIAs would also have been appropriate. Ameri­
can Adventures (1983) mentions that "more than 20,000 US troops had 
been killed' by the time of the February 1968 Tet Offensive, and then 
makes no references to Tet or post-Tet casualties of any kind65. America's 
Heritage (1986) explains that "more than 46,000 American soldiers 
were killed in combat' in a war which began when "the North 
Vietnamese began to move down into South Vietnam. They wanted 
to take control of the new republic'66.
A question might be raised about the meaning of the casualty 
figures represented in the above texts. Certainly the emphasis on 
American deaths and injuries encourages the reader to assume that 
the greatest impact of the war fell upon American participants. This 
perspective also encourages students to draw the conclusion that 
American policy issues (such as the suppression of communism) have 
a natural precedence over Vietnamese internal issues (such as civil 
war and self-determination). These casualty figures work to conserva­
tive political ends.
Even in the area of political analysis, these 1980s texts have 
failed to grow much past their 1960s predecessors. The 1982 edition of 
American History is no more sophisticated than the 1966 edition. 
American involvement in Vietnam began, according to this text, 
during "the summer of 1964' when "the former French colony of 
Vietnam was tom by w a r'67. American History fails to mention that 
Vietnam existed as a nation prior to the French occupation. The text 
continues:
Communist North Vietnam was supplying aid to pro-communist 
South Vietnamese guerrillas, who were known as the Viet 
Cong (sic). The Viet Cong had been seeking to overthrow the 
pro-American government of South Vietnam ever since 
Vietnam had been divided Into two countries In 195448.
An ideological framework is established which can support a narrative 
where Americans come to the defense of freedom-loving South 
Vietnamese who are desperately fighting off the Communist aggres­
sors: "Recent events such as the war in Korea and the Cuban missile 
crisis seemed to show that the way to check communist expansion was
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by firmness and force.'69 American History's belligerent tone is rein­
forced by the repetition of President Johnson's belief that “the fighting 
in South Vietnam was between local Vietnamese patriots and 'out­
side' communists'70. Chinese and Soviet communists, asserts the text, 
were “supplying the Viet Cong with weapons and advice, just as the 
United States was helping the anticommunist government of South 
Vietnam '71. Thus, the stage is set for a political struggle of global pro­
portions; leaving no room for discussion of the civil war taking place in 
Vietnam. According to this text, the consequences of the Vietnam War 
were the “cost of more than $ 100 billion and the lives of nearly 50,000 
Americans and a much larger number of Vietnamese'72.
“Communists Threaten South Vietnam* trumpets one section 
heading in the 1985 edition of America: The Glorious Republic. The 
sections which follow are filled with references to “highly disciplined 
Communists', and “Communist gains'. The reader learns that the 
“Communists launched surprise attacks', and that "the Communists 
paid dearly for the Tet Offensive'. The chapter review is marked by a 
section entitled “Communist Repression' in which the reader is told 
that “the repressive nature of communism was revealed by events in 
Europe and Asia ' (Czechoslovakia and China). The Vietnam War is 
framed in terms of the struggle between the Communist Menace and 
Free World73. The 1977 edition of the same text had a very similar tone. 
That edition devoted three pages to Vietnam, and featured a section 
entitled “The War in Southeast Asia ' which started with the claim that
the People's Republic of China began to challenge the 
Soviet Union for the leadership of the Communist world, the 
two countries competed for the favor of Communists In other 
nations. An area of the world In which they showed great 
Interest was Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos)...
(which) all had strong Communist parties74.
Rife with inaccurate historical claims (“The Communists (presumably 
the North Vietnamese) ... urged South Vietnamese Communists to 
revolt. These rebels called themselves the Vietcong. ') 75, the narrative 
in this text forms the basis of the history presented in the 1985 version; the 
same explanations are rehashed. In both versions the impact of the 
war on South and North Vietnamese life and culture is ignored.
There are a few texts which deal with the Vietnam War on a 
slightly more sophisticated level:
The introduction of the section on Vietnam in Rise of the 
American Nation (1982) contains the following passage: “The most 
serious problem that the United States faced between 1960 and 1980 
was a war in South Vietnam. This war had a great impact on the image
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of America around the world. It also influenced the way Americans 
perceived their own country and its role in the world.'76 This section, 
peppered with incorrect phonetic pronunciations of Vietnamese names 
(Ngo Dinh Diem as “NOH DIN DYEM' and Nguyen Van Thieu as “nuh 
WIN van TYOO'), does present the information that “the war had a 
shattering impact on all participants', citing both American and 
Vietnamese casualties. Civilians, it states, “bore the heaviest burden of 
suffering,' and it continues with the assertion that “by the end of 
1967 .civilian casualties were totaling between 100,000 and 150,000 a 
y e a r . S e v e r a l  pages later it cites the figure of 45,729 Americans killed 
in action and more than 300XXXD wounded and also includes figures on 
Vietnamese deaths: “estimates put South Vietnamese deaths at 
160,903 and those of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese at 922,295,' 
also noting that 6 million refugees were created by the war78. Rise of 
the American Nation is remarkable because it attempts to describe 
the suffering which resulted from the war, and includes statistics on 
both American and Vietnamese victims.
The Americans: The History of a People and a Nation (1982)a Iso 
stands out from the rest of the general texts. The Americans refers to the 
Vietnam War as “the longest war in US history' and explains that “the 
direct cost to the nation was 46,000 battle deaths, 300,000 wounded, 
and a price tag of about $137 million'79. There is mention of ‘42,000 
Vietcong casualties' during the Tet Offensive, and a significant section 
entitled ‘The Ground War' which refers to civilian casualties during 
search and destroy operations, the production of refugees, and the 
spraying of defoliants which ‘devastated about 20 percent of the 
landscape' and ‘ led to birth defects in Vietnamese children and in the 
children of American servicemen, as well as to liver damage, muscular 
disorders, and other health problems for the adults who were exposed 
to the chemicals'80. In the 22 textbooks reviewed, this was the only 
significant passage which referred to the use of toxic chemicals or 
dioxin poisoning.
Our Land, Our Time: A History of the United States (1985) 
devotes several pages to Vietnam, briefly citing “atrocities — some 
unintentional (such as the bombing of civilian targets), and some the 
result of soldiers cracking under the pressure of a vicious w ar' although 
it makes no mention of specific instances of atrocity, such as the Son 
My (My Lai) massacre81. In a sub-section entitled ‘Vietnam's Legacy,' 
this text discusses the tragedy of the war, although the American 
casualty figure is off by approximately 150,(XX). It is noted that ‘ proba­
bly 800,000 South Vietnamese and a comparable number of North 
Vietnamese died.' Placing these numbers in a graph, the caption 
notes that “each day during 1968, the most savage year of the war, 40 
Americanswere killed and 128wounded. And yet not one of the goals
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for which all the blood was spilled and all the money was spent was 
achieved'82. This is a unique observation in texts of this kind, and raises 
significant questions about the nature and value of patriotism, obedi­
ence , and authority. The text then points out that “veterans of the war 
were neglected and shunned, as if they were responsible for it, instead 
of being its victims'83. Despite the problematic strategy of turning 
soldiers Into “victims' (and thus according them the same status as 
Vietnamese civilian casualties or victims of atrocities), this text does 
acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, and the difficulties of readjustment for veterans after 
the war.
CONCLUSION
Some may argue that there is little room in US history texts for 
mention of Edap Enang, Son My, or Kerry Ryan. Most people believe 
that the purpose of these general texts is to survey the history of the 
nation — the political entity — which, given its scope, excludes de­
tailed treatment of human stories. But the exclusion of particular 
human stories and the inclusion of others (such as the heroic death of 
Pfc. Milton Lee Olive) creates a political framework which supports a 
particular (and not necessarily accurate) narrative of the Vietnam 
War. Vietnam is discussed in light of “the Communist Threat to South 
Vietnam'; the need for “The Tonkin Gulf Resolution'; and the wisdom 
of “Johnson's Vietnam Policies'84. The mythology which underlies 
these narratives is fundamentally incapable of encompassing a war in 
which American and soldiers fought, suffered, and died (and still 
continue to suffer) for less than noble reasons. And this mythology is 
incapable of dealing at all with the questions of Vietnamese history 
and political culture. An approach which could embrace these topics 
would lead to fundamental questions of authority and obedience to 
country, to school; in fact, to all figures of authority.
In an interview several years ago David Marr was asked a 
question about how to write about Vietnam in high school textbooks. 
He answered that “for the Vietnam war you will try to find out what are 
the most common public attitudes about the war, and you will repeat 
those in one form or another'85. A textbook written for the public 
schools cannot be expected to confront the fact that fathers, hus­
bands, and sons of the community have become casualties for no 
good reason. Textbooks, reflecting traditional cultural values, must 
present a history that can conform to “the most common public 
attitudes' even if they must rewrite events to achieve that end. They 
are noteworthy primarily because of how they choose not to deal with 
Vietnam, by their evasion, their lack of passion — their presentation of 
Vietnam in cold blood.
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Can educators be excused for this failure to face the facts? 
Next to parents, we are the primary agents by which our society 
encutturates its children. How can we justify our failure to confront the 
consequences of warfare? There is no question that texts ignore the 
"missing dimension' of the Vietnam War, and there is no legitimate 
excuse we can make for this ignorance. Frequently the evasion is 
disguised by a claim of academic objectivity, but this "objectivity' 
almost always turns out to work in support of a particular political view. 
The attempt to avoid the controversy which would enterthe classroom 
if we encouraged enlightened discussions aboutthe Vietnam War is an 
outgrowth of the political constraints placed on the comprehensive 
public school and of the cultural conditions which shape the schools in 
the community image.
The treatment of the Vietnam War In American textbooks 
serves as one of the means by which schools perform their 
larger social functions. Their most basic function Is to obtain 
an uncritical acceptanceot the presentsoclety. thus hindering 
rational analyses of conflicts such as Vietnam... the textbook 
examination of the Vietnam War Is eminently reasonable 
once we understand the role It plays in the larger social 
functions of schooling86.
It is the failure of educators to confront the community, and to 
question the role which we play in the whole of the educational system 
which results in the miseducation of our students. If we fought the 
Vietnam War in cold blood, we have taught the the Vietnam War in 
cold blood as well.
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Tw o  QuiET A mericans: T urnInq BRiTish  
L iter a tu r e  iNTO A merican P ropaqancJa
Mariam D arce F renier
On February 18, 1982, history, film, and literature met and 
merged in Ronald Reagan's description of the American decision to 
enter the Vietnam War. Echoing the platitudes of the fictional Alden 
Pyle, he stated:
If I recall correctly, when France gave up Indochina as a 
colony, the leading nations of the world met In Geneva with 
regard to helping those colonies become Independent na­
tions. ...North and South Vietnam had been, previous to 
colonization, two separate countries.... And openly, our 
country sent military advisors there to help.... And they were 
doing this. If I recall correctly, also In civilian clothes, no 
weapons, until they began being blown up where they lived 
and walking down the streets by people riding by on bicycles 
and throwing pipe bombs at them1-
As Garry Wills, Lou Cannon, and many others have pointed out, Ronald 
Reagan cannot always distinguish between movies and reality. In this 
case, Reagan's analysis seems to be shaped by too many late-night 
viewings of The Quiet American. Reagan's (probably unconscious) 
revision of history is a product of the same American tendency to 
reinterpret unpleasant realities as Joseph Mankiewicz's movie 
(sub)version of Greene's novel. In this article 1 will demonstrate the way 
in which Mankiewicz's reinterpretation of Greene mirrors American 
Cold War misinterpretations of the Vietnam conflict and of the French 
experience in Indochina.
Greene went to Vietnam during the early 1950s. The Quiet 
American was constructed from his experiences there as a newspaper 
correspondent. A converted Catholic2, his sympathies were with the 
political Left; he admired Fidel Castro and was once heard to say that, 
if forced to choose, he would prefer to live in the USSR than the US3 His 
novel examines American naivete in Vietnam in the early 1950s. 
Thomas Fowler, the novel's narrator, is a British journalist familiar with
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Saigon and the Vietnamese — obviously a proxy for the author. 
Originally published in 1956 and still in print, many critics now consider 
this the best novel about Vietnam in English.
As the novel begins, Fowlerand Phuong (Phoenix) have 
lived together for two years when the quiet American, Alden Pyle, 
stumbles into their lives4 The novel's Pyle is a well-intentioned promoter 
of a "Third Force' — Vietnamese who are neither communist nor 
collaborators. Fresh from the US, Pyle "knows' what the Vietnamese 
want and how to help them to accomplish their goals. Fowler tries to 
explain the realities of Vietnamese politics to Pyle, but Pyle cannot 
listen.
Nor can he listen when Fowler tries to explain the basis of 
Phuong's attraction to Pyle. Phuong has no understanding or interest 
in the romantic love which Pyle professes; instead, she is won over by 
Pyle's promises to take her to the United States and marry her.
In the course of his work, Pyle causes a massacre. Hopelessly 
immersed in American mythology, Pyle can only do harm, and Fowler 
decides to cooperate with the Viet Minh who wish to assassinate him. 
The French Inspector, Vigot, who investigates Pyle's murder decidedly 
concurs in Fowler's judgement of the political situation in Vietnam and 
of the quiet American. Pyle dead, Phuong gravitates back to Fowler.
The movie tells a different story. As in the novel, Fowler narrates. 
However, the movie's quiet American wins the romantic love of 
Phuong, is innocent of the murder of women and children, and repre­
sents wisdom while Fowler is the true innocent. In his naivete, the 
movie's Fowler is duped by the Chinese Communists into cooperating 
in their assassination of Pyle. Vigot seconds Pyle's analysis of Fowler. 
Phuong, in disgust at Fowler, and grieving for Pyle, returns to her life as 
a dance hall girl — rejecting Fowler's offer of marriage.
Joseph Mankiewicz wrote and directed the movie version of 
The Quiet American, which first appeared in American movie theaters 
in 1959s A Cold War liberal, Mankiewicz was accused of being a 
"fellow-traveller' by powerful director Cecil B. DeMille during the 
turbulent McCarthy Era. Though he retained his position as President of 
the Screen Director's Guild, he may have felt his reputation was stained 
by DeMille's accusations. His version of The Quiet American may have 
been created, in part, to drown out any whispers that he was soft on 
Communism.
Though Robert Lantz claimed that Mankiewicz "boasted of his 
projected transformation' of the novel, Mankiewicz denied this in 
19786 He describes the film, instead, as ‘the very bad film I made during 
a very unhappy time in my life...'7 But neither does Mankiewicz have 
praise for the novel, calling it "a terribly distorted kind of cheap
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melodrama in which the American was the most idiotic kind of villa in'8 
A critical and commercial failure, the movie failed to make the 
list of Annual Top Moneymaking Films for 1958 or 1959, falling far short 
of The Bridge on the River Kwai (estimated box office receipts $18 
million) and Auntie Mame ($8.8 million). The Quiet American did not 
even gross as much as $1 million9
When the movie was reviewed in 1958. many critics thought 
Mankiewicz changed the ending to avoid the anger of American ex­
hibitors and the movie's financing distributor. United Artists. But it is 
disturbing that Geist and other critics did not note changes more 
insidious than Mankiewicz's gross manipulation of the ending. Greene 
himsetf wrote to protest those changes in a letter to the Times of 
London, published on January 29.1957:
(S)uch changes ... will make only the more obvous the dis­
crepancy between what the (US) State Deparment would 
like the world to believe and what In fact happened In Viet 
Nam.
Speculations on the reasons for the differences between novel and 
movie include the strong possiblity that Joseph L. Mankiewicz and his 
company — along with too many other Americans in the 1950s — held 
so tightly to American mythology that they couldn't tolerate Greene's 
presentation. American mythology dictated that Americans cleaned 
up after decadant Europeans, and had a mission to bring God/ 
Democracy/American values to other parts of the world. Though 
Mankiewicz was critical of the “white hat/black hat' polarization in the 
Hollywood Western and gangster movie10- he was seemingly oblivious 
to his own decision to use that same device. Thus, in Mankiewicz's 
Quiet American, the American became a hero, the British journalist 
became a sleazy patsy for the Commies, and the wishes of the Viet­
namese became invisible and inrelevent.
To illustrate specific ways in which the movie inverts the novel, 
I will examine several key passages and scenes, and discuss their 
presentation in both contexts. As in most artistic works, the opening has 
a special significance, setting the tone of what is to come, and 
creating audience/reader expectations.
The novel begins at midnight In Fowler's room; it is the night of 
Alden Pyle's assassination. Six months have passed since he met Fowler 
and Phuong, and “weeks ago (it was) the Chinese New Year'. Vigot 
Is present, and the novel's first conversation between the French In­
spector and Fowler not only establishes that both were aware of Pyle's 
covert military activities, but that both disapproved of them. “To speak
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plainly,” Vigot states about Pyle's murder, "I am not altogether sorry. 
He was doing a lot of harm'. Pyle's misapprehension of Vietnamese 
politics is early established by these two experts, who acknowledge the 
importance and existence of the Viet Minh.
The United Artist movie opens with an orientalized title. Audie 
Murphy (Pyle) receives top billing, followed by Michael Redgrave 
(Fowler), Claude Dauphin (Vigot), and Georgia Moll (Phuong). Orien­
talized music plays as the titles are superimposed on a series of Asian 
faces, and then the movie breaks directly into a Chinese New Year 
celebration which features a paper dragon. Subtitles follow:
Frame 1:
SAIGON 
At the time of 
CHINESE NEW YEAR 
1959
Frame 2:
There was an Emperor who 
ruled by permission of France 
to whom it belonged
Frame 3:
and 300 miles to the north of 
Saigon, both the Emperor and the 
French were fighting a war against 
a Communist army
Frame 4:
But, at war or in peace. CHINESE 
NEW YEAR was a time to forgive 
one's enemies, square accounts 
with one's God and creditors —
Frame 5:
and to rejoice in a world that 
for two days, might be considered 
a happy one.
At the end of the credits the movie cuts to an Asian man who 
finds Pyle's body. He is joined at the scene by a group of Asian women.
In this way, although the “ it ' in Frame 2 is Vietnam, Vietnam itself 
goes unspecified. Furthermore, the date is given as 1952: Greene 
closes his novel with the notation “March 1952 — June 1955.' These 
changes distance the movie's Pyle from Colonel Edward G. Landsdale 
and the events of 1954, and make Vietnam a stand-in for any “it ' that 
is “fighting a war against a Communist a rm y'. Then, the subtitles estab­
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lish the importance of the Chinese in Saigon and begin to connect 
them with Chinese Communism. These political shifts transform Greene's 
novel.
In the novel, the most politically significant scene is set in a South 
Vietnamese watch-tower well outside Saigon. Pyle and Fowler end up 
there because their cars have been sabotaged — perhaps by the Cao 
Dai, a cult which once backed Pyle's for the leader of the Third Force, 
General Th6. They share the tower with two Vietnamese sentries.
Fowler: You and your like are trying to make a war with the 
help of people who Just aren't Interested.
Pyle: They don't want Communism.
Fowler: They want rice... They don't want to be shot at. They 
want one day to be much the same as another. They don't 
want our white skins around telling them what they want.
Pyle: If Indochina goes...
Fowler: I know that record. Slam goes.
Pyle: They'll be forced to believe what they are told, they 
won't be allowed to think for themselves.
Fowler: Thought's a luxury. Do you think the peasant sits and 
thinks of God and Democracy when he gets Inside his mud 
hut at night?
Pyle grounds his arguments in the theories of York Harding, an Ameri­
can scholar. But Fowler calls Harding merely "a superior sort of 
journalist... He gets hold of an idea and then alters every situation to fit 
the idea. Pyle came out here full of York Harding's idea'. Inthewatch- 
tower, Pyle again refers to Harding.
Pyle: You shouldn't be against York, you should be against the 
French. Their colonialism.
Fowler: Isms and ocracles. Give me facts.
Fowler tries to explain the Vietnamese peasants to Pyle:
The only man to treat him as a man Is the (Communist) political 
commissar. He'll sit In his hut and ask his name and listen to his 
complaints; he'll give up an hour a day to teaching him — It 
doesn't matter what, he's being treated like a man, like 
someone of value. Don't go on In the East with that parrot cry 
about a threat to the Individual soul. Here you'd find yourself 
on the wrong side — it's they who stand for the individual and 
we just stand for Private 23987, unit In the global strategy.
Finally, Greene points up the nature of the Viet Minh and Pyle's distrust
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of his South Vietnamese allies. Fowler leaves the watch-tower to fetch 
blankets from his car, and finds the atmosphere different in the hut 
when he returns:
Pyle: I don't trust (the sentry guards) with the gun If (the 
enemies) are coming....
Fowler: They are supposed to be on our side.
Pyle: I thought you didn't have a side.
Fowler: Touch6,1 wish the Viets knew It.
In the movie's watch-tower scene the conversation is very different. 
Pyle says of the two guards, “They're just kids.'  He wonders how to pass 
the time.
Fowler: Why not give them lectures on ‘ national democ­
racy.'
Pyle: You don't believe in It at all do you? There are two 
different beliefs here, both confined to this hut at this minute.
Fyie offers a cigarette to Fowler, who suggests he give some to the 
guards in order to stay friendly with them.
Pyle: I wouldn't have thought you'd suggest economic aid to 
buy friends.
Fowler: They're scared.... Theyjustwant enough rice.... They 
don't want our white skins around telling them what they 
want.
Pyle: You're telling them what they don't want.... (T)he skins 
In Russia are still white too.
Fowler: I don't take sides.... This sudden Importance of the 
Individual and his freedom, why have we Just discovered It?
Fifty years ago nobody would have spoken of It.
Pyle: I'm from a country that's been In existence less than 200 
years In a very old world.... (S)uddenly the world waits angrily 
for us to find the answers It hasn't been able to find In 50 
centuries.
Ma nkiewicz uses the watch-tower scene to establish Pyle's concern for 
his allies, America's special mission, and to confirm the audience's 
belief in monolithic communism. He ties the Vietnamese Communist 
struggle to the Soviet Union (never mentioned in the novel), and makes 
no reference to Vietnamese peasants or Viet Minh commissars.
Pyle's theories are put into practice, in both the novel and the 
movie, in the bicycle-bomb incident and in the bombing of a civilian
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crowd in Saigon. In the movie, the bicycle-bomb incident occurs after 
a Chinese, Mr. Heng, shows plastic (“Diolactin') and a mysterious mold 
to Fowler. Heng then suggests that perhaps Fowler will be “near the 
flower stalls on the Boulevard Chamet at precisely half-past one this 
afternoon'. Near the flower stalls at the appointed time, Fowler sees 
vehicles racing to a fountain, sirens screeching; officials jump from their 
cars, pick up nearby bicycles, and hurl them into the fountain. Heng 
appears and begins to talk to Fowler. The bicycles explode. With 
Heng's help, Fowler makes the connection between the bicycle- 
bombs, Diolactin, the mold, and Alden Pyle. While the novel is subtler 
— for example, Heng does not set Fowler up so explicitly — the bicycle- 
bomb incident has similar consequences.
But novel and movie lead the audience in different directions. 
This is brought out most clearly in the scene where explosions kill 
Vietnamese women and children congregating in a busy Saigon 
square. In the novel, after the explosions, Fower and Pyle meet in the 
square.
Pyle said, “It's awful.' He looked at the wet on his shoes and 
said In a sick voice, ‘What's that?'
’ Blood," I said....
He was seeing a real war for the first time....
He said weakly, ‘ There was to have been a pa­
rade.'...
‘ But the parade was cancelled yesterday. Pyle.'
‘ I didn't know.... They should have called It o ff.'
He looked white and beaten and ready to faint.
Greene's Pyle blanches at the realities of war, or dirty tricks, and 
acknowledges his faulty intelligence gathering.
The movie scene is full of burning cars, a woman screaming, 
and a woman being carried off on a stretcher. Pyle arrives standing on 
the dashboard of a vehicle; men are inside and he seems to be 
directing them to bring him to the massacre scene. Subsequently, he 
points out to Fowler that a French Military parade had been scheduled, 
then cancelled, and that there had been rumors about a demonstra­
tion and bicycle bombs. Fowler exclaims, 'Your bicycle-bombs!' and 
suggests that Pyle's Third Force hope. General Th§ has done the 
bombing. Pyle denies any part in the demostration and snaps: “Why 
don't you just shut up and help somebody.'
The movie's Pyle becomes the helper rather than the menace. 
Furthermore, a take-charge Pyle is established as being in full control of 
intelligence gathering and as being innocent of any part in the 
massacre. These shifts are part of a greater revision — Pyle's naivety
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replaced by Fowler's.
Early in the novel, the innocence of Pyle is established as a 
cause of concern to Fowler. After Pyle's death, the American Eco­
nomic Attach^ first tells Fowler that Pyle had “special duties' and then 
wonders why he was killed. Fowler responds:
They killed him because he was too Innocent to live.... He had 
no more of a notion than any of you what the whole affair's 
about, and you gave him money and York Harding’s books 
on the East and said, "Go ahead. Win the East for Democ­
racy.' He never saw anything he hadn't heard In a lecture- 
hall and his writers and his lecturers made a fool of him. When 
he saw a dead body he couldn't even see the wounds.
In the novel, Pyle's second-hand ideas are re-emphasized, and his 
foolish innocence is under-scored.
In contrast, the movie portrays Fowler as the true innocent and 
infers that Pyle's idea of “national democracy' is the solution for South 
Vietnam. York Harding is never mentioned in the movie. The movie's 
last scene between Fowler and Pyle demonstrates this subversion 
clearly.
Fowler: What do you hear from General The?
Pyle: I haven't seen him lately.
Fowler: I supposed he would have come to Saigon to see how 
his bomb worked.
Pyle: What makes you so sure It was his bomb? I don't think 
so....
Fowler: Believe me, national democracy Is something that 
comes out of a book.... Thd's not the leader for your Third 
Force.
Pyle: It's not my Third Force.
Fowler: Your country mustn't trust men like Thd....
F>y1e: You're talking cloak and dagger nonsense.... It'squlte  
true that I've been In touch with General Thd.... After I was 
graduated from college, I took some post-graduate work at 
Princeton.... While I was there I met a very prominent Viet­
namese living In exile In New Jersey.
Fowler: Who was he?
F>yle: Youknow.orshouldknow.aswellasl. Because If all goes 
well. If Vietnam becomes an Independent republic, this man'll 
be Its leader.
Fowler: And this future leader sent you to General Thd? 
Pyle: What makes you believe any sane government or sane 
man would send me on a mission like that?
Fowler: Then, who did send you to General Thd?
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Pyle: I did.
The movie conversation ends with Pyle denouncing Fowler: “I think you 
believe whatever you need to believe emotionally.... My government 
has nothing to do with this ... it was my own idea.' Pyle continues:
You've got a great talent for words... you depend on them as 
If saying a thing Is an effective way to make It true.... What are 
you afraid of anyway? Like an adolescent boy who keeps on 
using dirty words all the time because he doesn't want 
anyone to think he doesn't know what it's all about. You're 
going to hate this, but I think you're one of the most truly 
Innocent men I'll ever know.
Three important subversions exist in the scene described above. 
The most important is the reversal of Pyle's and Fowler's roles. In the 
novel, it is Pyle's words that are dangerous — innocent, idealistic, and 
deadly — but it is Fowler's words that are condemned in the movie. The 
second subversion is a removal of Pyle from the intellectual environ­
ment of Harvard (and York Harding) to the Princeton, New Jersey area, 
so that his connection with Diem (an "authentic' and validating 
connection) can be established. The third subversion is that Mank- 
iewicz absolves the US government of even the remotest complicity in 
the massacre of innocent civilians.
Mankiewicz uses several devices to accomplish the demolition 
of Fowler's credibility and character. He reverses the positions of 
innocence and wisdom which Greene had established between 
Fowler and Pyle, he realigns the sympathies of the French Inspector, 
Vigot, and he manipulates the relationship between Pyle and Phuong.
Where the novel's Vigot is sympathetic to Fowler, the movie's 
Vigot is contemptuous of him. In a scene set in the French inspector's 
office, Mankiewicz's Vigot and Fowler discuss Pyle's murder.
Fowler: He was killed by an Idea as much as anything else....
All his life they saturated him with this Idea; from books and 
slogans, church pulpits, lecture platforms.
Vigot: An idea so repugnant that he was killed for It?
The movie has already established that words, especially when uttered 
by Fowler, can be bad, but now it is clear that ideas are good and 
worth dying for. In this scene, idealism joins with anti-intellectualism, 
tapping into an old American disjunction between knowledge and 
ideals. The conversation continues, and it becomes clear that Fowler 
has been fooled into thinking that Pyle was dealing in explosives by the
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Communists. Vigot's contempt knows no bounds.
Vlgot: Do you ask ...about guilt (for the massacre)? Do you 
ask how about the guilt you decided upon before the crime 
was committed? And for which the sentence has already 
been carried out? ... It was the Idea that had to be 
murdered.... You know. It Is a mistake to say that Communism 
Is appealllng to the mentally advanced. I think it Is only true 
when the mentally advanced are also emotionally retarded.
Fowler: I'm not a Communist, Vlgot.
Vlgot: But someone was required to help assassinate the 
Idea, someone gifted In the war of words... to plead the right­
eousness.... But yet someone so emotionally Involved that he 
would not permit even his training as a professional reporter 
... to reject such an obviously Idiotic story.
Fowler: All right, mea culpa.
Vlgot: You were terrified of losing your girl to a younger man....
You've simply been used that you could be so childishly ma­
nipulated.... They have made a bloody fool of you.
In the novel, Fowler is driven to take sides when he realizes that Pyle's 
blind innocence has already brought about the death of civilians and 
will likely bring about more such deaths. Greene's depiction of the last 
exchange between Pyle and Fowler points out the correctness of 
Fowler's interpretation.
F>yle: I saw Thd this afternoon.... I dealt with him very se­
verely.... In the long run he Is the only hope we have.... The 
massacre was a terrible shock today, Thomas, but In a week, 
you'll see, we'll have forgotten It. We are looking after the 
relatives too.
Fowler: We?
FVIe: We've wired to Washington.
At this point, Fowler goes to the window to give a pre-arranged signal 
to Heng's associates. Still staring out the window, Fowler reads out of 
a book to Pyle:
I drive through the streets and I care not a damn.
The people they stare, and they ask who I am;
And if I should chance to run over a cad,
I can pay for the damage If ever so bad.
So pleasant It Is to have money, heigh hoi 
So pleasant It Is to have money.
By having Fowler quote from Arthur Hugh Clough's “Dipsychus' (the
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“twin-souled") Greene comments on America's moneyed insensitivity, 
and acknowledges that Pyle may indeed represent the flip-side of 
Fowler.
The scene in the movie goes in a very different direction. 
Directly after Pyle's statement that "My government has nothing to do 
with th is ... it was my own idea," he says, “I'm being sent home next 
week. Phuong's going with me. We're going to be married at home.
Immediately Fowler, in voice-over narration, notes: “Forthefirst 
time he spoke of Phuong, of taking her away with him, of leaving me 
behind alone.' That is the moment that Fowler chooses to go to the 
window to betray Pyle, and then to quote Shakespeare's Othello. 
rather than the more political Clough:
Though 1 purchance am vicious In my guess. —
As, I confess. It is my nature's plague 
To spy Into abuses, and oft my Jealousy 
Shapes faults that are not, —
Mankiewicz's Fowler thus betrays Pyle out of sexual jealousy. And it is 
this jealousy which disgusts Vigot and highlights the movie's focus on 
romantic love.
Greene's Phuong is incapable of romantic love: “It isn't in the 
Vietnamese nature," Fowler explains to Pyle. But the movie up-ends 
Phuong's response to the Pyle of the novel, and implies that romantic 
love is indeed universal. The movie's last scene between Fowler and 
Phuong takes place in the dance hall where they first met. Fowler reads 
her a telegram from his British wife: she is granting him a divorce so that 
he can marry Phuong. Phuong walks away from Fowler, but pleading, 
he follows after her. She turns to him and echoes his last statement.
Phuong: What “we" have always wanted Is In your hands?
What Is that?
Fowler: To be together as we were, to have again what we 
had.
Phuong: What were *we" and what did we have?.... There 
was a man who gave to me something ... of himself. I've 
known a man who loved me, he said.... Have you ever loved 
me? Have you ever even lied to me that you loved me?
Fowler: What will become of you here In a place like this with... 
with people like these?
Phuong: Since when does the future concern you?...
Fowler: Now, It concerns me now.
Phuong: Now Is too late for you.
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This argument takes place in the middle of the same Chinese 
New Year celebration which marked the beginning of the movie. The 
emphasis on Chinese culture is significant because it underlines the 
way in which Mankiewicz simplifies and reduces Vietnamese culture. 
To Mankiewicz, all Asian cultures are one — there is no need to 
distinguish among them. Thus, Greene's considered observations on 
Phuong's Vietnamese conception of love and marriage are easily 
replaced by standard 1950s American concepts (the "right' con­
cepts), in the same way that "good'  Vietnamese, like General Th6 and 
Diem, can accept American concepts of national democracy. ’ Bad' 
Vietnamese (like the Viet Minh) are equated with the Chinese Commu­
nists. The inference here is that traditional American values are good, 
and that traditional Asian values are corrupt.
Fowler's last words in both novel and movie are the same: 
"(H)ow I wished there existed someone to whom I could say that I was 
sorry'. But they imply something completely different in the film and in 
the novel.
In a 1969 interview, Greene said of his novels: "Even the early 
thrillers were political: The Confidential Agent deals with the Spanish 
Civil War. The Quiet American and The Comediens are political 
novels'11 Nevertheless, The Quiet American was written by a devout 
Catholic, who framed those last words carefully to represent an 
atheist's longing for God.
One gets so tired of people saying that my novels are about 
the opposition of Good and Evil. They are not about Good 
and Evil, but about human beings. After Hitler and Vietnam, 
one would have thought good and evil In people was more 
understandable12-
1950s America was incapable of getting the point, and it seems that 
this incomprehension has carried over into the 1980s. Reagan's 
February 1982 speech is only an extension of the logic which governed 
Manciewicz's revision of Greene's The Quiet American.
Life imitates art in amazing ways. Thomas Morgan tells the story 
of a conversation which took place between him and Audie Murphy, 
the real-life World War 2 hero who starred in Mankiewicz's Quiet 
American years before. Morgan and Murphy got into a discussion 
about the antiwar protesters who demonstrated against American 
involvement in the war in Vietnam.
'G ee,' (Murphy) said, 'I'd  hate their guts If they had
any.'
'I think we should get out of Vietnam,' I said.
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*No, you can't leave Vietnam unless you win the
war.'
*1 don't think the Vietnamese want us over there.' 
‘ Listen, when you feel you are morally right, you just 
have to act and let people catch up later. That's the way It 
Is in war.... It'll take one million troopsl But I say — we go In, we 
do the Job. Then we get out! There's no other w ay'13
1 Gettleman, Marvin E., Jane Franklin, Marilyn Young, H. Bruce Franklin, eds. 
Vietnam and America: A Documented History (New York: Grove Press) 1985: 
xili.
2 During his college years ‘out of Impishness,' Greene had Joined the Commu­
nist Party. He remained a member for six weeks. In 1926, at the age of 22. he 
converted from Anglicanism to Catholicism.
3 Current Biography (1969): 180-182.
4 The character of Alden Pyle was obviously modeled on the American CIA 
officer. Colonel Edward G. Lansdale. In 1954 Lansdale worked with the CIA to 
establish Ngo Dlnh Diem's power base; he used various methods to accom­
plish his ends. Including ‘dirty tricks'. He Is also known to have bribed several 
of the leaders of the Cao Dal and Hoa Hao to rally to Diem, paying them with 
CIA funds. (Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking) 1983: 222.) 
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10 Geist: 196.
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12 Ibid.
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F ir s t  Blood R ecIrawn
D on  K unz
Nearly everyone speaking or writing about America's Vietnam 
soldier eventually feels compelled to mention Rambo. As David Morrell 
notes with pride, the name of the character he created in his novel. First 
Blood, has entered our nation's household vocabulary1. It resembles 
in this case the title of Joseph Heller's World War 2 novel. Catch 22. and 
the macho movie-star name of Marion Robert Morrison — John Wayne. 
There is more at stake in the popular adoption of those terms than a 
simple enlargement of the dictionary. The evolution of Rambo from 
character to icon illustrates the fictionalizing process by which history 
is accommodated to myth.
Rambo is an ambiguous and contradictory epithet, its meaning 
shifting as a result of an elaborate revision process still underway. 
Morrell's protagonist has been appropriated variously as a symbol of 
American patriotism, mindless savagery, the frontier hero, and 
Frankenstein's monster. President Reagan has invoked Rambo as the 
deus exmachina  to his administration's hostage crisis and tax reform 
problems2. Rambo has subsequently trickled down into parental 
discussions of overly zealous Little League coaches, and to newspaper 
headlines about Los Angeles freeway killers. In the semantically 
confusing aftermath of the Rambo films — Ted Kotcheff's First Blood. 
Part I (1982), George P. Cosmatos' Rambo: First Blood. Part 2(1985), 
and Peter MacDonald's Rambo 3(1988) — David Morrell's 1972 novel 
has almost been forgotten.
Critics have written about the Rambo films in relation to one 
another and in relation to other films about Vietnam, ignoring the 
original literary work. I intend to reestablish the importance of the novel 
by a comparison of its setting, characterization, and theme to the 
revisionary film adaptation. I will then demonstrate the ways in which 
the two cinematic sequels to First Blood, Part 1 continue the 
transformation of a provocative, engaging fiction into a familiar and 
comforting myth.
The film adaptation and its sequels repackage and resell the 
Vietnam experience as an entertainment commodity for safe mass 
consumption — a sanitized rerun of America's first television war. In the
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films, David Morrell's complex and disturbing protagonist is simplified 
and softened in order to transform the public's concept of America's 
Vietnam veteran from psychotic loser to incorruptible and invincible 
superpatriot;Sylvester Stallone's muscular incarnation of John Rambo 
glosses over Morrell's profoundly troubling conclusions about America's 
treatment of Vietnam veterans.
In Morrell's original story, protagonist and antagonist alike are 
realistic extensions of the national character, reflecting the historic era. 
Their suffering is psychological as well as physical; the conflict is more 
tragic than melodramatic. Reading the novel, we are invited to 
acknowledge the humanity of those who provoke the returned 
veteran's violence. Asa consequence, we are unable to deny that to 
some extent the antagonists represent us, ordinary Americans of no 
great power or influence who nevertheless share responsibility for what 
happened to the Vietnam veteran.
Morrell's Rambo returns to an America which is hostile territory 
for anyone who looks different. The setting of the novel — Madison, 
Kentucky — is apparently unremarkable except for being near the 
heartland of America, for which it stands. Rambo, with his heavy 
beard, long hair, and ragged, dusty, patched clothing, is nearly run 
over by a car as he is hitchhiking in Madison, and a gas station 
attendant quickly calls the police because he looks like a vagrant. The 
Chief of Police, Wilfred Teasle, drives Rambo to the edge of town and 
leaves him In the ditch, like a throwaway bottle. When Rambo returns, 
Teasle tells him he looks like a drifter, a moocher, a drug pusher; he 
stands out "like some black man'3. Escorting Rambo to the city limits 
for the second time, Teasle remarks angrily that his town is changing: 
kids are hanging out on the street, littering, making noises that he 
doesn't want to hear. Rambo should get a haircut, a bath, and a job. 
Morrell makes it clear, when Rambo thinks to himself that Madison is the 
fifteenth town he has been pushed out of, that this old Kentucky home 
Is just like the rest of America in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In Morrell's America, blacks have been excluded from full 
social participation, ghettoized out of sight; there is a generation gap, 
an internal war between Establishment and counterculture. The local 
police have obviously taken President Nixon's speeches about law 
and order to heart. In fact. Chief of Police Teasle has made his home 
in the police station; an old schoolhouse newly repainted red, white, 
and blue. Rambo eventually dynamites the station along with the 
courthouse, and Teasle thinks, "Christ, he's gone out of his mind.... He 
wants to blow up the whole town'4. Synecdochically, the town is 
America.
In contrast, Kotcheff'sfilm adaptation of Morrell's novel makes
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the town which casts Rambo out seem atypical and fantastic. (The film 
was shot in Nelson, British Columbia; the same otherworldly location 
Fred Schepisi and Steve Martin used for Roxanne.) The neon sign at the 
city limits proclaims, “Welcome to Holidayland'. A remote resort 
surrounded by snow-capped peaks, this place seems special, not the 
average American small town. In First Blood. Part /, a black family lives 
beside a sparkling lake where children play happily together. The 
Police Chief contentedly belches and pats his full belly as he emerges 
from the station to banter good naturedly with the locals. The streets 
are bathed in sunlight reflected from the majestic, snow-covered 
mountains. This town's allegorical name is consistent with Kotcheff's 
revision: Hope.
Kotcheff's Rambo returns to America with a set of expectations 
which are soon dashed. Unlike Morrell's character, this Rambo is not 
just passing through one more American town along an endless road. 
Instead, he has come to Hope expecting to be welcomed; he has 
come to look up Delmore, a black comrade, the only other survivor of 
his Green Beret unit. In the opening scene, Delmore's mother bitterly 
informs Rambo that her son died of cancer brought on by his exposure 
to Agent Orange. Rambo is crushed to learn that there is no hope of 
escaping the damaging effects of the war, even after being discharged, 
and the sky actually darkens as he heads into town, looking for 
someone to blame. Hope is a false promise. The town seems beautiful, 
friendly, but it is actually a closed community harboring its own cancer; 
a utopia maintained by violently repressive and sadistic forces, denying 
access or understanding to outsiders. Kotcheff grants his film audience 
license to regard this town, and especially its inept and villainous police 
force as isolated from, rather than typical of, the nation at large.
In contrast, Morrell's Madison is just like the fifteen other town 
Rambo has been pushed out of on his aimless journey through America. 
The novel does not permit the readerto escape the unsettling conclusion 
that rejecting the Vietnam veteran and denying him a place in the 
society he fought for can only result in his decision to turn against 
America, to bring the full horror of the Vietnam War home.
Neitherthe novel northefilm give much insight into the townsfolk; 
it is the character of the police force which precipitates Rambo's 
decision to reenact the guerrilla war. In the novel the police are 
plausible civilian surrogates, representing America at home as the 
soldier does in Vietnam. The policemen of Madison are ordinary 
people who follow procedures, live routinely, think conventionally. 
Rambo can anticipate and openly mock their cliched remarks: what 
sex is he? and let's take up a collection to buy him a haircut. Chief 
Teasle automatically assumes that Rambo is a fugitive because he
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does not carry any identification. The wounds which are revealed to 
Teasle during his strip search of Rambo are assumed to be related to 
civilian life rather than military service. Teasle and his men are wholly 
unprepared to deal with an alienated, intelligent, skillful Green Beret 
who once escaped a North Vietnamese prison camp and was awarded 
the Congressional Medal of Honor. When an inexperienced policeman 
named Gait shakily draws his gun (against Teasle's orders) Rambo 
instinctively lashes out with the razor being used to shave him. The war 
at home begins with the police force unaware that Rambo is a 
veteran. In fact, they have been so conditioned to expect trouble from 
the opposite end of the political spectrum — counterculture war 
protesters — that they mistake Rambo for one.
Isolated and silent, ratherthan tribal and vocal, Rambo has not 
returned from the war to join the ranks of the protesters against it. He 
has, however, become a kind of dropout, scavenging, surviving off the 
land, and rejecting the option of settling down with a regular job. The 
badges of his status are his long hair, beard, and ragged clothing. The 
way Rambo chooses to live after the war is implicitly a critique of the 
establishment which sent him abroad to perpetuate its values. In 
suggesting at least a superficial (countercultural resemblance between 
the veteran and the antiwar protester, Morrell's novel invites our 
conclusion that the Vietnam War pointed an entire generation in 
roughly the same direction. Like us. the police officers of this typical 
American town do not, at first glance, understand the situation. They 
are average Americans of an older generation hostile toward a 
younger one, ignorant about Vietnam and unable to imagine how the 
war will have an effect on them.
The film adaptation depicts Hope's police as melodramatic 
villains who are aware of Rambo's war service almost immediately; 
they have read his dog tags. When a young policeman (Mitch) calls 
attention to Rambo's scars, the older officer (Gault) says curtly, “Who 
gives a shit?" Although Mitch can see Rambo is growing agitated and 
tries to calm him down, Galt, as senior officer, mocks and tortures the 
“soldier boy*. Without provocation or warning he strikes Rambo in the 
kidneys with his nightstick, washes him down with a firehose while 
laughing sadistically, and puts a choke hold on him when Rambo starts 
to object. Galt's brutality triggers Rambo's flashback to torture in the 
POW camp, and precipitates his violent escape. The cinematic 
flashback clearly equates Hope's police force with the North 
Vietnamese. AsElizabethTraube notes, “Domestic violence is modeled 
on the represented foreign violence, and the film makes a manifest 
attemptto identify the oppressive domestic forces with the Vietnamese 
enemy'5.
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Kotcheff's film adaptation transforms Galt from the least 
experienced to the oldest veteran on the police force. In the novel, 
Galt acts from ignorance and fear, as any of us might. In the film his 
blatant disregard for the veteran's pain and his eagerness to abuse 
Rambo make him hateful beyond the point of audience identification.
This reckless brutality is more characteristic of Hope's police 
force than not. Teasle's chase after Rambo is a crazy, headstrong 
charge off the highway, on to backroads, across fields and streams, 
through closed pastoral gates, until the officer overturns his car on the 
mountainside and crawls from the wreckage to fire a parting shot. The 
police cruiser is not the only thing upside down here.
It is no wonder that Teasle describes the evil Gault as his oldest 
and best friend: they are both corrupt authority figures who disguise 
their sadistic tendencies by maintaining the pretense of a rule of law; 
ironically, they provoke the disturbance which they are pledged to 
guard against. This conspiracy envelopes other citizens of Hope, such 
as the civilian whom Teasle employs to track Rambo with dogs. 
Dobermans, he asserts, are better than Bloodhounds because the 
fiercer dogs “can eat on the ru n '. Although Hope's police force wears 
white cowboy hats, the officers are clearly not the good guys of this 
cinematic melodrama. Theircrudedisregardforandsadistictreatment 
of the Vietnam veteran justify the magnitude of the destruction which 
he visits upon them and, more importantly, forestall any audience 
sympathy.
The police officers' willfully callous abuse of John Rambo, their 
disastrously ill-conceived search and destroy tactics, and obsession 
with avoiding at any cost a publicly humiliating defeat by a presumably 
inferior force might help the audience to the conclusion that these 
men are small-town surrogates for civilian and military leadership 
during the Vietnam War. But Rambo's prison flashback qualifies that 
interpretation, inviting the audience to regard Hope's police force as 
a quasi-foreign corruption of American civil and moral authority — the 
metaphorical equivalents of his brutal North Vietnamese captors. As 
such .they are justly punished by the Vietnam veteran who has returned 
to protect us from them.
Morrell's Police Chief Teasle is a more complex invention than 
his film counterpart. Though he orders the stranger out of town by 
sundown (exhibiting the typical macho of the frontier sheriff), he also 
offers him a ride to the city limits and, later, when Rambo returns, asks 
him if he needs a job. Teasle's tough talk is softened by some paternal 
gestures and an occasional smile which permits a glimpse of humanity 
beneath the gruff professional exterior. His police cruiser accident is 
not melodramatic but comic: Teasle is so astonished at seeing Rambo
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back in town that he stops short in traffic and get rear-ended by one 
of the local citizens. Fending off public embarrassment, he gives the 
man a ticket because “the law says the car in back is always wrong. 
You were following too close for an emergency'6. The episode depicts 
Madison's Police Chief more humanely, and serves as ironic 
commentary on his pursuit of Rambo — Teasle follows him too closely, 
unable to anticipate the accident he is about to cause. Morrell's 
Teasle is complex because we have access to his consciousness. We 
see him worrying about the wife who has left him, remembering his 
father's death in a hunting accident, and considering how to renew 
relations with his surrogate father, Orval. Although Teasle denies it, 
even Orval (and. hence, the audience) recognizes that it is displaced 
anger that compels Teasle to pursue Rambo. Teasle is unable to 
separate his personal and professional life, creating a dangerous and 
volatile situation.
In Morrell's novel. Teasle and his police force are not evil men; 
they are simply unfamiliar with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
dulled by small town life and official procedures, and overly protective 
of their authority. They are not prepared to cope with the emergency 
which the Chief's routine rousting of Rambo provokes. Most importantly, 
they show no initial malice toward Rambo, and have no suspicion of his 
veteran status. The police of Madison are simply implemented of 
America's domestic law-and-order agenda. Morrell makes it difficult 
to hate these policemen and easy to believe they are only average 
men making natural mistakes which must inevitably trigger Rambo's 
violent backlash. Madison's policemen are family men.
The guerrilla war which Rambo brings home to America in 
Morrell's novel is, finally, a family affair. Rambo is the son Teasle wanted 
but could never have. Morrell has carefully constructed Rambo's 
entrance to coincide with the departure of Teasle's wife: Teasle 
wanted a child; his wife didn't want the “trouble*7. Teasle is old enough 
to be Rambo's father and, even after he learns Rambo's name, 
continues to refer to him only as “the kid' — an epithet which the rest 
of his men adopt. Teasle and Rambo are very much alike; they have 
matching temperaments. Both are proud, independent, macho 
personalities, men without the softening influence of women. Neither 
likes to receive advice or take orders or negotiate.
The novel's protagonist and antagonist have been shaped by 
similar experiences. They are heroic veterans: Rambo is a Congressional 
Medal of Honor winner .Teasle is a recipient of the Distinguished Service 
Cross for his conduct in Korea. Both men have macho foster fathers 
(Orval and Trautman) who they have grown to resemble and whose 
authority they have challenged in rites of passage to adulthood. Both
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men are alienated: Teasle returning from Korea to be Chief of Police 
in his hometown, "except it was no more home, just the place where 
he had grown u p '8, and Rambo returning from Vietnam to wander, 
homeless, from town to town. The personal war between Teasle and 
Rambo continues the cycle of rebellion against a harsh fatherfigure in 
whose Image a boy has been raised. Morrell uses family violence as a 
trope to explain the blind ferocity and self-destructive nature of a 
tragic action replicated on a national scale. The war between father 
and son is prologue to , and rehearsal for, foreign war. And now the war 
has come home again, the family enlarged, the epilogue written.
As Teasle's battle with Rambo unfolds in Morrell's novel, it 
becomes more personal, more intimate. He enlists Orval's help in 
tracking Rambo, and then loses all professional perspective when 
Orval is shot: "... Teasle was vowing to track the kid forever, grab him, 
mutilate him... No more because of Galt.... Personal now. For himself. 
Father, fosterfather. Both shot. The insane anger of when his real father 
had been killed, wanting to strangle the kid until his throat was crushed, 
his eyes popping'9. The Vietnam War has come home for Teasle, 
threatening first his professional reputation and his pride in keeping 
order in his hometown, and then threatening his personal relationships 
and his ability to control and order his family life.
Although the State Police and the National Guard become 
involved in hunting Rambo, Morrell focuses primarily upon the 
developing intimacy between Teasle and his prey. Each crawls 
painfully through a thicket of brambles to escape the other (Teasle in 
the mountains and Rambo in town); each experiences chest pains 
(Rambo because of broken ribs,Teasle because of heart trouble); both 
want to end their war but cannot, caught in the escalating struggle 
which moves the war from the mountainous wilderness into the town 
itself.
The plot moves to resolution as they fire reflexively and 
simultaneously, wounding one another with pistols. And, significantly, 
each experiences mysteriously transcendent moments which precede 
the catastrophe. Rambo's transcendence occurs at a level which 
"the native allies in the war had called ... the way of Zen. the journey 
to arrive at the pure and frozen moment achieved only after long 
arduous training and concentration and determination to be perfect. 
... the moment could not be explained. The emotion was timeless, 
could not be described in time, could be compared to orgasm but not 
so defined because it had no physical center, was bodily everywhere'10. 
Teasle's moment occurs first as a dream in which he foresees exactly 
how Rambo will escape the trap set for him by detouring through a 
"graveyard' of junk cars and stealing a police cruiser, and, then, after
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Rambo shoots him. in a moment when “it was all reversed, him outside 
of himseif, but everything out there within him.... He had never seen 
anything with such distinct clarity'1'. Teasle has become Rambo's 
secret sharer.
What the two veterans have suffered together has made them 
reluctant antagonists. After he has wounded Rambo, Teasle admits. ' I  
shot him and all at once I didn't hate him anymore. I was just sony'12. 
Similarly, Rambo “squinted to clear his vision, looking down the mound 
where Teasle lay flat in the brush. Christ, he had hit him. God, he had 
not wanted tha t'13.
Theirdeveloping intimacy in the novel is publicly acknowledged 
just before death. As Teasle lies wounded, “the one policeman shook 
his head queerly. 'Hethinkshe'sthekid.'.... 'He'sgone crazy,' the other 
sa id '14. Teasle is perceived by observers not justas having lost his mind 
like Rambo, but having, in a sense, become Rambo. Killing Rambo is 
like killing himself. When Teasle continued to stalk Rambo despite his 
own mortal wound, he argued with Trautman about who had the right 
toendit: “He's mine,'says Teasle. “Notyours. He wants it to be m e '15. 
As he was tracking Rambo, Teasle thought, “There was blood here on 
the fence. The kid's. Good. He would be going over where the kid had. 
His blood dripping on the kid 's....'16
But it is Captain Trautman, who finally kills Rambo, taking off the 
top of “the kid 's' head with a shotgun blast as the dying Teasle 
watches: “He thought about (his wife) again, and she still did not 
interest him. He thought about his house he had fixed up in the hills, the 
cats there, and none of that interested him either. He thought about 
the kid, and flooded with love for him, and just a second before the 
empty shell would have completed its arc to the ground, he relaxed, 
accepted peacefully. And was dead'17. The tragic conclusion of the 
personal war between Rambo and Teasle is couched in the intimate 
terms of a belated reconciliation between estranged father and son 
whose life experiences mirror one another.
In Morrell's novel, the body count from Rambo's guerrilla war at 
home is a staggering 200 kills18, indicating the extent to which the 
Vietnam veteran succeeds in making his fellow Americans experience 
the pain and suffering of the conflict which they had exported to 
Southeast Asia. Like America's policy makers, the Madison police 
force pay an enormous price for steadily escalating the conflict. But in 
this tragic novel's catastrophe, Rambo manages to make civilian and 
military authorities recognize the pain of the Vietnam veteran who was 
the instrument of America's destructive policy abroad and a casualty 
upon his return. Teasle and Trautman, who serve as Rambo's civilian 
and military foster fathers, discuss the murder of their “son': “'What's
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it like for you?' 'Better than when I knew he was in pain.' 'Y e s " '’
Ted Kotcheff's film adaptation spares its audience the pain of 
any such discussion of strife between fathers and sons. For one thing, 
neither Teasle nor Rambo die on celluloid. Instead, Trautman talks 
Rambo out of killing the sadistic and obsessive Police Chief of Hope, 
and then leads him off to prison. Trautman and Rambo march side by 
side through an assembled crowd, through flashing lights that seem 
more awed tribute to a returned Vietnam veteran's victory over evil 
forces than an arrest — a belated parade in which he has compelled 
them to march. This Teasle is not like Rambo: he is not a war hero, or 
even a veteran. This private war is not structured sothat the experiences 
of the combatants reflect one another. There is no mutual respect in 
their final orgy of destruction.
Kotcheff's Teasle is a ghoul in a horror movie, the bad guy in a 
western — a sadist who wants “to kill that kid so bad he can taste it '. 
The scene where Teasle and his police force pursue Rambo in the 
wooded mountains is a cinematic hybrid. Rambo. garbed like an 
American Indian, ambushesand cripples each white-hatted deputy in 
turn. The techniques he uses seem to come from the latest manual of 
guerrilla warfare. Resurrected from his tragic end in the novel to 
become a muscular romantic film hero, Rambo rises mysteriously from 
the forest floor, leaps from trees; he stabs one deputy in the leg, lashes 
another to a tree with a garrote, impales another on punji sticks. 
Lighting flashes, thunder booms, and each wounded deputy screams 
for help. Rambo finally pins Teasle against a tree and holds a knife to 
his throat: the savage delivers a civilized warning: “In town you're the 
law; out here its me. I could have killed them all. Let it go or I'll give you 
a waryou won't believe. Just let it go.' And Rambo disappears silently 
back into the forest darkness.
The film First Blood. Part 1 is a revisionist Western like Ralph 
Nelson's Soldier Blue (1970) or Arthur Penn's Little Big Man (1971), 
inverting our sense of who is savage and who is civilized. Teasle and 
Rambo are intimate, but opposite. Rambo is a modem version of the 
prototypical American hero: the Green Beret, like the Indian Fighter, 
adopts the alien other's costume and tactics in the service of fighting 
for progress along a frontier poised between savagery and civilization. 
In Vietnam, the Green Beret used the small-band guerrilla tactics of the 
Viet Cong, and now he has returned home to use those same skills on 
the war-making savages who masquerade as righteous representatives 
of law and order. Like the mythic American frontier hero, the Green 
Beret is distinguished from the savage antagonist whom he resembles 
not only by the progressive mission which his savagery serves but also 
by the civilized restraint which exercises.
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But Kotcheff is also making a horror film. Harvey Greenburg 
notes that First Blood, Part 1 can be considered a 'b ridge ' film which 
connects earlier works depicting the Vietnam veteran as an urban 
vigilante (a kind of post-modern Western) to the spectral lunatic 
haunting 'slice and dice' thrillers20. This first Rambo film is an updated 
Frankensteinv/tth Rambo as the rejected monsterandTrautmanasthe 
scientist-creator 'come to reestablish control over the dangerous 
power that he has unleashed'21. In the novel Jeasle sends forTrautman; 
in the film Trautman mysteriously appears immediately after Teasle 
exclaims, 'W hat ever possessed God in Heaven to make a man like 
Rambo?' 'God didn't make Rambo. Id id/saysTrautm an. Trautman 
speaks of Rambo as if he were not quite human, but rather a sort of 
bomb that needs to be ’defused'. Through its mixed homage to two 
of cinema's melodramatic forms, the Western and horror genres, the 
film First Blood, Part 1 distances its audience from the conflict between 
the returning Vietnam War veteran and his countryman; by its 
conventional fictionality.the adaptation forestalls consideration of the 
troubling conclusions to which the more inventive novel leads its 
readers.
In Kotcheff's film, Rambo brings the guerrilla war home simply 
because he Is brutalized by police so sadistic they seem foreign. In the 
novel his motives are complex and disturbing. When Morrell's Rambo 
breaks out of jail he is not being tortured but being made to look like a 
solid citizen: bathed, clean-shaven, and short-haired. Morrell's Rambo 
has gotten himself into jail in the first place as a matter of principle. He 
maintains that he has the right to dress, eat, sleep, and go where he 
chooses. This Rambo sees himself first as an American civilian entitled 
to basic liberties that have been systematically denied to him in the last 
fifteen towns he has passed through. He feels strongly that his wartime 
service also entitles him to respect. Finally, Morrell's Rambo admits that 
he misses the war and is hungry for some action. This matrix of motives 
inevitably conspires against peace when the Vietnam veteran returns 
to an America divided between respect for authority and preservation 
of liberty. As a result, everyone is drawn plausibly into an insanely 
escalating conflict which resuits in the winner of a Congressional Medal 
of Honor getting killed for demanding his basic civil rights and a minimal 
veterans' benefit — respect. Morrell's story poses a challenge to 
America's sense of innocence, righteousness, and invincibility.
Kotcheff'sfilm does not dramatize the Vietnam veteran's painful 
homecoming in terms which would lead the audience to seif-scrutiny. 
The film focuses on special effects excitement — exploding helicopters 
and massive firepower. It is almost as If the filmmakers set out to 
eradicate traumatic memories of the Vietnam era in the same way
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that policy makers tried to win the war itseif; with a technological fix. 
Only in the movie's final scene is the veteran allowed much more than 
a sullen expression to articulate his feelings about the war and its 
aftermath. In a rambling monologue, Rambo responds to Troutman's 
assertion that "this mission is over'. Rambo answers that the war cannot 
simply be turned off by those who turned it on. Although repelled by 
the horror which he experienced in war, the civilian life to which Rambo 
has returned is nothing without the code of honor by which he lived in 
Vietnam. He wants to "go hom e', but where is that? The war is officially 
over, but Rambo cannot hold a job, or even talk to anybody "back in 
the World'. The film adaptation urges us to conclude that the Vietnam 
veteran's real home is not with us but in the military. Infact.Trautman 
tells Rambo he has called a helicopter to fly him back to Fort Bragg. 
With the wildman/monster back on his military reservation, and the 
quasi-foreign, police-state authorities killed-in-action or hospitalized in 
intensive care,thetheateraudiencecan escape any lingering concern 
about everyday issues like non-violent abridgement of civil liberties or 
PTSD.
Cinematic revision of Morrell's novel facilitates assimilation of 
the Vietnam "experience' into the popular consciousness in a non­
threatening (or even self-congratulatory) way. Richard Crenna recently 
referredtothe Rambo film phenomenon as "an audience participation 
cartoon'22. Through such mass-audience entertainments we escape 
the spectres of the Vietnam War and the turbulent 1960s. Personal 
betrayal, military failure, and moral bankruptcy can be attributed to 
corrupt authority figures. In First Blood, Part 7 the audience can identify 
with the Vietnam veteran as a victim who exacts violent poetic justice 
upon a police force so brutal that they represent corruptions of 
American civil and moral authority. We do not recognize them as part 
of our national family, but as quasi-foreign infiltrators who are destroying 
the country from within.
The second Rambo film, George Cosmatos' Rambo: First 
Blood. Part 2. presents the comfortable spectacle of the Vietnam 
veteran's return to Southeast Asia for a rematch against the North 
Vietnamese. Rambo wins a belated victory by destroying a prison 
camp and liberating a small band of American POWs. Because the 
North Vietnamese are assisted by Russians, there is the additional 
satisfaction of seeing American fighting mettle tested successfully 
against the Evil Empire... almost as a preview of coming attractions. 
More importantly, the enemy soldiers are depicted as both foreign and 
familiar: the North Vietnamese wear distinctive “Asian' uniforms, but 
the beret-clad Soviets look western; both use technologically 
sophisticated weaponry and employ massively superior numbers in
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either conventional front line assaults or search-and-destroy missions. 
The screenwriters have constructed a fiction in which the historic 
image of the Vietnam-era American soldier is linked (through uniforms 
and berets) to one so foreign and sinister that we are pleased to see it 
eliminated. Similarly, the fictional American and South Vietnamese 
forces (Rambo and his native intelligence contact, Co) are costumed 
and deployed as guerrillas: without uniforms; vastly outnumbered; 
relying upon primitive weaponry or what they can steal; and practicing 
deception, harassment, and hit-and-run tactics on fixed defensive 
positions. The image of the Viet Cong has been projected onto the 
fictional allied forces in a way which makes the fantasized American 
victory more plausible. This first sequel revises history by a fictitious role 
reversal. The implication is that Americans could have won the 
Vietnam War if we had relied less on technology, superior numbers, 
and conventional tactics.
Ultimately, this conclusion is an indictment of American 
leadership, a shifting of blame away from the many individual veterans 
with whom we share the movie theater, and onto a few more distant 
political and military decision makers. This Rambo. then, rehabilitates 
the reputation of the Vietnam veteran by demonstrating that he could 
have won the war, and by identifying a scapegoatwho prevented 
him from winning.
Cosmatos' sequel starts by clearing Rambo's former 
commanding officer, now “Colonel'Trautman,of anytaint of betrayal. 
In the opening scene, we see that Rambo has not been flown back to 
Fort Bragg, as Trautman had promised, but has been condemned to 
hard labor on a prison rock-pile. Trautman comes to the imprisoned 
Rambo and asks him to believe that he tried to prevent this punishment, 
but was over-ruled by higher authorities. Moreover, Trautman has 
been instructed to offer Rambo immediate release from prison, a 
temporary reinstatement in the Green Berets, and a possible Presidential 
pardon in exchange for his services on a covert reconnaissance 
mission. Rambo asks only one question: "Sir, do we get to win this 
time?' Trautman replies, “This time it's up to you.'
But it isn't. The sequel asks us to believe that the same “higher 
authorities' who kept us from victory in Vietnam are also preventing the 
recovery of American POWs. This time “they* have conspired to use 
Rambo and Trautman in a scheme to cover up the existence of 
American prisoners in Southeast Asia. Rambo isto be sent to reconnoiter 
a POW camp that American authorities know will be empty, so that 
when this notorious war hero and defender of veterans' rights reports 
that he found nothing, a potentially embarrassing and costly political 
issue will be convincingly closed. The Vietnam veteran has been
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seduced back into his country's service under the illusion that he will be 
freed from debilitating restraints imposed by devious or cowardly 
leaders and so be given an opportunity to conclude the war's unfinished 
business honorably. In Cosmatos' film, the betrayal of the Vietnam 
soldier is compounded, the stakes doubled, the potential for cathartic 
revenge increased.
The covert mission is directed by Marshall Murdock, a man who 
identifies himself as Head of Special Operations in Washington, and 
who alludes to his committee's interest in resolving the POW-MIA issue. 
While Murdock tells Rambo that he himself served in Vietnam and 
cares passionately about finding and rescuing POWs, he later explains 
to Trautman that it is doubtful any POWs will be found and that the 
whole mission is a public relations strategy to pacify special interests. 
Before being deployed, Rambo tells Trautman he knows Murdock lied 
about serving in Vietnam, and that Murdock is not to be trusted. 
Because of mis-timing, Rambo does discover a handful of American 
soldiers being held prisoner by the South Vietnamese and, instead of 
simply taking pictures, he actually brings a prisoner back to the pickup 
point. Murdock then aborts the mission — abandoning American 
soldiers as a sacrifice to political and economic expediency. Returning 
from witnessing the aborted pickup, Trautman confronts Murdock 
about the mission, shouting, ” It was a lie I Just like the whole damn war!'  
Murdock's reply is that Vietnam wasn't his war; he is just there to clean 
upthemess.bringittoa conclusion, and indulge in some “bureaucratic 
ass covering*. Once this conspiracy is revealed fully, Trautman has to 
be restrained and arrested to prevent him from assisting Rambo, and 
Rambo, even while being tortured by Russians, vows to return to “get* 
Murdock.
In Murdock the screenwriters have created a comfortable 
scapegoat. He is a politician accustomed to acting out of expediency, 
not principle; he is a bureaucrat quickto absolve himself of responsibility 
by pleading that he only follows the orders of those higher up; he is a 
technocrat who augments his own feeble powers with the most recent 
sophisticated computers, communications devices, and weaponry. 
Obviously, he is a foil for Rambo who lives by a personal code of honor, 
gladly assumes responsibility for winning “a war someone else lost*, 
and relies on his own mind and muscle. While Rambo gets tangible 
results by taking aggressive action in the jungle, Murdock manufactures 
false, image-saving political solutions in the comfort of his artificial 
environment. It is worth noting that Rambo is so burdened by the 
technological weaponry which Murdock provides that it nearly kills him 
at the beginning of the mission. Literally cutting himself free of this 
technological baggage in order to depend upon more primitive
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devices and his philosophy that "the mind is the best weapon',  Rambo 
authentically completes the mission that Murdock's dependency on 
artifice would have doomed to failure.
In First Blood. Part 2, protagonist and antagonist conform 
closely to the familiar conventions of American myth. Rambo is the 
archetypal American hero: his German/American Indian ancestry is a 
literal mingling of immigrant and native characteristics. His hometown 
in Arizona, his costume (bare chest, headband, necklace), his weaponry 
(bow with flaming arrows, Bowie-like survival knife), and his penchant 
for physical violence controlled only by a personal code of honor are 
clear reminders of the frontier experience which shaped the American 
character. And Murdock is a familiar antagonist for the frontier hero. 
He is from the city (Washington, D.C.), costumed in a white shirt and tie 
(a man of ideas, not action), dependent upon the artificial brains of his 
computers for decisions (and thus has no personal honor), and relies on 
the weapons of his functionaries for protection (shrinks from participating 
in physical violence).
Susan Jeffords argues that this sharp contrast between 
protagonist's and antagonist's style, behavior, and values in effect 
constitutes gender stereotyping: “Surrounded by comforts, computers, 
and loyal personnel, Murdock marks a clear feminine to Rambo's 
expanded masculine'23. In fact, the film's shot composition repeatedly 
supports this assertion. The Rambo character is photographed with 
angles, distances, and lighting which enhance Sylvester Stallone's 
well-developed musculature and place particular emphasis on his 
biceps and pectorals so that the physical aspect of his masculinity is 
exaggerated to the level of a cartoon figure like that of Arnold 
Schwarzeneggar in the Conan films. Moreover, when he returns to 
"get' Murdock he enacts a symbolic rape. First Rambo destroys 
Murdock's computers with gunfire while Murdock cowers in an adjoining 
room. Then Rambo bursts through the door, throws Murdock down 
across a desk, draws his knife, and lying on top of Murdock plunges the 
knife down next to his ear. Jeffords concludes that "this overtly sexual 
display confirms the defeat of the weak feminine by the phallic 
strength that is celebrated in all these recent Vietnam film s'24.
Feminizing the scapegoat is yet another facet of re-enacting 
American myth, specifically the flight of the male hero from civilization 
associated with the female and the restraints she entails. In this sense. 
First Blood. Part 2 is about reestablishing the masculinity of the Vietnam 
veteran, cast in doubt by the loss of the war. In this fictional resolution 
of the trauma of emasculation, the veteran reclaims the manhood 
deviously stripped from him by those "feminine' influences which 
constrained him from winning the war and recovering his captured
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comrades.
What, then, are we to make of Co, the female intelligence 
contact who guides Rambo to the POW camp and rescues him from 
his Russian torturers? Her first words to Rambo are, “You did not expect 
a woman, no?' And, indeed, women are excluded from the masculine 
universe of Ted Kotcheff's First Blood. Part 1 and do not appear in Peter 
MacDonald's Rambo 3. Co is an anomaly. She fulfills the conventional 
role of the woman in the Hollywood epic of male adventure, nursing 
Rambo when he is injured, cheering for him when he escapes death, 
providing an audience to whom he can explain his values and by 
whom he can hearthem confirmed, and, as a love object, she acts as 
something immediate and tangible for him to value and protect. But 
in her tenacious loyalty, her readiness to fight physically, and her 
courageous rescue of American POWs, Co assumes those desired 
masculine characteristics which Murdock's feminized character lack. 
Because Cosmatos locates evil in the feminine, Co can be a sympathetic 
character only if she is masculinized. Through the alchemy of fiction. 
First Blood. Part 2 projects masculine characteristics upon the female, 
andfeminine characteristics upon the male just as it projected American 
costume and tactics upon Soviet and Vietnamese soldiers, and the 
guerrilla behavior of the Viet Cong upon the American hero and South 
Vietnamese heroine. Cosmatos offers us a fiction which seems to 
reflect history's reverse image: the historical negative is projected as a 
fictional positive.
The result of the process by which fiction revises history into myth 
is the creation of closure. As a South Vietnamese still loyal to the cause 
for which her father died (preservation of a non-Communist state), Co 
reaffirms for Rambo the validity of his earlier trials in Vietnam. In her 
desire to leave Vietnam (which she defines as a place of death) and 
go with Rambo to America, she reconfirms that the values which the 
United States tried to export to Southeast Asia may not have taken root 
there but are still prized and worth fighting for. When Co is killed by the 
North Vietnamese, Rambo dons her good luck charm, vows not to 
forget her, and sets out with renewed determination to free the 
American POWs not only for the sake of US honor, but also in memory 
of those South Vietnamese who relied upon American promises and 
support. Rambo: First Blood, Part 2 provides a victorious surrogate 
closure to all of the unfinished items of business entailed in the Vietnam 
War: loyal South Vietnamese are brutally murdered and then properly 
avenged; POWs are rescued; the Vietnam veteran's manhood is 
restored; and, the effeminate politicians responsible for the war's loss 
are identified and brutally threatened.
The third Rambo film, Peter MacDonald's Rambo 3. moves the
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Vietnam War into the present by recreating it in Afghanistan. Stallone, 
who co-wrote the screenplay with Sheldon Lettich, rejected David 
Morrell's initial suggestion to set the story in Nicaragua, presumably 
because Americans were so divided on US covert involvement there25. 
Once again Morrell was interested in facing up to the complex and 
disturbing legacy of Vietnam, but the filmmaker preferred a less 
troubling scenario.
As Rambo 3 opens, the twice-betrayed veteran has retreated 
to find peace in a Buddhist monastery. When Colonel Trautman arrives 
to request his assistance in a covert mission in Afghanistan, Rambo 
declines. He tellsTrautman that “it'snot my war,' and refusesto believe 
that his involvement would make a difference. Only when Trautman 
is captured in Afghanistan does Rambo reluctantly join the war effort. 
The theme of the veteran'sabandonment by cowardly, lying American 
bureaucrats runs as strongly through this film as it does through its 
predecessor. An American embassy official, Griggs, helps Rambo 
infiltrate Afghanistan, but telsl him, “We can't do anything about it. Not 
officially. If you are captured, we will deny your existence.' Rambo 
replies, “I'm used to it.' Similarly, when his native guide, Mousa, tells 
Rambo, “If you fail, I will accept no responsibility,' Rambo remarks 
laconically, “Sounds familiar.' This time Rambo has taken on the POW 
rescue mission for reasons more personal than patriotic: Rambo 3 is a 
buddy film.
Despite its continued scapegoating of American politicians 
and bureaucrats, this film offers an even fuller opportunity for the 
audience to revise the negative image of America which is the 
historical legacy of involvement in Vietnam — this time by projecting it 
more completely and explicitly onto the Soviet Union. As Colonel 
Trautman tells his Soviet counterpart. Colonel Zaysen: “We already 
had our Vietnam. Now you're going to have yours.' The Green Berets, 
Rambo and Trautman, advise and assist the oppressed natives, who 
are victims of Soviet atrocities. These mujahadeen guerrillas ride 
horses, lurk in mountain caves, and fire primitive weapons against a 
massive Soviet army of occupation, which conducts genocidal search 
and destroy missions with helicopters, rockets, napalm, and automatic 
weapons. But once Trautman and Rambo have killed an enormous 
number of Soviets and have escaped the rest with the help of the 
mujahadeen, they decline any further participation in the war and ride 
off together in a jeep, sharing a joke about getting soft. The war is 
recognized as the proper responsibility of not only indigenous but also 
younger males like Little Hamid, who self-consciously imitates Rambo's 
super-masculine heroics. (It is possible that we are only one sequel 
away from Son ofRamboj. In Rambo .3 the screenwriters have recast
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America's role in a foreign war to illustrate that we have transcended 
the mistake that was Vietnam. American are shown acting in 
accordance with their mythic sense of self: peace-loving people who 
make war reluctantly and only for a righteous cause which ensures 
their triumph.
John Hellmann argues, in American Myth and the Legacy of 
V/efnam,thatourmore “realistic* national literature aboutthe Vietnam 
War illustrates profound disillusionment with the fundamental myth of 
our culture. Specifically, the lesson that the American Adam learned 
in Vietnam is “that his parentage ties him to a fallen past, that he is not 
an exception to history and the fallen world of time, but is rather a 
limited, fallible person whose destiny is in profound doubt'26. The myth 
of the American hero, who defines himself by fleeing from feminine 
civilization into a masculine wilderness where he is regenerated by 
violence exacted according to a code of personal honor, is challenged 
by many Vietnam novelists. David Morrell, in First Blood, contributes 
significantly to the restructuring of this myth. Morrell's Vietnam veteran 
returns home to demonstrate what he has learned abroad in a limited 
war presumably fought for reasons of national security. The code of 
machismo locks us into a sadomasochistic cycle of unregenerative 
violence — an unreasonably escalating use of physical force visited 
back upon the father by the son to whom he taught it — an American 
family engaged in mutually assured destruction.
Ted Kotcheff'sfilm adaptation of First Blood is a step backward, 
reaffirming the failed American myth by denying the history of the 
Vietnam War. In the film, a more restrained violence is justifiably visited 
upon a scapegoat by a heroic veteran who uses the guerrilla tactics 
he learned in Vietnam to restore America's lost innocence. Cosmatos' 
sequel, Rambo: First Blood, Part 2, is yet another step backward; one 
in which the veteran is elevated to a mythic savior whose special 
mission is to illustrate that America could have won the Vietnam War 
and still can free its soldiers from foreign captivity if it will only throw off 
the feminine influences which hold its masculine heritage enthralled. 
The retreat from history continues in Peter MacDonald's Rambo 3. in 
which Americans are shown that a war like Vietnam could only be 
perpetrated by the Evil Empire, and that it is the natural tendency of 
Americans to join with freedom fighters against oppression.
All three cinematic spinoffs exaggerate the masculine 
characteristics of the American hero and link him in a variety of ways 
to a conventionally fictive version of our country's frontier heritage. The 
second (and most popular) Rambo film most fully perverts Morrell's 
message by blaming America's failure in Vietnam on feminine rather 
than masculine failings. The third film inverts Morrell by showing Rambo
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blissfully bequeathing the American macho legacy to a foreign 
surrogate son. More than one analysis of recent political events 
suggests that such artistic revision supporting the myth of American 
power and innocence are not only eagerly sought out, but also acted 
out: 'Americans especially tend to live in a timeless and mythical world 
in which reality is not allowed to intrude very much upon the Walt 
Disney epic which insists that we are heroes, the defenders of freedom 
and justice, and the protectors of the weak and oppressed'27.
In 'Reporters of the Lost War.' Thomas B. Morgan concludes 
that in telling the Vietnam story 'rewriting history is the alternative to 
facing up to it.... To come to terms with what happened in reality, not 
nightmare or illusion, remains a debt of honor'28. The successive 
cinematic transformations of David Morrell's fictional but believable 
Vietnam veteran, John Rambo, deny the importance of any search for 
historical accuracy. In this case, American popular culture actively 
encourages the decision not to face up to the limits of America's moral 
and military power by providing a barely qualified .fantastic reaffirmation 
of belief in the myth of American innocence, righteousness, and 
invincibility.
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A HuNdREd HAppy S p a r r o w s : An 
AMERicAN V eteran  R eturns t o  V iet n a m
La r r y  Lee R o ttm an n
For Sister Huynh TN Mai and 2nd Lt. Peter B. Bushey
As all good historians know, the past Is a great darkness, and 
filled with echoes. Voices may reach us from It, but what they 
say to us Is Imbued with the obscurity of the matrix out of which 
they come; and try as we might, we cannot always decipher 
them precisely....
Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale 
P R E l u d E
This account of my return to Vietnam does not begin with the 
invitation I received in 1987 via the US-Indochina Reconciliation Proj­
ect. Nor with the decision I made ten years ago to go back if 1 had the 
opportunity. Not even with my original tour of duty as an American 
soldier. In fact, this story has as much to do with fate — or, as it's called 
in Vietnam, dinh-menh — as it does with my own plans and goals.
I was born on December 20, 1942, in Jefferson City, Missouri. 
(My father was a World War 2 Gl from a small farm near Marthasville and 
my mother was a schoolteacher from Kansas City.) That same day, 
halfway around the world, in Xom Giua, Vietnam, a small group of 
revolutionaries met to proclaim the creation of the National Liberation 
Front (NLF). These seemingly unrelated events lay at the foot of a path 
that would ultimately bring me face-to-face with Indochina twice.
I went to Vietnam for the first time in 1967, as a young off icer with 
the 25th Infantry Division. My second visit came exactly twenty years 
later, when I returned as a university scholar in search of materials for 
my Vietnam Literature class, as a father who felt a growing responsibil­
ity for the children of Southeast Asia, and as a veteran still trying to find 
answers to many questions about the war. not the least of which is 
“Why?*
Over and over, my day of my birth has been interwoven with 
events relating to Vietnam. On December 20 1960, an American 
military advisor was killed in an ambush near Tan Son Nhut Airport, 
becoming the first "official' US casualty of a war that was to last fifteen 
more years'.
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On December 20,1967 I spent my 25th birthday on a combat 
operation in WarZoneC nearthe Cambodian border. Five years later, 
on December 20,1972, while traveling as a journalist in the People's 
Republic of China, I visited the factory in Tsinan where the Chicom 
122mm rocket that nearly took my life during the 1968 Tet Offensive was 
manufactured. And on that same day, Nixon launched the infamous 
1972 Christmas Bombing (officially,"Operation Linebacker2) —twelve 
days and nights of high altitude warfare against Hanoi.
Thirteen years later, on December 20,1985, while driving down 
Highway 96 to my teaching job at a rural Ozark high school, I encoun­
tered an astonishing sight: a legless man with muscular arms “walking'  
on his hands along the edge of the road, ponderously propelling his 
upper body forward in eighteen-inch “steps'. He was alone, with 
nothing to indicate who he was or what he was about, except perhaps 
for the camouflage fatigue jacket he was wearing. I was already 
behind schedule, so with a honk and a wave, I drove by. But almost 
without realizing it, I slowed my car and pulled off the pavement. I sat 
a few minutes, torn between being late to school or surrendering to the 
undeniable urge I felt to talk to that solitary traveler. In the end, I turned 
the car around, and went back.
Bob Weiland is a former 25th Infantry Division medic who was 
trekking from Los Angeles to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Wash­
ington, DC, hoping to draw attention to the war-related problems of 
vets. Bob had been injured by an American mortar round transformed 
into a booby trap by the VC. The explosion killed his commanding 
officer... the lieutenant who had taken the place of the man who had 
succeeded me (Lt. Peter Bushey) when my replacement was killed. (In 
thirteen months, three of my unit's lieutenants were KIA, and one (me) 
was wounded.) Bob and I walked and talked side-by-side for about a 
mile, and made plans to meet at Springfield when he arrived there in 
a couple of days. Later that day, I mentioned this story to the school 
janitor, Dennis Cooper. He reacted incredulously, for he'd been 
wounded in the same ambush and had, in fact, been the guy who had 
loaded Bob's “remains' aboard the medivac chopper. Dennis had 
been sure that Bob was dead.
On the morning of December 20, 1987,1 left the States once 
again for Vietnam — a trip which proved to be filled with similar chance 
encounters. Most westerners would interpret this long and continued 
series of related incidents as simply coincidental, but Asians (and 
particularly Buddhists) believe otherwise. They know that dinh-menh 
determines which things happen, and in what sequence they occur. 
It is, as my friend Anthony Chi Tinh Do explains, an improbable but 
undeniable inevitability. I do know that when the opportunity for me 
to make a return visit to Indochina came, I wanted to go; felt com­
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pelled to go. As Sterling Silliphant has written about the Vietnam 
combat experience:
Something In the country, something in Its earth and among 
Its durable people, something In Its dawns and sunsets, had 
worked a quiet spell, so that It became in retrospect not the 
fault of the country or of its people, but the fault of those who 
were blind or willful, and you remember Vietnam with 
Inexplicable nostalgia as a place, sometime In better days If 
they ever come, you hunger to return to2.
The fact that I couldn't afford the trip, or that it would extend two weeks 
into my teaching semester, were obstacles I never even considered. I 
was going to go.
Travelling by way of Hawaii, Taipei, Korea, and Thailand, I 
arrived in Vietnam on December 30, 1987. For the next 24 days I 
explored a country I'd never really seen, meeting a people I'd never 
really known. I traveled from one end of the country to the other — from 
Hanoi to Hu§ to Ho Chi Minh City — from the former DMZto Dalatto the 
Delta — going by plane, bus, car, boat, bicycle, and on foot. I visited 
schools, factories, communes, offices, museums, libraries, cafes, mar­
ketplaces, theaters, farms, hospitals, and private homes. It was a 
journey during which I ultimately learned as much about myself as I did 
about Vietnam.
In T ra n sit
12/20/87 AM, Springfield. I depart on the morning of my 45th birthday, 
aboard an airline with the same name as my 1977 novel about 
Vietnam: American Eagle.
PM, Dallas. Shortly after takeoff, flight attendant Leslie (wife of a 
Vietnam vet) approaches me. She says her husband served with the 
25th Infantry Division. She thanks me for going back — says she wishes 
her husband would too; she feels it would help him. Later, the captain 
seeks me out. He's a pilot who flew jets out of Tan Son Nhut Airport in 
1967 and 1968. He says returning is “brave'. Says he'd like to go back, 
but never will. When I deplane in Los Angeles, both the pilot and Leslie 
are waiting for me at the door. “Thanks for going back and under­
standing,'they say. Both are misty-eyed. I'm amazed. The journey is 
truly underway.
PM, Los Angeles. The currency exchange at the airport has no 
Vietnamese money. A black clerk about my age (a vet?) is openly 
hostile to my request. He mutters, “Gooks... Communists.' His eyes 
bore into me and say, “Traitor... Dupe.'
PM,In Flight. My seatmate is An, known as Andrew. Fled Saigon in 1981. 
made his way to Thailand by boat, and thence to America. Just
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graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a degree in Electrical 
Engineering. His mother was originally from Cu Chi. and now lives on 
the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City. We chat about our travels. Andrew's 
on his way to Japan to visit his fiancee. I feel uncomfortable (why?) 
about my trip. I mention Korea, Thailand, but not Vietnam. He nods, 
and then asks, would I take a message and some money to his mother? 
(How does he know? Does it show?) Hehasnotseenhisfamilyforseven 
years. He mails money and medicine frequently, but apparently only 
part of it gets to them. Would I deliver a letter with some cash? He 
spends the next couple of hours composing his message which I agree 
to try to deliver. I leave the plane in Honolulu as Andrew continues the 
flight. We embrace. I look back once; he's watching me. I don't look 
back again.
12/24/87 PM, Waikiki. Celebrating my 21st wedding anniversary with 
my wife Francie, precisely 20 years after meeting her here while on a 
five-day Rest and Recuperation (R&R) from the war. I recall very little 
about that short week. One day I was eating cold c-rations in a muddy 
bunker near Dau Tieng, while angry Asians were trying desperately to 
kill me, and then — just 24 hours later — I was having lobster in a luxurious 
ocean-front hotel, with smiling Asian waiters at my beck and call. I 
remember being tired and jumpy, and threatening to fight the desk 
clerk about something petty. I suppose Francie and I walked on the 
beach and went souvenir shopping and watched TV and attended 
luaus and made love. I slept a lot, and didn't want to talk about the 
war at all. Then, before I knew it, I was back in Vietnam. If it weren't for 
a few faded photographs that Francie took. I'm not sure I'd believe it 
ever really happened. And, in truth, the gaunt, sunburned Gl in those 
pictures doesn't look at all like me.
12/26/87 PM, Waikiki. I talk to a wheelchair-bound Vietnam vet at the 
Ala Moana Shopping Center. He's bearded and bitter, and his arms 
are covered with military tattoos. One reads, “Willie Peter Will Make 
You a Believer!'3 He's outraged I'd even consider returning to Indo­
china, unless it was “to help teach them commie bastards the lessons 
we weren't allowed to last time.' “Fuck them motherfuckers,' he 
growls over and over, “Fuck them!'
12/27/87 AM, Honolulu. The Currency Exchange has no Vietnamese 
money. The clerk, a refugee from Da Nang, is amazed I'd even want 
any. “What for?' she asks. Why would anybody want to go there? 
PM, In Flight. The airline movie is an American classic, the original 
Captain Blood; a swashbuckling pirate tale starring Errol Flynn. I knew 
Flynn's son Sean, a free-spirited combat correspondent who disap­
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peared in Vietnam while riding his motorcycle toward Cambodia. 
(Sean Flynn was a wildman, and he served as the model for the 
character of the war-crazed photographer played by Dennis Hopper 
in the best movie so far about the war. Apocalypse Now.) Indochina 
draws nearer every minute.
12/28/87 AM, Seoul. I'm at the window of my downtown hotel, it's 3:06 
in the morning, and I can't sleep. I'm too wired. In the last eight days 
I've traveled over 8,000 miles, passed through eleven time zones. And 
crossed Into tomorrow at the International Date Line. My body doesn't 
know whether it's day or night, or even what day of the week it Is. But 
I can manage that. It's where I'm headed that's beginning to get to 
me. Up until now, I've been pretty cool about this trip, but tonight is a 
maelstrom of memories about Vietnam. I can handle the dreams 
okay. Justwakeupandtheystop. Not real. But memories are real, and 
the feelings they provoke cannot be ignored. I'm still 2,700 miles and 
three days from Vietnam, but just being back in Asia seems too close. 
When I finally do get back to Indochina, will I be able to separate the 
veteran from the scholar from the man? I don't know. It will surely be 
difficult, perhaps noteven possible. Perhaps not even desirable. I think 
I'm frightened; not for my safety, but for something more central. I'm 
not afraid of what I'll learn about Vietnam, but what I might learn anew 
about myself.
12/29/87 AM, Bangkok. From the air. the Thai countryside looks just as 
I remember. Green. Lush. Ordered. Clean. Calm. But after landing 
and leaving the airport, I see that Bangkok has become a major 
metropolis since I visited here two decades ago. Smoked-glass sky­
scrapers. Stainless steel office buildings. Eight-lane freeways. Neon 
billboards. Smog. Yet Bangkok also remains a city of hustles and 
hassles, clamor and confusion. Urine and sweat and rot and rain and 
incense and fish. Horns and whistles and bells and shouts and wails. 
Happiness and grief and hope and despair and anger and greed. 
Where swarms of swaggering and stoned GIs on 3-day leaves from 
Vietnam once congregated, knots of bright-eyed and befuddled 
American tourists now huddle together, clutching their belongings too 
tightly. Bangkok both is, and is not, as I remember it. I am, in that way, 
like Bangkok.
The first cinema I pass is showing Platoon, the Oscar-winning 
Vietnam warfilm written and directed by Oliver Stone, who served with 
the 25th Infantry Division the same time as I did. Outside the theater, 
long lines wait impatiently for admission. Mytaxidrivertellsmethatthe 
film has been playing in town for weeks, and it is wildly popular, 
especially among teenagers. It is curious that young Thais, not even
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bom when the war was raging, and from a culture which has a 
historical enmity for the Vietnamese, would attend Platoon. But then, 
I recall one of my 19 year old college students explaining to me that 
she'd gone to see the movie three times 'just to see what my parents, 
teachers, and politicians have been hiding from me all my life.'  Maybe 
Thais feel the same. Platoon, with its meticulous attention to military 
detail, unflinching examination of racism, cowardice, drug use, confu­
sion, hate and rage, and unsettling portrayal of the moral quandaries 
raised by the war, helped to launch the American resurgence of 
interest in Indochina4. I've seen the film a number of times, and shown 
it to my Vietnam Literature class, but I still can't watch it without 
weeping. And if I can't watch a Hollywood depiction of the war 
without coming unglued, then what the hell am I doing going back to 
Vietnam?
PM, Bangkok. Briefing by Philip R. Mayhew, Counselor for Political 
Affairs of the US Embassy. A cool performance, with just the right touch 
of casualness, shoptalk and scholarship. The perfect diplomatic brief­
ing by a glib and smooth professional. The most memorable Mayhew 
quote for the two hour meeting: 'The US has no vital national interests 
in Indochina." That's what millions of Americans in the Peace Move­
ment believed. That's what they anguished about, and wrote letters 
about, and demonstrated about, and got beaten up about, and were 
imprisoned, disowned, divorced, despised, fired, or exiled about. 
Cassius Clay (now Mohammed Ali) put it most succinctly when he 
publicly refused the draft: ' I  ain't got nothing against them Viet 
Congs."
12/30/87 AM, Bangkok. In just a few hours. I'll be returning to Vietnam. 
It still doesn't seem real. My mind is seething with images, memories, 
impressions, emotions, so that even though I desperately need to, I 
cannot sleep, not this night. My apprehension is so powerful, I wonder 
if it is visible to others, like some sort of dark aura. I was frightened last 
time, sure, but also excited and even a bit eager to really see a war, to 
test my courage, to measure my machismo. General Philip Sheridan 
once said, 'The bravest soldiers I ever had were sixteen year old boys, 
small for their age, who couldn't imagine dying." Part of me was like 
that. I guess. And even after seeing combat and becoming ac­
quainted with the real horrors of war, I still wasn't fully aware of the 
immorality of my own participation in it. That knowledge has come to 
me more slowly over many years. It is not an awareness that leads to 
personal tranquility, but a realization that unsettles me profoundly in a 
part of my heart where I rarely allow myself to look. So terrible are these 
memories and truths that I've never allowed them to come fully to the 
surface. These are memories far darker than the worst nightmares. I
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fear I will finally be forced to confront them head-on before this day is 
over. I am not ready. I want to call It off. I want to turn back. I am no 
longerfascinatedbyadesire.oracuriosity.tosee Vietnam again. Yet, 
I am compelled by circumstance, conscience, and dinh-menh to 
return. As I prepare to depart Thailand, my attempts to convert dollars 
to dong meet with astonished laughter at the airport. “Keep your US 
money,' the clerks advise. “Dong are worthless everywhere, even in 
Vietnam."
BAck In Co un try
12/30/87 PM, San Bay Nol Bai. At 1:36 PM I return to Vietnamese soil, 
twenty years, eight months, four days, seven hours and six minutes after 
I first set foot here. Customs is slow and thorough, but not unfriendly. The 
hassle of off-loading, processing, etc. is as ponderous and officious an 
any government procedure anywhere, and having to deal with it gives 
me little time to think about where I am; although I'm certainly aware 
of the sometimes hard (and always curious) glances, the N VA uniforms, 
the large photos of Ho Chi Minh, the distinctive and unforgettable 
sound of Vietnamese voices and music. I know I'm in the reunified 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I know it, but I don't think I believe it yet. 
PM, Highway 2. I climb into a Toyota mini-bus, and head for Hanoi, 30 
miles to the southeast. The asphalt road is narrow and rough, and 
crowded with heavy Russian trucks (and a few US Army Dodges), 
hauling dirt, rock, and construction materials. The land, which is part of 
the flood plain of the great Song Hong (Red) River, is flat and I pass 
Irrigated fields of rice, corn, potatoes, beans, and lettuce. The Song 
Hong is also called the River of Life. Off to the north stretches a row of 
small, verdant mountains, the Ngan Son. Alongside the highway, 
people are working in the fields. Some are planting rice, bent over 
nearly double as they push small shoots into the ankle-deep water of 
flooded pxaddies. Others are repairing or readjusting dikes and water­
ways. Some are drawing water from irrigation ditches or small streams, 
using the ancient method of two people, two ropes, and one bucket, 
swinging the bucket up and back in a movement and rhythm as old as 
civilization. It isaslow.simple. labor-intensive process. The pace of day- 
to-day life here is inexorably linked to the land (about 80 percent of the 
people live in rural areas) and hasn't changed much over the centu­
ries. Little boys herd geese, ducks, and water buffalo and swim nude 
in the ditches and streams. Adults and teenagers not in school are all 
hard at worktending charcoal kilns, making bricks, gardening, building 
or remodeling small masonry houses and working on the roads. In the 
tiny hamlets of Phu Vien and Ai Mo the houses are small, with only one 
or two rooms. Most cooking, washing, eating, and socializing is done 
in tiny hard-packed earthen courtyards framed with flowers and
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bamboo.
For a moment, part of me begins to feel good, almost comfort­
able. But I also feel a sense of unease, a sense of unreality. After all, this 
is Vietnam. These people are (or were supposed to have been) the 
hated enemy. I feel a bit naked without a rifle, flack vest, and steel 
pot... and someone to watch my back. Are there crosshairs trained on 
me at this very moment? I want to scan the treelines and paddy dikes 
for snipers, but I don't.
PM, Yen Phu. Sitting on my bed in Room 235 of the Thang Loi (Victory) 
Hotel, watching the sun sink slowly over Ho Tay Lake, I watch the lights 
begin to wink on across the water in a small fishing village. The hotel is 
a spartan but comfortable facility built out of reinforced concrete and 
native teak in the mid-1970s by a Cuban work brigade. I'm glad to 
have a private room, for I cannot imagine sharing, my thoughts and 
feelings with anyone this evening. I can't sleep, so I leave my room and 
stroll overto Yen Phu, which is comprised of many small masonry houses 
fronting on narrow, winding stone paths. The residents, used to strang­
ers from the nearby hotel, are not surprised to see a six-foot bearded 
Caucasian wandering about. They nod and smile. One curious old 
lady asks if I'm Lien xo, a Russian.
No, I shake my head. 'To ilanguo iM y." I'm an American.
"Ahhh.' she says sadly, 'x in  lo i.' Sorry.
Young children zoom around, running and playing in that high- 
energy, carefree manner little kids all over the world have. Older girls 
playjump rope or nhay lo co (hopscotch), whilethe boys play checkers 
or soccer. It's near evening meal time, and women are cooking rice 
and vegetables in tiny woks over courtyard charcoal stoves. Some of 
the men are returning from the fields or fishing boat docks. Others are 
finishing up the last of the day's work in backyard sandal shops, 
furniture factories, or brick kilns. I walk back to the hotel after dark, 
suddenly very tired. I fall asleep immediately and do not dream at all.
12/31 /87 PM, Hanoi. I'm at a New Year's Eve celebration at the Bo Ho 
Restaurant and Dancing Hall. I've just finished a meal of frog legs, beef, 
shrimp, snails, chicken, pork soup, eggrolls, rice, noodles, cucumbers, 
tomatos, etc., all topped off with lua m oi(vodka) and bia (beer). On 
stage the Viet My Band, 13 strong, is playing foxtrots, sambas, and 
tangos, while older couples glide elegantly around the floor. But from 
the second floor disco, I hear the unmistakable thump-thump of an 
electric bass, which suggests even more action. So up the stairs I go.
The disco is packed with hundreds of gyrating teenagers 
wearing Reeboks™ and designer jeans. The seven piece rock band 
West Division, equipped with modem electronic instruments and syn­
thesizers, is playing both Vietnamese and American rock music, includ­
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ing songs of the Beatles, Madonna. Whitesnake, and the Doors. The 
celebrants, mostly students and young workers, are friendly and talka­
tive. They say that life is good and that they are happy. They do tell me 
they don't like the fact that buses are old and jam-packed, that 
postage stamps are sometimes unavailable, that there is too much 
unemployment.that medical facilities are poorly staffed and equipped, 
that schools are rundown and overcrowded, that the national food 
distribution system is in disarray. But these young people also feel that 
the future is bright and they are convinced that the prosperity and 
freedom now being enjoyed by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are within 
sight for Vietnam. I smoke a “Hero' (popular Vietnamese cigarette), 
drink warm Heineken (imported via Singapore) over ice, and watch 
the dancing. At midnight, the Year of the Dragon will begin. Since the 
dragon was once the symbol of the emperor, and still represents 
power, weaith, and good fortune, many new families will arrange that 
one of the two children the government recommends per marriage will 
be born in 1988. At about 11:30 I excuse myself from the crush of 
revelers. Let the country's first postwar generation in a hundred years 
celebrate without me. I need to be alone.
My mind is swirling with the pictures of the faces of the nearly
60.000 GIs who didn't live to see this new year; with memories of those 
families at Can Tho and Ben Tre and My Lai who were massacred during 
the war; with love and longing for my beautiful ten year old son Leroy, 
who is growing up with a sometimes strange and haunted father who 
gets upset too easily about a place called Vietnam. It's nearly twelve 
now, and I'm sitting on the banks of Ho Hoan Kiem Lake. The streets are 
relatively quiet. A child runs out to the stoop and sets off a single 
firecracker. A solitary orange rocket arches over the water in the 
distance. Along the dark, tree-lined streets, fresh incense sticks glow, 
their evocative and haunting odor mingling with the other pungent 
smells of the night. Most Vietnamese are passing into 1988 quietly at 
home. They know it will be another tough year, to be sure, but the 
children are sleeping. And no bombs are falling.
1/1/88 AM, Yen Phu. I begin the first day of 1988 by exchanging money 
at the hotel. The official exchange rate is 500 dong per dollar (up from 
80 just last month, a devaluation designed to encourage tourism). 
However, nearly any xich-lo (three-wheeled bicycle taxi) driver can 
get you up to 2,500 on the black market. Since an average hotel room 
is about 1,250 dong per night, and the local beer is 100 dong per bottle. 
US currency (crisp, new $20 bills are preferred) goes a long way here. 
But with an annual inflation rate of nearly 700%, prices are still very high 
for the Vietnamese, whose average yearly income is approximately
60.000 to 70,000 dong. Breakfast is at 6 In the morning today, so that I
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can get into town in time to be one of the first in line at the state tomb 
of Ho Chi Minh. I'm not sure I want to go. but my hosts insist.
AM, Hanoi. Long shadows still shroud the black-slabbed mausoleum 
when I arrive. The tomb is located downtown, across a wide lawn of 
dark green grass and an equal expanse of smooth concrete. It was at 
this spot that Ho Chi Minh announced his country's independence 
from France on September 2 1945. The Viet Minh constitution was 
modeled after our own Declaration of Independence, and began. 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal....' The poet leader of a tiny country about the size of New 
Mexico (but which was able to overcome the might of China, Japan, 
France, and the United States), is laid to rest here; preserved for viewing 
in a somber air-conditioned marble building similar in style to the 
Lincoln Memorial. Vietnam reveres Uncle Ho with the same depth of 
feeling that America has for Honest Abe. I've been to Lenin's tomb in 
Red Square, and I viewed the body there with a sense of detachment, 
levity even, at such a gruesome, melodramatic, and morbid display of 
national bad taste. But Ho Chi Minh isn't just a name in a history book 
tome. I fought against his countrymen. I heard him speaking over the 
radio and I saw him on television and in films. And I witnessed dying VC 
proclaiming, 'Bac Ho muon nam\‘ (Long live Uncle Ho!) I sensed his 
presence in the fabric and spirit of Vietnam. He dedicated his entire life 
to national reunification and complete liberation from foreign control. 
“South and North are washed by the same sea,' he declared. “In our 
hearts there can be no boundary.'
I approach his cold and forbidding crypt with a sense of dread. 
The glass sarcophagus is located deep in the interior of the building — 
a hushed place, beyond the reach of outside light or sound. I enter the 
main doorway just as the early morning fog begins to lift. The entrance 
leads up a long red carpet, then a left turn on cold terrazzo floors to a 
half-flight of smooth marble steps, worn slightly hollow in just thirteen 
years by the endless lines who queue up daily to pay homage to their 
fallen leader. I tum right, climb another half-flight of stairs, then turn right 
for about ten feet. Another right turn, and I enter the exhibition room. 
It is cold here, and dark, with slick marble walls and floors devoid of any 
decoration, even a name. The body lies at rest in a recessed pit about 
six feet below floor level. Ho is sealed inside a large, ornate glass case, 
about five feet wide and eight feet long, and his body reposes upon 
a bed of rich plum-colored silk, surrounded by a wreath of delicately 
carved and highly polished teakwood flowers. Ho is dressed in his 
customary olive drab military uniform, bare of medals or any other 
Indication of rank. His delicate, small-boned hands rest lightly on his 
lower chest and his legs are covered by a dark purple quilt. The body 
angles slightly upward, so that even in perpetual repose. Ho seems to
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be overlooking the visitors who line up outside in Ba Dinh Square. The 
gentle old face, so often distorted in foreign cartoons, looks back at 
me. The famous wispy white goatee lies slightly off to the left, as if blown 
aside by a last- second puff of air when the casket was vacuum sealed. 
His is, even in death, a proud, princely.fatheriy face; aface to trust. The 
eyelids are gently closed, but around his eyes I can see the lines of worry 
and grief etched there by 79 years of war. The mouth is sensitive, as 
befits a true poet, but it is also firm; a mouth that reflects the personal 
resolve his countrymen never saw fatter, even in the most difficult and 
uncertain hours. But there is more in this darkened room than just Ho Chi 
Minh's body and silent echoes. I can feel it — on my skin and in my 
heart. Buddhists believe that the soul hovers above the body in its 
coffin, praying forthe forgiveness of those who offended the person in 
life. Of course. Ho hasn't been waiting over a dozen years just for my 
return, but as I pass out of the room I glance back and picture the very 
faintest twitch of a smile, as If Ho was letting me know that he knew I was 
here. At this moment I realize where I am and what I'm trying to do. It 
Is time to actively start seeking the resolution I've been drawn back to 
Indochina for. This is a turning point of signal proportion that I cannot 
deny, even if I want to. I leave the mausoleum reluctantly, and walk out 
Into a palm-shaded garden where a warm winter sun lights the faces 
of a long line of small children waiting their turn to enter the tomb. They 
are laughing and fidgeting, a hundred happy sparrows full of life and 
song; children who remember nothing of war, or Americans, or even of 
Ho Chi Minh.
1/2/88 AM, Hanoi. Meeting with Nguyen Can, the Deputy Director of 
the North American Continent Office of the Vietnamese Foreign 
Ministry. He says, ’Great and long-overdue changes are in the wind for 
Vietnamese-US relationships.' Can says he sympathizes with the 
families of American MIAs, but points out that there are over 300,000 
Vietnamese MIAs. And war, he notes, is never a neat business. In the 
informal discussion. Can reveals that his favorite American song is Bob 
Dylan's ’Subterranean Homesick Blues'.
PM, Hanoi. ’ I thought,' says Ngo Zhi Han, ’that America had gone 
crazy.' On my 30th birthday. December 20, 1972, the Christmas 
Bombing began, For 12 days and nights, at two hour Intervals, waves 
of US warplanes attacked Hanoi and Its environs. Giant B-52s released 
their complement of thirty tons of 500 pound bombs from an altitude 
of six miles. Ground-hugging F-l 1 Is  strafed the city with 20mm can­
nons. napalm, and willy peter. ’ I thought,' says Ngo Zhi Han. ’that 
America had gone crazy.' Back home in the States, Nixon interrupted 
200 million TV dinners to explain that only military targets were being hit. 
Most Americans didn't pay much attention to the broadcast. Han
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didn't get the message either, because she was buried in the rubble of 
the Kham Tien Elementary School, watching a classmate bleed to 
death. "I thought," says Ngo Zhi Han, “that America had gone crazy.'
1 /5/88 AM, Highway 1. Driving down the coast of the South China Sea 
toward Hu6 and Da Nang. This is the only overland route (along with 
the narrow-gauge railroad that parallels it) connecting northern and 
southern Vietnam. It was originally constructed over a thousand years 
ago by the emperors, who called it “The Imperial Road". Over the 
centuries it has been improved by the Vietnamese and various foreign 
occupiers. The Imperial Road was first paved by the French in the early 
1900s, and then, as relations between the two countries deteriorated 
into almost a century of war, became known to French soldiers as “La 
rue san jo ie ' (The Street Without Joy)5.
This is one of the most spectacular areas of the country. The 
towering and heavily forested Truong Son Mountains come right down 
to the water's edge in some places, forcing the road to snake back 
and forth as it clings to the rocky precipices. Vietnam is only about 50 
miles wide at this point, and the land between here and neighboring 
Cambodia is wild and virtually unsettled. Hundreds of waterfalls 
cascade down the mountains, cutting deep valleys where small rice 
paddies have been painstakingly carved out of the rock. The many 
streams form flat deltas when they encounter the ocean, and around 
them are tiny fishing villages, usually clustered around a central square 
and a Catholic church. In most cases, the beach is so steep and rocky 
that spray from the surf is flung high into the air, creating one glistening 
rainbow after another.
Nearer the ocean, and usually below the road, lies the railway. 
One train a day runs in each direction, loaded with boxcars and 
crammed passenger coaches. At five in the evening, the trains pull 
onto sidings for the night and the passengers set up camp with plastic 
tarps. straw mats, and hammocks. Meals are cooked, clothes are 
washed, children play, and just before dark everyone finds an isolated 
spot to “collect flowers' (eliminate body wastes). The train ride from Ho 
Chi Minh City to Hanoi covers 1,700 miles in six days, a picturesque but 
grueling journey.
PM, Highway 1. This whole trip, though fascinating, is very distressing. 
What has been for twenty years a repressed, constipating pain is 
gradually — underthe influence of the serenity of Vietnam — become 
a cathartic pain, a pain of release — almost as if I were giving birth to 
a new awareness. I haven't yet exorcised all my demons (if indeed that 
is ever possible), but I know this trip is helping me reach an accommo­
dation with them. The most difficult people to face here are notthe kids 
(who have no memories of war), northe unruffled elderly, who just want
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to live out the remainder of their lives in peace. No. the toughest to 
confront are those of my own generation; the veterans and widows 
who've lost limbs and loved ones. The look in their flat black eyes is not 
one of hate, but of astonishment; a look which says. “You were our 
hated enemy, how can you come back?' That's hard to take, and 
even harderto explain. But still, the visit so far has been a wellspring of 
release for me.
1 /6/88 AM, Hu6.1 enter Vietnam's sixth largest city by crossing the Song 
Huong (Perfume) River — named after the fragrant lemongrass which 
grows in its marshes — on the Cau Phu Xuan Bridge, which connects the 
two main parts of Hu6. During the terrible fighting ofTet 1968, guerrillas 
and regular NVA forces captured the north bank, including the down­
town area, the marketplace, and the ancient Imperial Palace, known 
as the Citadel. The south shore was in the hands of ARVNs and US 
Marines. In nearly a month of terrible house-to-house, hand-to-hand 
fighting, the central portion of one of the oldest and most beautiful 
cities in Vietnam was 110 percent destroyed (the extra 10 percent was 
added because not only was everything above ground demolished, 
but bombs and rockets also plowed up the soil to a depth of five or ten 
feet). My friend Randy, a Marine who participated in the battle for Hu6, 
describes the final assault to capture Cau Phu Xuan Bridge as a 
nightmare he'll never be able to forget. "We tried to run, but we 
couldn't.' he recalls, “because we kept slipping on all the blood. Theirs 
or ours, I couldn't tell, it all looked the same.' Thousands of farmers, 
fisherman, shopkeepers, housewives and students now cross back and 
forth over the bridge every day. and no one even seems to notice the 
sign at the south approach which states that the still scarred span has 
been renamed Hoa Binh, or Peace Bridge.
PM, Hu6. While touring the Citadel (which is being slowly rebuilt), I meet 
Duong Hoang Oanh, whose name means Yellow Bird. Oanh teaches 
English at the University of Hu£ and is conducting a tour of freshman 
students. She and her charges have never met an American before, 
but they have studied the US and know that my home town, Jefferson 
City, is the capital of Missouri. They sing for me a traditional song called 
“Long Me' (Mother's Heart) which compares a mother's love with the 
immense ocean, with the sweet sound of gentle streams, with the soft 
moonlight of mid-autumn. The chorus likens a mother's lullaby to the 
wind breathing through the rice fields in the evening. Oanh loves Janis 
Joplin, and thinks that America is “interesting and lovely'.
1/7/88 AM, Hue. Along the northern bank of the Perfume River, down 
a narrow, winding dirt pathframed by coconut palms and red blooming 
hoagiay. lies the home of Nguyen Van Huong, kitemaker. A bright pink
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Larry Rottman with some of the "Hundred Happy Sparrows" 
outside the tomb of Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, January 1, 1988. PHOTO BY 
HARRY HAINES.
A Veteran R eturns 127
500 lb US bomb converted into flower pot. Located in the Thang 
Loi (Victory) Hotel parking lot in Nha Trang, January 10th, 1988. 
PHOTO BY LARRY ROTTMANN.
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Mr. Nguyen Van Huoung, kitemaker at his workshop along the 
Perfume River in Hue, January 6, 1988. PHOTO BY LARRY 
ROTTMANN.
Along Highway 1, North of Qui Nhon. Grain from the fields is 
brought to the roadway for winnowing and shocking. PHOTO BY 
LARRY ROTTMANN.
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paper fish in the window catches by eye, and I enter the yard and ask 
a young man if I can meet the artist. He introduces me to his 
grandfather. I show Huong a wrinkled photo of myself with a big 
Missouri bass. He grins appreciatively and slaps me on the back. We 
talk fishing a while. Finally I thank him and prepare to leave, but he 
takes my hand and leads me upstairs to his cluttered workshop, 
overlooking the water. There he proudly shows me his more ambitious 
creations. Graceful and colorful birds and dragons and butterflies — 
all exquisite. We examine each one carefully. He explains just how 
they're constructed. His deeply veined hands flutter through the air, 
demonstrating how the kites fly. He shows me the delicate rice paper, 
the finely split bamboo, the homemade glue. We drink Boa Loc tea. 
Then Dalat wine. Smoke a couple of Hero cigarettes. He takes my 
measure. And then, as the room grows dim, he sends his teenage son 
into a back room. The boy returns with a dusty but still sinister kite 
modeled after a fighter-bomber. It is more than six feet long, silver with 
stars on its sides, and has a detachable bomb on each wing. Mr. 
Nguyen (somewhat sadly, I think) says it flies quite well but that he's 
flown it only once, 16 years ago. When he did, it made the children run 
away crying.
PM, Hue. At the State School on Le Loi Street, where Pham Van Dong, 
Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi Minh were once enrolled, I visit Mr. Hoa 
Minh's ninth grade physics class. The busy students take a break to tell 
me about their studies and their lives. And then, after about twenty 
minutes, the teacher asks me answer some questions about my coun­
try. I go to the front of the room, steeling myseff against the anticipated 
queries about the American bombing of Hanoi, the Marines' destruc­
tion of Hue. the massacre at My Lai. A dozen hands shoot into the air, 
and I apprehensively select one questioner. “I want to know,' she says 
loudly and clearly, 'about Disneyland.'
1 /8/88 AM, Phu Bai. There is very little left here of the former US Marine 
base, except rusty concertina wire and dilapidated buildings. The 
main street downtown features the Big Sound Dancing Club, on its 
marquee a picture of the Beatles, circa 1968. Nearby, the local 
cinema has a giant hand-painted billboard showing a guerrilla fighter 
with a big ivory-handled revolver, shooting at a hovering helicopterfull 
of mean-looking GIs.
1/9/88 AM, Da Nang. The waves on China Beach advance and retreat 
with an agenda uniquely their own. The tides here are more accurate 
than American watches, more punctual than French ministers, more 
durable than Japanese calendars, more predictable than Chinese 
invaders. The waves on China Beach advance and retreat the way
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wartime memories ebb and eddy around the edges of my daily routine 
at home, repeating over and over the gentle whisper of Ho Chi Minh, 
"The wheel of life turns without pause... Men and animals rise up 
reborn.' The waves on China Beach advance and retreat, and I kneel 
on the sand and weep the grief I've hoarded for twenty years.
PM, Da Nang. During lunch at the hotel restaurant I meet Le Minh. He 
was a professor of Literature and Letters (Latin and Chinese) at the 
University of Saigon until the liberation of 1975. Minh spent several years 
in a reeducation camp and. after being released, drifted into the 
finance and export business. Although there is officially no trade 
between SEATO countries and Vietnam because of the US-imposed 
embargo, there is a lot of fudging going on. For example. Minh 
arranges for the transfer of Laotian and Vietnamese teak to Japanese 
boatyards in exchange for motorcycles and electronic goods. Minh 
says that life is slowly getting better and. although he has considered 
returning to teaching (where he is badly needed), he feels Vietnam is 
on the verge of an economic boom. "Soon.' he says with a wry smile, 
“the best communist will be the one who makes the most money.'
1/10/88 AM, Highway 1. I'm driving north of Qui Nhon, still insight of the 
ocean, although I'll soon turn inland and head west into the central 
highlands. The more I travel this road, the more aware I become that 
it is much more than an avenue for transportation and communica­
tion. Highway 1 is also a 1,500 mile long workbench, and thus a perfect 
window on rural harvesting, commerce, construction, distribution, and 
socialization. For example, the road is a country-long crop drying 
surface. The warm, flat pavement is the perfect place to dry rice, tea, 
coffee, corn, wheat, shrimp, fish, manioc, and hemp. All along its 
length, farm families spread out their harvests on the paved shoulder, 
constantly turning the crops over and over with brooms and rakes. Rice 
and wheat and straw are threshed on the highway. Sugar cane is 
stacked for cutting and bundling. Baskets are built and sorted. Logs 
are piled and graded and peeled and cut up. Coconuts are husked. 
Straw mats are woven. Brickmakers stack and sort bricks on the 
highway. Stonemasons take their raw materials from the mountains 
Highway 1 cuts through, and then shape their building stones along its 
edges. Carpenters mill their planks into lumber, then use the wood to 
construct furniture right there on the road. Cattle are driven to markel 
down the highway. Water buffalo, goats, and pigs are walked to the 
fields along its length. Ducks and geese and chickens are herded up 
and down the way. The road Is also a playground, soccer field, 
badminton court, and basketball arena. And since the road usually is 
the main thoroughfare (and often the only paved street) in smaller 
villages, it is additionally the town square, festival center, marketplace.
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dance pavilion, bus stop, wedding aisle,funeral procession path, teen 
hangout and community meeting place.
To get a better feel for the character of Vietnam, I ought to 
bicycle (or, better yet, walk) the length of this road. But the trip would 
be difficult, mostly because many Vietnamese have never seen an 
American. They are fascinated. Curious. Even a bit frightened — not 
of me, or of my past military connections, but of my physical strange­
ness. My skin color. My height. My beard. My clothes. To stop in any 
small town. at any time. is to precipitate a near riot. In minutes the news 
is passed. People of all ages come to look at me, to touch me. It's like 
being an off-world alien. Everyone wants to see me, to leam about me, 
but no one knows who I am or what I'm doing in their village. The kids 
approach first, shyly but inquisitively. It doesn't take long for them to 
make friends with me. I pass out a handful of Superballs which I have 
brought along just for this purpose; and soon the balls are bouncing 
wildly all overthe highway. Next come the teenagers, bolder and even 
more curious. Then the grandmothers, who can be the sweetest and 
the most fun. Sometimes they pinch me hard just to see if I'm real (I leam 
to yelp in pain immediately and loudly. They like that). The middle- 
aged men usually hang way back. Many of them are former guerrillas, 
and are understandably reluctant to approach. Some feign indiffer­
ence. Others edge closer, too interested in an old enemy (whom most 
never met face-to-face) to resist the attraction. Grandfathers are 
usually the last to arrive but are often the most friendly. The old men are 
talkative, eager to discuss farming and fishing. Do you grow rice in 
America? How do you catch fish? I show them a nearly worn-out 
photo of my son, which is quickly passed from hand to hand. His blonde 
hair and open smile draw ohs and ahs from the crowd, and an 
aggressive matchmaker offers me a local girl as a potential wife for 
Leroy. I pass around the photo of myself with a seven pound large- 
mouth bass, a very large fish by Vietnamese standards. These pictures 
are a big hit and make excellent ice-breakers. Soon we're all talking 
at once, and laughing as we try using each other's native language. 
But a middle-aged woman on the outside fringe of the crowd reminds 
me sharply of a the past by shouting an all too familiar phrase: “Go 
home.GI. Go home!"
PM, Phu Cat. The 1986 Toyota minibus rocks through the vast dark as 
sharp images appear out of the blackness, then disappear: tiny 
roadside stands dimly lit by smoky kerosene lamps; ancient Buddhist 
shrines faintly illuminated by glowing joss sticks; a young couple side by 
side, hand in hand, on bicycles; three sleepy-eyed water buffalo; an 
old man pulling a handcart heavily laden with firewood; a group of 
laughing musicians walking home from a late performance. Unlike the 
working day with its hectic pace, the long night is calm and measured.
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People are at rest. Animals move slowly. But my restless mind fills in the 
void between images with dreadful dreams and memories of my first 
visit here, twenty years ago. We blow through Tuy An and “Pinkville 
North'. Inch up and down CuMong and Deo Ca Passes. It grows late 
and I become mellow. Even the turbulent surf of the South China Sea 
seems to become more tranquil. War damaged buildings, still unfilled 
bomb craters are all invisible at night. My thoughts drift. I think of 
peace, of resolution, of the future. Then Vinh, the driver, pops in a well- 
worn Gl tape and Dylan intones. "All the money you make can never 
buy back your soul.'  It's still a damn good song, Bobby, but you'll never 
know the half of it. Not even the half of it.
PM, Nha Trang. I find it increasingly difficult to sleep on this trip, not 
because of poor facilities, but because I'm so keyed up. Time seems 
so short that I want to spend it all — day and night — drinking in 
Vietnam. Seeing it. Feeling it. Tasting it the way I wasn't able to taste 
it twenty years ago. Experiencing Vietnam as it is. At work and at play. 
And at peace. I'm having formless dreams, impressions without plot, 
images without context. Things I've seen. Pictures I've taken. All the 
intense experiences of the last couple of weeks piled on top of that 
closely-held collection of memories from the war. My brain and heart 
are working overtime; overloaded with complicity and good inten­
tions. And even in restless sleep, I seek connections, looking for 
answers, searching for a way out of paradox, bridging gaps, forming 
and rejecting and reforming hypotheses, shaping responses. I'm like 
an over-heated early model computer, whirring and ticking, cumber­
some with blinking lights, slow moving mechanical parts, and bulky 
tapes that can't keep up with the incoming rush of new information. 
I'm backlogged. My input is days, weeks, months ahead of my output. 
But I want more data. I'm hungry for it. Wild for it. Desperate for it. I 
take it all in. I cannot get enough. And my need is not for percentages 
or statistics or numbers or committee reports or government docu­
ments or official briefings. I need faces and names. I never got to learn 
who these people were the last time. I spent a whole year here before, 
but I don't remember a single Vietnamese person. So far on this trip I 
have the names and addresses and photos of 81 people whose hands 
I've shaken, whose families I've met, whose meals I've shared, whose 
kids I've held, whose work I've shared, whose classrooms I've visited. 
And these are real people. Not slant-eyed rifle range caricatures; not 
blurred images glimpsed through dusty jeep windows, over barbed 
wire fences, or through bunkerfiring ports; not gruesome, stiff cadavers 
stacked high after a battle or a bombing; not ragged bleached bone 
bags rotting under a tropical sun.
I want to meet these folks. To hold them. Touch them. Smell 
their life and sweat. I want to know they are alive, especially the
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children. I need to be reassured that we didn't kill or poison them all. 
Or destroy their individuality or their collective spirit. I wallow in the 
happiness of the children, and am buoyed by their smiles, laughter, 
sense of life and purpose. A sleeping baby. A pregnant woman. A 
nursing mother. A young couple holding hands and making moon 
eyes. These are the sights that make my day. I don't give a damn at 
this point in time (and perhaps I never did) about who won the war. But 
I need to know that the country is alive and viable. It feels very good 
to know that Vietnam lives.
1/11/88 AM, Phan Rang. Whenever I think about my tour of Vietnam, 
thefirst thing I remember is the constant,terrible noise. Allthe time, day 
and night, in the local villages or big cities or thick jungles or open rice 
paddies — unnatural sounds. The crump of mortars, the shriek of 
rockets, the whistle of bombs, the clap of artillery, the rattle of small 
arms, the clanking of tanks, the squawk of radios, the crackle of flames, 
the shouts of men, the wails of women, the screams of children, the 
cries of prayer. But it's not like that here anymore. It's totally unex­
pected and strange to be in a Vietnam of peace and quiet, to hear 
everywhere natural sounds, and not the horrible din of war. The songs 
of birds, the grunts of pigs, the ripple of water, the echo of temple 
gongs, the hoofbeats of water buffalo, the patter of raindrops, the 
tinkle of bicycle bells, the peeping of tree frogs, the jesting of men, the 
banter of women, the laughter of children, the murmur of prayer.
1/12/87 PM, Dalat. In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (officially, at 
least) there is no Champa, no Buddha, no Sita, no Thien Hoa, and 
certainly no Jesus Christ. But down a crooked side street in Dalat, in a 
small bedroom above Dinh Gia Khan's welding shop. I'm shown a 
beautifully decorated pine tree and a wall-size hand painted banner 
proclaiming “Happy Merry Christmas!' The whole family gladly as­
sembles for a group photo. We laugh at jokes, exchange holiday 
stories. There are carols playing on a small cassette recorder. And no 
one notices that it isn't an authorized holiday.
1/13/87 PM, N’thong Lha. The K'ho people of the remote mountains 
along the Laotian border have been weavers for centuries. Their 
intricately designed cotton cloth bears traditional patterns reflecting 
their environment and culture. In a small stall at the central market, an 
ancient darkskinned woman displays tablecloths, door coverings, and 
blankets decorated with brilliant birds, animals, and flowers, along with 
a single red. white, and blue shawl that clearly stands out from the rest 
of her offerings. On a field of the whitest white, horizontal lines of blue 
and red are intersected by a hundred unusual geometric shapes.
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Close inspection reveals what was on the weaver's mind as she 
shunted the hand shuttle back and forth in her distant village. Giant 
silver birds of prey that lay explosive eggs.
PM, Bao Loc. This is a medium sized village located about halfway 
between Dalat and Ho Chi Minh City on Highway 20. At an altitude of 
3,000 feet, this area is famous for its coffee and tea. I buy two kilos of 
strong smelling, air dried coffee beans at the local market for 1,500 
dong. While here, I meet Linh Huong, a shoemaker. He shows me a 
letter from his brother Pham, who lives in Westminster, California. The 
envelope has $3.28 in US stamps on it, and the postmarks indicate it 
took about three months for the letter to arrive. Huong is proud of his 
brother, who is a computer programmer, but Huong has no interest in 
moving to America himself. He shows me a small stack of cassette 
tapes sent by Pham; mostly jazz and rock and roll. “Music in Vietnam 
is not for amusement, but for the expression of the soul,' Huong 
explains. “In America the pace of life is frantic and busy, because you 
must be active in the body in order to remain warm. Your music is too 
nervous, like yourselves.'
1/15/88 AM, Ho Chi Minh City. Whether you refer to it as Ho Chi Minh 
City, as the communists have decreed, or Saigon, as most natives still 
call it. this sprawling, bustling town hasn't changed all that much since 
1968. I've been here less than 24 hours, but it feels like I never really left. 
The smells, sights, character, and rhythm of Saigon haven't changed. 
Tthe form of government is different, but this city, which survived, con­
quered , or absorbed the influences of Chinese, French, Japanese and 
American occupations, has never surrendered its personality. Saigon 
is Saigon, and like the other great cities of the world it has a soul uniquely 
its own. It feels good to be back.
I'm staying at the legendary Caravelle Hotel, now redesig­
nated the Doc Lap (Independence). But Caravelle is still the name 
engraved on the building's facade and etched into the room keys and 
embedded in the memories and dispatches of the hundreds of journal­
ists who made this their temporary home. For nearly thirty years, 
correspondents from around the world gathered at the rooftop ter­
race bar to sip drinks, exchange gossip, pick up companions for the 
night, dance to the music of Filipino bands, and watch the war being 
fought in the distance. My room is number 208, overlooking notorious 
Tu Do (Liberty) Street — now renamed Dong Koi (Revolution) — and 
from my tiny veranda I can see the Saigon River several blocks to the 
east, and the docks where cargo ships from Russia, Cuba, Sweden, 
and Japan are moored. Four blocks to the west is the towering 
Catholic cathedral, in front of which Buddhist priests and nuns immo­
lated themselves In order to protest the war. (The first woman to die this
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way was Sister Huynh Thi Mai, who left this message after burning herself 
to death in 1966: “I am not mad and I am not unhappy. Life is beautiful 
and I wish I could have loved it to the end. But it is right for me to offer 
it for our country and our faith. May the responsibility for this act fall on 
the wicked men who rule Vietnam.”6) The Caravelle Hotel is located 
in the middle of Saigon, fronting Le Loi Boulevard, and just across the 
street from the old National Assembly Building (now a concert hall, 
where Vietnam's premier rock group. Bong Sen (Soaring Lotus) is 
performing nightly).
The most obvious differences between these and earlier Saigon 
streets are the absence of GIs, bars, whores, drug dealers, and Saigon 
cowboys. There are few motor vehicles now, and there is a 10PM 
curfew. Throughout Vietnam, all social activities cease at 10PM, 
except on holidays and very special occasions. Since the workday 
begins very early six or seven days a week, there are few complaints 
about this policy.
1/15/88 PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Located in the incongruous setting of a 
palm shaded French villa near downtown Saigon, the National War 
Crimes Museum makes a grim tourist attraction. I enter past a long row 
of huge American war machines: an M-48 tank, an APC-mounted 
flame thrower, a 155mm howitzer, a big pile of aluminum junk that was 
once a B-52 bomber, and a 1500 pound “hamburger bomb'. Inside 
the first exhibit building I confront a wall size enlargement of Ronald 
Haeberle's famous color photograph of the My Lai Massacre victims.
I find myself drawn to this hideous picture, and move close enough to 
the nearly life-size (death-size?) images to see the individual bullet 
holes riddling the sprawled bodies of women, children and infants — 
bullets which came from the smoking-hot guns of teenage GIs. I'm 
ashamed to have been in the same army as these men. It breaks my 
heart — again — to see such a wanton waste of life, such a terrible 
example of US xenophobia. I flee the room to escape those lifeless, 
accusing eyes and go on to the next display, which features the results 
of chemical defoliation agents, as illustrated by photos of grotesquely 
deformed newborns and a monstrous something in a glass jar. And 
here, on the wall, is a giant blow-up of a 1971 Boston Globe article 
stating: “Larry Rottmann, a former Army officer, testified that he knew 
of the presence and use of CBW (chemical and biological warfare) 
techniques in Vietnam.'7 Death dealing devices. Bloody children. 
Deformed babies. Three-armed, headless fetuses. And, in block letters 
two inches tall, my name. Seen by countless thousands of Vietnamese 
visitors and foreign travelers. Forever a legacy of my first visit here. Larry 
Rottmann... Larry Rottmann... Larry Rottmann...
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1/16/88 AM, Ho Chi Minh City. At breakfast I'm pleasantly surprised to 
encounter Dr. Ralph Timperi. of the Tufts University School of Medicine. 
He is in-country on a health related project, and Is a former colleague 
of Dr. Louis Weinstein, who treated me for war-related Illness in 1971. 
Ralph also served with the 25th Infantry Division in 1969.
PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Sua Van Qunh approaches me shyly at the 
Saigon Zoo. "You My?' she asks (my is the Vietnamese word for 
American). I nod yes. “You know Bill Smith?' she Inquires, and 
produces a faded photo of herself and a baby-faced Gl. Inscribed on 
the back, in ajuvenile scrawl, arethe words, “Aug. '66. Love, Bill.' “We 
engaged,' she proclaims proudly, and shows me a cheap PX wedding 
band with the gold plating nearly worn away. "He go States, but he 
promise come back for me, so I wait.' Her smile is strained, her tone 
resigned, but still hopeful. We sit together near the Elephant House and 
drink warm lemonade. I don't know what to say, so I tell her that 
America is a very big place and that I'm sorry but I don't know her Bill 
Smith. She sips her drink. Watches me closely. She is painfully thin but 
carries herself well for a woman of late middle age. "We engaged,' 
she repeats, “so I wait.'
PM, Ho Chi Minh City. A meeting with the Most Venerable Thich Minh 
Chau, Director of the Buddhist Center, and the monk who supervises all 
aspects of Buddhist life in Vietnam. The center provides the three years 
of education and training necessary to prepare young people to 
become monks and nuns. Since Buddhists have always been antiwar 
activists, their presence and programs have historically run afoul of the 
various Vietnamese governments, including the communists. Thich 
Minh Chau explains:
We are Buddhists first, Vietnamese second. Except for the 
teachings of Lord Buddha, we follow the same university 
curriculum as prescribed by thestate. There are some problems 
of course, but no restrictions on what we as a religious 
movement can believe. Obviously, the precepts of socialism 
and Buddhism don't always coincide, so this form of 
cooperation Is rather new and unusual. There Is often a failure 
of the socialist leaders to understand how this unity of state 
and religion can work, or be carried out. But both of us are 
trying to work out these problems.
PM, Cholon. One of the most striking differences between the Vietnam 
of 1968 and the Vietnam of today is the cleanliness and orderliness of 
the country. My wartime recollections are of a chaotic and filthy 
society, and it never occurred to me at the time that such disarray 
could be due to the war itself. Vietnam today is clean and well- 
ordered, withoutthe graffiti, litter, and piles of garbage that even some
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of the more advanced Third World countries like the Philippines or 
Mexico cannot seem to get rid of. Every morning people can be seen 
raking their small yards, or sweeping the sidewalks and streets in front 
of their homes and businesses. Neatness here is a matter of pride. 
Vietnam's cities and roads and parks are much cleanerthan America's. 
The legacy of the war is not always obvious, because for the most part 
the damaged buildings and bomb-cratered fields have been re­
paired. But missing limbs and napalm scars are not infrequent, and 
when I look carefully. I see US military hardware which has been turned 
to peacetime usage: defused bombs made Into flower pots. Gl steel 
helmets used as buckets, jet wingtanks turned into bathtubs and boats, 
and aircraft aluminum cut into roofing material, cooking utensils, and 
even a merry-go-round.
1/17/88 PM, Ho Chi Minh City. Meeting with Nguyen Co Thach, the 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at his offices (only the third air-condi­
tioned place I've visited; the others were Ho'stomb and the University 
ofHoChiMinhcomputercenter). The Minister is laid-back,friendly,and 
speaks excellent English. This is more of a conversation than a briefing, 
and there are no restrictions on topic. Some observations by Mr. 
Nguyen:
Without diplomatic relations, how can the US expect us to 
help more with the MIA Issue?... This has become a 
neverendlng story... and as long as diplomatic problems exist 
between our countries, nothing can be done about our 
mutual rmoral wounds.... I agree with James Res ton, who 
wrote In 1975, that ‘America has withdrawn from the war, but 
thewarhasnotyetwithdrawnfromAmerlca.'... Ourbiggest 
problem is that we've tost all control over our economy; for 
example, a kilo of steel Is worth only 6 dong, but a single egg 
costs 30 dong. This is stupid. The bureaucratic problems that 
exist between our countries — student exchanges, MlAs, 
Ameraslan children, refugees, etc. — are not good. But not 
because of deliberately bad Intentions, but because of the 
old wounds (both ours and yours) that remain from the war.
Isn't It time to focus not on the past, but on the future?
1/18/88 PM, Cu Chi. Sitting on the porch of Nguyen Van Sen's 
farmhouse, I can see the site where I was stationed twenty years ago. 
Sen raises sugarcane, wheat, and rice in fields reclaimed from the 
sprawling 25th Infantry Division base camp. In the courtyard. Sen's wife 
Kim is winnowing a big pile of rice, tossing it repeatedly into the air so 
that the breeze will blow the chaff away from the grain. In the distance 
three young girls scramble about on an abandoned US tank. Later, I
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explore a few of the hundreds of kilometers of VCtunnelsthat were built 
in this area, some of which ran right under our division's barracks. One 
of the longest extended for miles and was never discovered during the 
war because it had been constructed directly underthe middle of the 
main highway, where no one ever thought to look, and where the US 
(who depended on the road) never bombed. For a while I just wander 
around the area, lost in thought. I am not unhappy, just reflective. My 
capacity for remorse has been exhausted. I'm ready, eager, to start 
thinking ahead. About what I might do in the future regarding 
Vietnam, rather than continuing to dwell so extensively — to live so 
exclusively — in that bitter and confusing period of the past. What I'd 
believed was a bottomless well of grief has been dried up. I'm too full 
now of new names and faces and places and experiences and ideas 
to have room or time for that old sorrow. Maybe my hosts understood 
that — expected that — and have arranged the entire visit to con­
clude this way, on a hopeful note; or it could be that dinh-menh is once 
again at work. Perhaps this reconciliation has been my own personal 
agenda all along.
1/19/88 AM, Tan Son Nhut. For the second time in my life I'm leaving 
Vietnam behind, and from the very same airport. I remember that I'd 
thought we'd all cheer when we lifted off in 1968. but it was just the 
opposite. We grew deathly silent and didn't look at each other at all. 
I think we were all praying that the plane would not crash or get shot 
down. We just wanted to go home. We were damn glad to get out of 
Vietnam. This time, however, I feel a great sense of sadness about 
leaving. I'm not readytogososoon,so abruptly. But this Air France 747 
is full of Vietnamese who are voluntarily leaving their country, most of 
them forever, to go to America. They are anxious to depart. Life can 
be very hard here. As the plane lifts off .they begin crying and laughing 
and clapping and snapping pictures of themselves in their new free­
dom. And we're all flying in a luxurious airliner which was made in the 
United States and is owned and operated by a company in France... 
two nations who fought wars here, and lost.
BAck In ifiE  USA
1/22/88 PM, Honolulu. Coming through customs the agent (a vet) is 
astonished to see Vietnamese visas stamped in my passport. “You 
went back?' he asks. “Really?' He's now only going through the 
motions of examining my bags. “You went back voluntarily? I hated 
it. Hated it.' He pauses, lost In thought, then turns up the VC pith 
helmet, complete with red star, that I'd traded my Bass Pro Shop hat for. 
The Inspector is stunned. “Where'd you get this?' he asks, almost in a 
whisper. I tell him. “I hated Vietnam.'he repeats. He's lost all interest 
in my luggage now. He looks at me, but doesn't see me. I wait. Finally
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the question comes, hesitantly. "What's it like now?' I try to explain, but 
it's hot, crowded, rushed. People are pushing behind me, impatient. 
The customs agent ignores them. He listens, hanging on every word. 
He asks: Have I been to Da Nang? Did I see the airbase? What's the 
city like? How are the people? Do they hate us? I tell him that most 
do not. He's silent for a moment, then says. "If I were them, I would.' 
Finally, the inspector passes me on through, but as I leave he calls me 
back, takes me aside, and asks, "Do you think I could go back 
sometime?'
1/23/88 AM, Springfield. I land at the same airport I returned to twenty 
years ago. On the night I arrived home in 1968,therewasnoonehere 
to meet me. (It was three days before Lyndon Johnson announced he 
wouldn't run for reelection and fourteen days before Martin Luther 
King, Jr. was assassinated.) This time there's a group of TV, radio, and 
newspaper reporters waiting for interviews. I try to explain my feelings 
about the trip and describe what Vietnam and its people are like, but 
the journalists keep asking about the American MIAs and the commu­
nist government. I reply as best I can, and emphasize that I'm not a 
diplomat, only a concerned citizen and a veteran who went back for 
personal reasons. But just like many of their wartime predecessors, 
these reporters are more interested in political topics than human 
issues, and so they miss the whole point of my trip, and the larger story 
of post-war Vietnam8. The question that really needed answering was 
asked by Bernard and Marvin Kalb years ago:
The war has numbed us all. It's been going on for so long that 
It's grown a culture of Its own. It contaminates everything It 
touches — you, me, everyone. And what troubles me ... Is 
whether the damage Is temporary or permanent. Can you 
wash It off with a shower? Or are you dirtied forever?9
2/7/88 PM, Springfield. I've been back for a couple of weeks now, but 
I'm still having a difficult time readjusting. I'm busy at school and, on 
the surface at least, am getting caught up with classes, correspon­
dence, etc. But I still find myself confused for no apparent reason. I'm 
not out of control exactly, but I keep seeing things in a whole new light, 
an entirely new reality. I'm almost dizzy with distraction, and all the 
routine daily bullshit around me seems totally irrelevant. It's like a 
dream where I've left my body and I'm watching myself from a 
distance as I go through the motions of daily living. I know I am capable 
of controlling the scenario, but it just doesn't seem important enough 
to make the effort. I'm still on that journey which, in some basic and 
profound way, is altering forever who I am. I need the time and 
distance and space to try and put everything into focus, but I'm not
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getting it. I'm wired. Strung too tight. Tuned too high. Colors are too 
bright. Sounds are too loud. I'm accustomed now to the pace of life 
in Vietnam.whichissloweranddeeperthan in America. I know I wasn't 
ready to come back yet. Part of me remained back in Vietnam in 1968, 
and another part of me stayed there this time. I 've got to go back soon. 
I've been too busy since I came home to examine myself and see 
whether I've gained any valuable new perspective. But last night for 
the first time ever, I dreamed of Vietnam at peace.
The wheel of law turns without pause 
After the rain, good weather.
In the wink of an eye, the universe throws off its muddy clothes 
For ten thousand miles the landscape 
spreads out like a beautiful brocade.
Light breezes. Smiling flowers.
High In the trees, amongst the sparkling leaves, 
all the birds sing at once.
Men and animals rise up reborn.
What could be more natural?
After sorrow, comes Joy.
Ho Chi Minh, Priso n  D ia ry  123456*89
1 James T. Davis, a member of the US Army 3rd Radio Research Unit, was killed 
In action In December 1961, and Is usually listed as America's first Vietnam 
fatality. However, US Air Force Captain James B. “Earthquake' McGovern was 
shot down and killed while flying supplies to the French at the Battle of Dlen Blen 
Phu on May 6 1954. McGovern's name does not appear on the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial In Washington, DC, since only US casualties between 1959 
and 1975 are listed.
2 Sllllphant, Sterling. SteelTlger (New York: Ballantine) 1983:
3 “Willy Peter' Is a slang term for white phosphorus, a deadly burning chemical 
used In US bombs and artillery shells.
4 Rottmann, Larry. “Vets Remember' (review of P la toon), Sp rin g fie ld  N ew s- 
Lea d er (22 February 1987).
5 Fall, Bernard. Stre e t W ithout Jo y  (London: Pall Mall) 1965.
6 The first recorded Immolation was Thich Quang Due, a Buddhist monk, who 
died on June 11,1963 in Saigon. Immolations were conducted In an orderly 
fashion: “Reverend Mother Thich Nhu Hue... has been a nun for 35 years, and 
Is in charge of all the nuns In Vietnam... It's she who must give permission when 
one of the nuns wants to commltsulclde, and 150 requests await her decision.' 
Orlana Fallaci. N oth ing  and  So  B e l t .
1 Taken from testimony at the Winter Soldiers Investigation In 1971. Convened 
in Detroit, Michigan on January 31 and February 1 and 2, 1971 by Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War to provide a forum for soldiers who wanted to testify 
to having committed or witnessed war crimes In Vietnam.
8 Interview with the author, Sp rin g fie ld  N ew s-Lea d er (.February 2 1988).
9 Kalb, Bernard. The La st A m b a ssa d or (Boston: Uttie, Brown) 1981:
DispUTiNQ ThE WRECkAQE: IdEOloqiCAl
STRUqqlE AT t He ViETIMAM VETERANS
M e m o r ia l
Ha r r y  W. Haines
Even before its construction, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
(“The W all') achieved public and critical attention. Magazines, 
newspapers and television reports gave wide currency to Maya Lin's 
winning design, producing a mass mediated aura for the Memorial 
before it took shape on the Washington Mall. These early reports, and 
the Memorial itself, helped initiate what political elites had long avoided: 
an ideological struggle over the meaning of the Vietnam War, the 
symbolic political function of Vietnam veterans, and most significantly, 
the rationale for American deaths. This ideological struggle continues 
to unfold at The Wall, a ritual site where pilgrims enact complex 
relationships with casualties and history. The Wall now functions as a 
potent and politically volatile sign of the citizen's relationship to others 
and to the state1 and does not, as Griswold2 argues, “separate war and 
politics'. On the contrary, the Memorial provides a locus of ideological 
struggle, revealing the political nature of the current rejntegrative 
phase of Vietnam's "social drama'3 as various ideological blocs 
struggle to assign meaning to the war, Vietnam veterans and the 
dead.
BREAkiNq t He SUence
The Wall helped initiate a reintegrative — or healing — process 
in the aftermath of what Fox Butterfield4 describes as “a trance of 
collective amnesia,' during which the war was officially “forgotten' by 
political elites and Vietnam veterans were effectively removed from 
public discourse. The “trance' (an example of the productive capacity 
of hegemony) served the interests of political power by avoiding a 
potentially damaging analysis of the structural relationships and 
assumptions5 which produced the war as “an ersatz conflict, invented 
for protecting artificially conceived vital interests'6. Additionally, the 
"trance' provided time for the regrouping of political interests in the 
immediate aftermath of an ideological crisis. Historian Marilyn Young7 
observed:
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The fundamental Institutions which gave rise to the Vietnam 
war have hardly changed; what has changed is the credibility 
of the Imperialist Ideology which justified that war. From the 
viewpoint of the State, that Is the wound that must be healed.
Serving as the anomaly in the reassertion of structural credibility, the 
Vietnam veteran was simply silenced; a profoundly tragic process 
which David Rabe8 predicted in his politically controversial play. Sticks 
and Bones. The absence of a strong political consensus (shattered by 
the war's ideological crisis) positioned the veteran as a potentially 
volatile sign of a failed strategy, what Gibson9 calls “mechanistic 
anticommunism'. The process of hegemony silenced the veteran by 
providing no position from which to speak about the war. This process 
is revealed in mass mediated representations of the veteran as either 
a victim or psychotic, two variations on the theme of repression10, and 
is strengthened by its indictment of the antiwar movement as the 
source of the veteran's discontent.
The Wall, in effect, broke the silence of the immediate postwar 
years, returned the veteran to discourse and initiated the ideological 
struggle which now characterizes the reintegrative phase. Televised 
rituals introduced the Memorial and alsofocused on how veterans and 
others used it to enact their sense of loss. These widely disseminated 
rituals forced political elites to verbally recognize Vietnam veterans for 
the first time since the end of the war and spawned several 
“homecoming parades' which Michael Clark11 has called examples of 
“historical surrealism'. The Wall produced Vietnam veterans and the 
war dead as objects of ideological struggle, reflected in subsequent 
mass media representations, including Rambo, Platoon, and various 
television programs such as Magnum, P.I.; The A-Team; Tour of Duty; 
China Beach; and Vietnam War Story. Significantly, the veteran's 
return to discourse occurs during a revisionist period, and the process 
of hegemony — no longer able to silence veterans — adjusts to the 
new conditions by developing therapeutic and disciplinary strategies. 
Nowhere are these strategies more evident than at The Wall.
DispiJTiNq TtlE WRECkAqE
Sensingthe potential cooptation of their lived social experience, 
the antiwar Vietnam veterans argued against anyattempt to represent 
the dead in the form of public architecture. Marine combat veteran 
W.D. Ehrhart's12 poem, “The Invasion of Grenada,' expresses an 
oppositional view:
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I didn't want a monument 
not even one as sober as that 
vast black wall of broken lives.
I didn't want a postage stamp.
I didn't want a road beside the Delaware 
River with a sign proclaiming:
’Vietnam Veterans Memorial Highway.'
What I wanted was a simple recognition 
of the limits of our power as a nation 
to Inflict our will on others.
What I wanted was an understanding 
that the world Is neither black-and-white 
nor ours.
What I wanted
was an end to monuments.
Ehrhart implies "an understanding' which recognizes Vietnam's social 
reality, the very thing which US war managers attempted to obliterate 
by the deployment of technology and rapid modernization13 and 
which hegemony attempts to further marginalize by means of historical 
revisionism14. Thomas Roberts15, an activist in the soldiers' antiwar 
movement, suggested alterations to what he expected would be the 
"typical' war memorial: "Defy the typical motif by situating the slab 
sunken, sucking air for meaning.' Roberts envisioned an archlight 
beaming across the Mall, illuminating a monumental crater, "the ashes 
of 50,000 John Does... scattered to the bottom.'
Ehrhart and Roberts responded bitterly to what they saw as the 
predictable cooptation of the war dead. They understood intuitively 
what Waiter Benjamin14 concluded in the 1930s: "Even the dead will 
not be safe from the enemy if he wins.'  And they were right to fear the 
cooptation of the Vietnam experience by political interests determined 
to use veterans and casualties to justify future interventions. But the 
ideological struggle centered at The Wall developed in unexpected 
and unpredictable ways, and this struggle is worthy of examination.
Since its construction in 1982, The Wall has quickly developed 
as a popular attraction in a city accurately described as a “tourist 
district'. Elaborate sightseeing rituals are evident, and the Memorial 
demonstrates what MacCannell17 identifies as several phases in a 
process of "sight sacralization,' in which attributes formerly reserved for 
holy places are ascribed to tourist attractions in the modem world. The 
ideological struggle to assign meaning to the Vietnam War emerges at 
the Memorial in what MacCannell identifies as the “naming' phase18. 
Naming activities include public speeches, other administrative
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messages and various news accounts functioning to define the 
Memorial and to thereby define the war and veterans. For example. 
President Jimmy Carter signed the Memorial's construction authorization 
with these words:
A long and painful process has brought us to this moment 
today. Our nation, as you all know, was divided by this war.
For too long we tried to put thatdlvlslon behind usby forgetting 
the Vietnam war and. In the process, we Ignored those who 
bravely answered their Nation's call, adding to their pain the 
additional burden of our Nation's own Inner conflict” .
Clearly, the Memorial is to be a sign signifying both a sense of loss forthe 
dead and a sense of reincorporation of the survivors. It is the sign of 
community refound, as if the Nation is coming to its senses following an 
incomprehensible lapse in memory (the trance of collective amnesia). 
Carter locates the Vietnam veteran as a carrier of a special “burden," 
a unique repository of America's war-related contradictions. He 
names the Memorial as a sign of national expiation, a sign through 
which Vietnam veterans are purged of an unidentified “inner conflict". 
Hegemony's therapeutic strategy unfolds even before the 
groundbreaking.
The Memorial, veterans, and by implication, the war itself are 
furtherpsychologized in the naming phase. The idea for a Vietnam War 
memorial originated as the response of one veteran to a mediated 
version of the war, the feature film The Deerhunter. Former infantryman 
Jan C. Scruggs, tormented by flashbacks after seeing the film, formed 
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund in April, 197920. He was joined by 
several volunteers, many of them wives and mothers of soldiers killed in 
the war. By January 1980, Congress authorized the memorial, and all 
one hundred Senators co-sponsored the bill. The Fund announced a 
juried competition for memorial designs in October 1980. Texas 
millionaire H. Ross Perot provided seed money for the competition. 
Submitted designs were required to list the names of all the dead and 
missing Americans and to demonstrate sensitivity for the site, close to 
the Washington Monument and Lincoln Memoria21!. Thq_se!ection 
criteria required that the design be apolitical in the sense of expressing-"  
no specific position on the correctness of the war.
From among 1,421 entries (the largest design competition in 
the United States or Europe), a jury of eight prominent architects and 
sculptors selected the design of 22-year-old Maya Lin, an undergraduate 
student of architecture at Vale University. The Lin design was selected 
in May 1981, and approved by the National Capitol Planning 
Commission, the Fine Arts Commission and the Department of the 
Interior. In October 1981, a bitter opposition emerged; a significant
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development in the naming phase. Wounded Vietnam veteran Tom 
Carhart, now a civilian lawyer at the Pentagon, called the design ’a 
black gash of shame and sorrow,' and asked the Fine Arts Commission:
Are we to honor our dead and our sacrifices to America with 
a black hole?... Can America truly mean that we should feel 
honored by a black pit? In a city filled with white monuments, 
this is our reward for faithful service22.
Although Carhart's own proposed design (a representational 
figure of an army officer holding the body of a dead infantryman to the 
sky) had been rejected, his opposition to Lin's design was apparently 
based on criteria of stylistic ’normalcy'. For him, Lin's design was 
symptomatic of the disorder. Where the Commission saw ’dignity', 
’nobility', and ’serenity', Carhart saw ’shame and sorrow', the 
veterans' burden all along. He was joined by author James Webb, a 
decorated Marine Combat veteran who later served as Secretary of 
the Navy, and Assistant Secretary of Defense. Webb called Lin's design 
a ’wailing w a ll'23. Perot also opposed the selected design and 
opposition grew when the Chicago Tribune called it ’a monumental 
insult to veterans'. Those agreeing with Carhart and Webb wanted the 
Memorial to be white and above ground, similar to other monuments 
in Washington, DC.
Congressional opposition gathered, and Interior Secretary 
James Watt withdrew his support in January 1981, six weeks before 
groundbreaking. Scruggs then drew upon support from national 
veterans' groups and influential military leaders to fight the opposition. 
Secretary Watt, named by Congress to oversee the design process, 
ordered Scruggs to seek a compromise. Throughout January and 
February 1981, conflicting sides argued and finally agreed to a 
compromise design which included a flagpole and a representational 
statue by Frederick Hart. Despite the acrimony of the early naming 
phase, the actual ceremony marking off the Memorial was 
characterized by these selected statements:
Army Chaplain Max D. Sullivan: ‘ May this place be a holy 
place of healing.'
National Commander of the American Legion Jack W. Flint:
’ The suffering and the loneliness (the veterans) bore when 
they returned home... are finally at an end. The frustration and 
confusion of the American people, long willing but unable to 
express their gratitude and appreciation to a generation of 
unselfish patriots. Is finally at an end.'
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Executive Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Cooper T.
Holt: '(the Memorial will help) create an accord out of our 
bitterest military experience since the Civil War.'
Virginia Governor Charles S. Robb (President Johnson's son- 
in-law and Marine combat officer In Vietnam): * I wasn't able 
to answer 'why' (when writing to the families of men killed 
under his command), and this memorial doesn 7 attempt to 
sa y  w hy but It does sa y  we cared and we remembered. 'M
Jan C. Scruggs: "The American people were divided by the 
war... but one point that all Americans can agree upon is that 
Vietnam veterans deserve recognition and appreciation for 
their sacrifices. Let this memorial begin the healing process 
and forever stand as a symbol of national unity.'25
The Memorial is named a therapeutic place of healing and 
accord, an expression of gratitude and national unity, a unique 
physical location where consensus emerges, where suffering, loneliness, 
frustration and confusion are purged. The trance of collective amnesia 
is broken in 1981, as America “remembers'. But it is a specific kind of 
remembering, identified by Governor Robb. The memory istherapeutic 
and not his+oric. The most important question Robb pondered mile 
writing to the survivors of dead Marines remains unanswered even as 
consensus is attained.
Since its introduction in 1982, the Memorial has quickly 
developed as the focal point of the national memory of Vietnam. This 
memory is produced as the product of ideological struggle and takes 
material form in the broad range of activities which now occur at the 
site. The Memorial's ambiguous stance generates a shifting symbolic 
ground, a fluctuating, constantly renegotiated field in which visitors 
enact the meaning of the Vietnam War. Based on his ethnographic 
observations at the Memorial site, Ehrenhaus26 categorizes the visitors 
according to three types of behavior and how these behaviors embody 
particular types of social meaning.
Mourne.scome “insecularpilgrimage'.oftentoleave "artifacts 
ofcommemoration' atthesite. The mourners include Vietnam veterans 
who treat the Memorial as “sacred ground'. Meaning arises from the 
personal truths of remembrance in the liminal encounter of the living 
and the dead27.
Searchers have no personal relationships with the names on 
The Wall: they search for ways of participating as broadly as possible 
in discovering the Memorial's meanings', and “they use mourners and 
their artifacts as focusing lenses'. For searchers, meaning arises in part 
from memory, but mainly from the chance and momentary encounters
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with mourners and artifacts of the Memorial's social world.
Volunteerswere initially mourners or searchers, and have made 
a commitment to the Memorial as a place of ’genuine experience'. 
They serve as caretakers who help visitors and who watch over 
veterans overwhelmed by their encounters28.
As Ehrenhaus' observations suggest, these three groups 
constitute an ever changing social and political context for the 
Memorial. Their ritualized behaviors help keepthe Memorial's meaning 
open and resistant to closure and ideological containment. Their 
presence maintains an organic quality in the ideological struggle over 
the war's meaning. Foss29 attempts to explain the extraordinary 
popularsuccess of the Memorial byfocusing on the design'sideological 
ambiguity, a product of the design criteria. Because ’no one meaning 
emerges from the memorial', each visitor must Dring his or her own 
meaning to bear upon the names in granite, and each must see his or 
her own reflection — the self — among the dead, and this helps explain 
the development of the Memorial as a site of pilgrimage. The Wall's 
ideological ambiguity acknowledges what Scarry30 calls ’the referential 
instability of the hurt body'. In her analysis of ’the structure of war'. 
Scarry focuses attention on the phrases: ’to kill for his country' and ’to 
die for his country', the universal ideological declarations in warfare. 
The killing and dying constitute ’a deconstruction of the state as it 
ordinarily manifests itself in the body'31, requiring ’the appended 
assertion (either verbalized or materialized as in the uniform), 'for my 
country". The Wall avoids the ’appended assertion* and assigns no 
heroic motivation whatever to the injured bodies recounted in the 
names, but otherwise significant by their absence. Only individual 
names accumulate as war's wreckage, prompting the Ncrtional Review 
to complain: ’The mode of listing the names makes them individual 
deaths, not deaths in a cause; they might have been traffic accidents.'
But the list of names makes it possible for the Memorial to 
simultaneously comfort the visitor while evoking an interpretation of 
profound loss. As a sign of the injured body, the Memorial's names and 
how pilgrims acknowledge them work against the political cooptation 
Ehrhart and Roberts feared. The injured body, represented by the 
individual name, develops as the sign of the deconstructed nation, 
and this sign is enacted in the ritual of touching The Wall. By touching 
an individual name, the pilgrim acknowledges the injured soldier's 
absence from social relationships, locating Vietnam ’as an experiential 
and historical fact in the lives of... families'32 and in other social 
networks extending across time. Pilgrims further acknowledge the 
injured body by leaving artifacts proclaiming the individual 
characteristics of lost soldiers, placing the loss within specific social 
settings.
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Each name locates the meaning of war in the lived, individual 
experience of a specific casualty, whose absence from social discourse 
extends the meaning of war to the community. Each name is a sign of 
an injured body, a life lost at a specific moment in time. Because the 
names are listed chronologically, and not alphabetically, the reader 
must search for a specific name according to the specific moment of 
loss. Occasionally, an alphabetical arrangement breaks the precise 
pattern of representation, and "we know that here were the men of a 
single platoon, wiped out together in a single engagement'33. Instead 
of serving as a sign of the structure of war. the injured body signifies 
what Gilligan34 calls the ’structure of interconnection*.
Foss35 reports that “supporter and protester of the war alike' 
often respond to The Wall with the term "eloquent'. But this eloquence, 
this ambiguity, opens the Memorial to ideological struggle and makes 
it potentially susceptible to the hegemonic process now evident at the 
site (as well as in other cultural forms, including mass media 
representations of the war). More than any recent example of public 
architecture, the Memorial provides a concrete instance — a perfect 
model in material form — of Stuart Hall's36 observation that "no 
guarantees' exist in ideological struggle. The design's ambiguity 
makes it peculiarly open-ended as an object of struggle, suggested by 
its widespread use by a variety of political factions as a symbol of the 
war's meaning. By claiming The Wall, conflicting groups claim the 
memory — the "lessons^ — of Vietnam for their various agendas. The 
meaning of the Memorial remains open. The hegemonic process has 
not yet fully coopted it. but not for want of trying.
ThERApy ANd DiscipliNE
Hegemony attempts to coopt the Memorial by therapeutic 
means, demonstrated by Veterans Day ceremonies in 1984 and 1988 
which administratively normalized the Vietnam veteran. At the 1984 
ceremony, President Ronald Reagan officially accepted the Memorial 
on behalf of the nation. The acceptance came a few days after the 
unveiling of Frederick Hart's representational addition to The Wall and 
climaxed a week-long series of events called Salute 2. a sequel to the 
1982 National Salute to Vietnam Veterans in which 150,000 veterans 
marched through Washington forthe televised opening of The Wall. In 
newspapercoverage,Sa/ufe2organizersstressedthetheme "American 
Veterans — One and AH', a conscious appeal to integrate younger 
Vietnam veterans with older veterans of earlier, more successful wars. 
This model of transgenerational positioning would take subsequent 
form in film and television representations of the Vietnam veteran 
within the conventions of World War 2 combat films, thereby 
decontextualizing the Vietnam War by removing it — and Vietnam
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veterans — from specific historical circumstances. One newswire 
reporter explained that Salute 2
was billed as part of a 'healing process' for those veterans, 
many of whom relumed from Southeast Asia to be spat at by 
anti-war protesters as 'baby killers' and by veterans of 
America's victorious wars as 'losers'37.
Administrative power offers a therapeutic position for Vietnam veterans, 
“hailing'38 them as World War 2 heroes and demonstrating hegemony's 
ability to smooth over ideological contradictions, to make them seem 
natural and right, or what Hall39 calls “’good sense,' which — leaving 
science to one side — is usually quite enough for ideology*. In Salute 
2. acknowledgement of the Memorial is intended as reintegration of 
the Vietnam veteran, as well as identification of the veteran's “burden*, 
left unspecified by President Carter four years earlier. The theme of 
healing and reintegration is stressed throughout the newspaper reports 
of the ceremonies and emerges as the central administrative message 
in President Reagan's 11 November 1984 speech of formal acceptance, 
quoted in detail by New York Times reporter Ben A. Franklin40:
'This memorial Is a symbol of both past and current sacrifice,'
Mr. Reagan said.... 'The war In Vietnam threatened to tear 
our society apart, and the political and philosophical 
disagreements that separated each side continue, to some 
extent,' he said. 'It's  been said that these memorials reflect 
a hunger for healing.
‘Loyalty and Valor' Praised
* I do not know If perfect healing ever occurs... but I know that 
in one sense when a bone Is broken and It Is knit together well, 
it will In the end be stronger than as If It had not been broken.
I hope that before my days as Commander and Chief are 
ended, the process will be completed.'
'Le t me say this to Vietnam veterans gathered here today,'
Mr. Reagan said, 'When you retuned home, you brought 
solace to the loved ones of those who suffered the scars.... But 
there has been a rethinking there, too. Now we can say to 
you, and say as a nation, thank you for your courage."
'There has been much rethinking by those who did not serve, 
and those who did.... There has been much rethinking by 
those who had strong opinions on the war, and by those who 
did not know which view was right. There's been rethinking on 
all sides, and this Is good. And it's time we moved on. In unity
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and with resolve, with the resolve to always stand for freedom, 
as those who fought did, and to always try to protect and 
preserve the peace.'
Hegemony produces a new position for the veteran, who is 
"subjected, used, transformed and improved'41 by therapeutic and 
disciplinary means. The Memorial symbolizes "both past and current 
sacrifices', linking the Vietnam Warto a continuing vigilance necessary 
to “protect and preserve the peace*. The cost is great but it is 
nevertheless a normal condition in which Vietnam is a specific example 
of a general type. Vietnam veterans are “those who fought*, those 
who stood “forfreedom*, as Americans have always stood f orfreedom 
— and still do. The Vietnam War is normalized in terms consistent with 
American political ideology, the deaths are made rational, and the 
veterans are whole once again, stronger for their expiated burden.
The message identifies the veterans' burden as “little solace,* 
the lack of compassion and acceptance given to combat veterans by 
their countrymen once the war was lost. The lack of solace is further 
specified as a characteristic of Americans “unable to distinguish 
between* a generalized abhorrence for war and “the stainless 
patriotism* of Vietnam veterans. The contradictions of the veterans' 
firsthand experience42, the war's “counterfeit universe*43 are explained 
as ‘philosophical disagreements* in the process of resolution. Where 
disagreement existed, a consensus is manufactured which attemptsto 
integrate the Vietnam veteran with other veterans and to normalize 
the Vietnam War in terms of other wars. For the veteran, the price of 
reintegration is the revision of memory to coincide with hegemony's 
newly produced consensus. Many veterans are willing to accept these 
terms, a measure of their postwar isolation. Hegemony structures “the 
field of other possible actions'44 open to some veterans, who bring their 
interpretation of Vietnam in line with prevailing interpretations, enabling 
a therapeutic function of the Memorial. In this way, Vietnam veterans 
may become what Hall45 calls ‘fully paid-up members of the consensus 
club*, the sign of the reintegrated society.
Veterans D ay 1988
The 1988 Veterans Day ceremonies at The Wall, televised by the 
C-SPAN cable network, served several political interests. It provided an 
opportunity forthe American Legion National Commander. HF “Sparky* 
Gierke, to briefly mention the results of a study showing that ‘almost 
two-thirds of those who experienced heavy combat* in Vietnam 
‘ reported delayed psychological and other health effects*46. Gierke 
told the crowd of about 10,000 persons47: “The problems faced by
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these veterans are real. They are not self-inflicted. They are veterans 
who need help but are not getting it from a country they served.'
Psychologically distressed veterans remain an ideological 
anomaly in the hegemonic process whereby Vietnam veterans are 
hailed as World War 2 heroes. Such veterans signify ideological crisis, 
what Lewis48 identifies as a disconfirmation of meaning. Thev continue 
to occupy a social role which inherently questions the credibility of the 
policies which hegemony now reasserts. Their distress is politically 
volatile. Significantly, Gierke insists that the problems are “not self- 
inflicted', implying a basis for the problems within the structure of the 
war itself, but his comments are ignored by other speakers who share 
a common objective: the production of Vietnam veterans and the 
war dead as signs of ideological certainty — as signs of a reconstituted 
consensus. For example, Virginia Senator-Elect Charles Robb reminded 
the crowd that the 1984 ceremonies had consecrated the Memorial as 
“a holy place', and he linked the reconciliation of veterans to the 
broader concept of foreign policy49:
Perhaps In no other area Is the need so acute as In the area 
of foreign policy. We have to proceed on a bipartisan basis 
for a course of energetic engagement, a policy that vigorously 
asserts America's Ideals and defends her interests abroad, a 
policy that establishes our role as an Inspiration to oppressed 
peoples everywhere.... And It must be a policy that neither 
renounces nor relies exclusively on the use of force, a policy 
tempered but not paralyzed by the lessons of Vietnam.
Robb'sfinal comments implied what “the lessons' might include. 
He called for the nation to “stand for support of democracy ad human 
rights and vigorous opposition to tyranny,' an agenda which “the 
memory of our fallen brothers and sisters' in Vietnam is intended to 
inspire. Hegemony again obscures the contradictions of American 
involvement in Vietnam by decontextualizing the structural relationships 
betweentheUSwarmanagersandtheSaigongovemment —structural 
relationships in which corruption and tyranny were the norms?0. The 
Vietnam War dead emerge as signs of political consensus for a 
renewed policy of containment,the very policy which failed in Vietnam.
Other speakers developed the theme of reconciliation and 
closure. The ceremonies occurred one month after Election Day, and 
John Wheeler, Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, 
called for political unity. The ceremony also marked the approaching 
end of the Reagan administration. Behind the speakers podium a 
large banner read: “Vietnam Veterans Memorial Thank You Mr. 
President!' Wheeler explained that Reagan had intervened in behalf 
of the Memorial's construction when Secretary of the Interior Watt had
152 Vietnam Generation
moved to block it, and Wheeler added51:
President Reagan brought the Vietnam veterans home. He 
brought us home In the sense of according us respect and 
opening the door so that we can continue to serve our 
country.
In 1981, the separation between Vietnam veterans and our 
country was a very deep wound. There had not been a 
condition like that anywhere In our country's past. Now, eight 
years later, there's been a remarkable reconciliation.
Here, Wheeler comments directly on the therapeutic nature of the 
ideological process which began unfolding atthe Memorial and within 
other cultural forms once the Vietnam veteran was returned to discourse. 
Hegemony, in the form of administrative action, signals a new 
acceptance and, for some, opportunities. For this, Wheeler thanked 
the President, who called Vietnam veterans “gentle heroes' and 
“champions of a noble cause'52:
I am not speaking provocatively here. Unlike the other wars 
of this century, of course, there were deep divisions about the 
wisdom and rightness of the Vietnam War. Both sides spoke 
with honesty and fervor, and what more can we ask In our 
democracy? After more than a decade of desperate boat 
people, after the killing fields of Cambodia, after all that has 
happened In that unhappy part of the world, w ho can d oub t 
th a t the ca use  fo r w N ch o u r m en fo ug ht w as ju s f t  (Miles 
added)
It  w as. a fte r a ll. how e ve r Im p e rfe c tly  p ursue d , the ca use  o f 
freedom . And theyshowed uncommon courage In Its service.
Perhaps at this late date we can all agree that we've learned 
one lesson: th a t young A m e ric a ns m ust ne ve r ag a in be se n t 
to fig h t a nd  d ie  u n le ss we are  p re p a re d  to le t them  w in. (Italics 
added)
The therapeutic strategy takes form as administrative expiation. As in 
1984, veterans are reminded in 1988 that they fought for freedom in 
Vietnam, but were not permitted to win the war. Here the strategy 
relies directly upon what Kimball53 identifies as “the stab-in-tne-back 
legend' which holds thatthe Vietnam Warwas “lost' by weak politicians, 
civilian strategists, antiwar activists, news reporters and others and is 
“founded on arch-conservative and militaristic assumptions and values'. 
The strategy is especially powerful in its ability to ascribe an anti­
veteran position to its critics, and this parallels stab-in-the-back
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arguments which equate "criticism of containment militarism with 
disloyalty'54.
The ceremonies generated a photo opportunity which further 
deployed the strategy throughout various media, including the front 
pages of the 12 November 1988 issues of the New York Times. Los 
Angeles Times, and the Washington Post. The photo provides an 
instance of ideological condensation in which the productive power 
of hegemony takes material form. The photo shows President and Mrs. 
Reagan in the role of mourners at The Wall, identified in the following 
captions:
The New York Times: President Reagan and his wife, Nancy, 
at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. Mr. Reagan said that 
despite divisions over the war, 'who can doubt that the cause 
for which our men fought was Just?'
Los Angeles Times: Nancy Reagan reaches out to the wall of 
the Vietnam War (s/c) Memorial as she and the President pay 
a Veterans Day visit.
The Washington Post: As the President looks on. First Lady 
Nancy Reagan reaches out to touch wall of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial.
The photo opportunity extends the process of ideological cooptation 
into the rituals which produce the war's meaning. Hegemony claims 
The Wall for the specific needs of a reasserted consensus implied in the 
President's speech. The ideological struggle focused on The Wall 
includes attempts to reassert a consensus which serves power in three 
ways: it closes debate on the structure of American policy in Vietnam; 
it provides a therapeutic and politically useful reintegration for veterans; 
and it facilitates future military interventions based on an improved 
and more fully rationalized Vietnam model.
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On tHe Cover of t U e  RoIUnq Stone: 
TowarcI a ThEORy of CuIturaL ThERApy
K aLi T aL
On the cover of the 7 April 1988 Rolling Stone there is a picture 
of Martin Luther King. He's looking toward the future and his head fills 
the page, even covering a portion of the Rolling Stone logo — and the 
issue carries the headline ‘Portrait of a Generation.' ‘An 
unprecedented poll of young Americans: What they think about their 
lives, their county and their leaders.'  ’ Rolling Stone paints a picture of 
a generation whose idealism springs from the example of the civil rights 
movement, and whose disillusion is bom partly of the assassinations of 
its cherished heroes — Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy — but 
"more profoundly the bitter disillusionment resuiting from the war in 
Vietnam'2. According to the Rolling Stone survey, the lessons this 
generation learned from Vietnam were "totally negative'3. The result 
of the Vietnam experience is that a generation consumed by the idea 
that it could rebuild the nation in its own idealistic image has given up 
this dream and retreated back into itself. No longer Interested in the big 
issues, most members of the generation prefer to Involve themselves In 
local causes like anti-drunk driving campaigns and neighborhood 
crime watches.
According to Rolling Stone, the members of this generation 
have also turned against the idea of enlisting in the military and fighting 
for their country.
Asked to select situations under which they would enlist, 27 
percent of the men surveyed could not Identify any situation 
that would lead them to enlist; 22 percent said they would 
enlist if America's strategic Interests were threatened; 19 
percent said they would enlist to keep a third-world nation 
from falling to communists; 33 percent would enlist if our close 
European allies were attacked; and 73 percent would enlist 
If war broke out on the North American continent4.
Rolling Stone concludes that foreign-policy planners are just going to 
have to live with this ‘ stunning political fact'. They argue that there is
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no longer a patriotic consensus supporting the cold war, and that 
skepticism has replaced belief in the necessity of foreign entanglements. 
Only 16 percent of the members of the generation think that the U.S. 
should have fought the Vietnam War. 55 percent favor staying out of 
other conflicts which might resemble Vietnam5. Top on this generation's 
list of foreign policy objectives is slowing down the arms race, chosen 
by 47 percent.
All of this might be heartening if the rest of the study didn't 
present so many troubling contradictions. For example, when asked 
why the U.S. had not won the Vietnam War the largest percentage of 
respondents (36 percent) said that they "felt the United States failed to 
make a great enough military effort.'  And the second most important 
foreign policy goal (next in line after arms reduction) is stopping 
terrorism. "41 percent said they would mildly or strongly favor a 
president who was committed to developing Star Wars.'6
Rolling Stone comments on the “split vision' of the generation, 
remarking that
This generation favors the Idea of redistributing Income to 
produce more equality, but It Is opposed to tax Increases.... It 
wants the government to stop terrorism and maintain a strong 
defense, but it also wants the country to end global hunger 
and stay out of foreign conflicts. ... The future leader who 
captures the Imagination of this generation will be the 
candidate who breaks free of his or her party's standard 
rhetoric and unashamedly embraces these contradictory 
yearnings7.
The last sentence in that paragraph is particularly striking. 
Standard rhetoric will no longer do. Contradictory yearnings should be 
uncritically embraced. A rational stance is no longer necessary, even 
as a pretense, asserts Rolling Stone. How have we come to this place?
An indication of where to look for an answer is provided by a 
recent study on the Civil War by historian Eric Linderman8. I originally 
approached Linderman'sstudy, Embattled Courage, with the intention 
of comparing the contemporary process of developing a new improved 
image of the Vietnam combat soldier to the similar process of revision 
described by Underman. Linderman argues that the Civil War resulted 
in the destruction of cherished soldierly ideals in both soldiers and 
civilians on both sides. Soldiers, whose notions of honor and glory had 
undergone radical change when they were subjected to the rigors of 
the battlefield, resented their treatment by the civilians who had sent 
them off to war. And civilians, heartilysick of war, wanted nothing more 
to do with soldiers. This situation lasted some fifteen years until around 
1880 when Americans once again became interested in hearing
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about the Civil War. Linderman argues that
As the Civil War was Incorporated in public ritual and the 
reputation of soldiering rose, participation In war became an 
Important mark of merit. Honor attached itself less to 
courageous or cowardly conduct, battles won or lost, causes 
preserved or destroyed than to one's simple presence in the 
w ar.... As community ritual magnified the war, the war began 
to magnify all those who had fought and lived9.
This reassessment (which came some fifteen years after the 
Civil War) seems mirrored in the revisionist histories of the Vietnam War 
which began appearing in the early 1980s. The current reinterpretations 
seem particularly ominous in light of Linderman's observation that: 
"The values young men carried to war in 1898 were again those of 
1861.... But the picture of war that sons carried to Cuba was false 
because their fathers' memories had become false to the war of 1864­
6 5 .'10
With this argument in mind, I began to document and describe 
the phenomenon of the appearance of the Vietnam War in public 
ritual and popular culture, and correlate that process with our growing 
military presence in Central America. The argument seemed particularly 
compelling in light of the recent headlines describing U.S. troop 
movement in Honduras, and the first hints that we might consider using 
military means to secure our access to the Panama Canal.
But the 7 April issue of Rolling Stone forced me to reevaluate 
both my argument and my methodology. Pop culture rag that it is. 
Rolling Stone had a point: as a generation, we docontradict ourselves. 
Somehow, those contradictions must be dealt with. I don't buy the 
Rolling Stone ideal of synthesis — the idea that one candidate, or party 
or platform might really be able to reconcile all of those conflicting 
desires. Many of those desires are mutually exclusive, and anyone who 
looks at it rationally ought to be able to see that. But I do think they are 
correct in identifying what it is that we want. And this raises new 
questions: What is the process which causes clearly drawn ideological 
lines to blur and fade over time? What are these clear ideologies 
replaced by? How do new ideologies come into being?
The first possibility that comes to mind, of course, is a comparison 
with Kuhn's” description of scientific paradigms — old paradigms do 
not fall apart gradually, but are replaced only when a complete new 
paradigm emerges and when the powerful proponents of the old 
paradigm have died off. Kuhn's explanation, however, is not sufficient 
for understanding the gradual process of paradigmatic metamorphosis 
which seems to be occurring as this generation shifts piece-meal from 
one ideological stance to another.
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Another problem with Kuhn isthat ideologies cannot be equated 
with scientific paradigms; the purpose of an ideology is not to explain 
a given set of phenomena, but to provide a social, cultural and 
political framework with which a human being can assimilate and 
interpret events. Ideologies 'renderotherwise incomprehensible social 
situations meaningful,' they ’construe them as to make it possible to 
act purposefully within them '12. Exchanging one ideology for another 
is almost always the result of some discomfort, some problem, with the 
original ideology.
The decision to shift from one ideology to another is not made 
at the level of group decision, however. Psychologist Daniel Goleman 
provides us with a description of one of the important factors shaping 
ideological shift in his book Vital Lies. Simple Truths: A Psychology of Self­
Deception. Goleman attempts to tackle the difficult question of how 
people choose their particular versions of reality in order to cope with 
the anxieties of their day-to-day lives13. ’Technically speaking,' he 
says, "cop ing ' is the term for a range of cognitive maneuvers that 
relieve stress arousal by changing one's own reaction rather than 
altering the stressful situation itse lf.'14 He adds: ’ If the locus for anxiety 
in the world is immovable, then that leaves room for change only in 
how one perceives the w orld .'15 Certain areas of thought, or events, 
are blocked out or revised — seen in ’shadow'.
Though coping mechanisms occur on an individual level, they 
have a cumulative social effect:
The collective mind Is as vulnerable to self-deceit as 
the Individual mind. The particular zones of shadow for a 
given collective are the product of a simple calculus of the 
schemas shared by Its members. The areas of experience 
blanked out In the most Individual minds will be the darkest 
zone for the group as a whole.
Cultures and nations offer the best examples of this 
principle writ large. ... An index of a culture's uniqueness, 1 
suggest. Is Its blind spots, the particular elements of reality the 
cultural 'we' represses to ease anxieties16.
If this is an accurate assessment, the examination of the popular 
culture generated by a nation or a people takes on entirely new 
meaning and significance. The nature of this shift might best be 
explained by a use of the methaphor of the patient-therapist 
relationship. The duty of the therapist is to be an objective listener, an 
outsider, a mirror to the patient who is revealed to him or herself 
gradually during the course of successful therapy. The therapist listens 
carefully to what the patient says, and takes even more careful note 
of what the patient does not say. As a patient's coping methods are
Cultural T herapy 161
gradually made conscious, the patient then has the opportunity to 
discard mechanisms which were once successful but which may now 
be self-destructive or damaging.
Popular culture reflects the unconscious decision of a society to 
represent or repress particular events and conditions. A culture's 
representations may provide the best map forthose who are interested 
in studying its blind spots. Susan Kappeler, a feminist theorist who writes 
chiefly about the implications of pornographic representation, has 
thought deeply about the significance of representations as cultural 
objects. In Pornography and Representation, she explains that:
Representations are not Just a matter of certain objects — 
books. Images, films, etc. The structure of representation 
extends to ‘perceptions' and self-images, the anxious pose of 
the bourgeois community In front of the camera of public 
opinion.... Representation Is thus one of the most fundamental 
structures of conceptualization, centered on the subject. Just 
as fiction Is not Just a matter of stories In books, but of narrative 
conceptualization In general ... perception Is the 
representation of something to oneself, a conflation of the 
author and the audience In one single subject. Perception 
externalized Inserts Itself Into the structure of communication 
between different subjects: author and audience may be 
separate Individuals. It will therefore be expedient to look at 
representation in the context of communication17.
Popular culture mediums do not simply reflect the ideas and 
opinions of the mass culture, but are part of an ongoing dialogue 
between members of that culture, shaping and being shaped by their 
individual anxieties and fears.
This process is described quite well by Jean Elshtain, who
asserts:
Narratlvesof warand polltlcsare Inseparable from theactMties 
of war and politics; each — writing about and doing war and 
politics — are practices existing In a complex, mutually 
constitutive relationship. I espouse no vulgar notion of mimesis 
here. Rather, stories of war and politics structure Individual 
and collective experiences In ways that set the horizon for 
human expectations In later epochs.... The politics of the text 
distorts by expressing exaggerated fears and hopes — 
amplifications that go on to become embedded In practices18.
And this brings me back to the Rolling Stone survey. If we take 
their challenge seriously and try to create a coherent ideology out of 
the generation's “contradictory yearnings' we are certainly doomed
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to failure. The challenge is, itself, a part of the problem — a gesture of 
faith in illusion, a declaration of the need for a new coping mechanism. 
We must, instead, question the ideological framework that supports 
such a challenge.
The metaphor of the therapist seems, once again, peculiarly 
suitable. A therapist notes his patient's delusions, but does not 
participate in them, will not be drawn into the conversation on the 
patient's terms. The mental health care worker who operates on the 
level of societies rather than individuals might properly be called a 
“cultural therapist." And it is as a cultural therapist that I will approach 
the problems posed by Rolling Stone.
The cultural therapist, examining the survey results gathered 
from questions about the Vietnam War, would formulate certain 
important questions: 1) What are the bases on which this generation 
has decided that the U.S. should not have been involved in the 
Vietnam War? 2) What fears oranxieties are reflected in this generation's 
reluctance to involve itself in foreign wars which it perceives to be 
similar to the war in Vietnam? and, 3) In what terms are these issues 
addressed?
The third question is the most crucial, and it is certainly the one 
which would benefit most from the examination of a cultural therapist. 
The terms of a discussion limit and define appropriate topics and 
arguments. For example, the Rolling Stone survey asked which one of 
four factors best explained why the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam:
36 percent said they felt the United States failed to make a 
great enough military effort. Twenty percent cited the a ntl war 
protests and the lack of support In the United States for the 
war. Another 20 percent felt It was because of the lack of 
adequate military and civilian support from our South 
Vietnamese allies, and 8 percent said It was because of the 
strength and numbers of the opposing communist forces'9.
What is the framework for the discussion here? Distinctly missing 
are any factors which might be part of a moral or ethical discussion of 
American involvement, or which might offer some kind of historical 
perspective. The designers of the survey cannot be held entirely 
responsible for their omission, which is reflected in the culture as a 
whole and has been noted by other Vietnam War scholars. The 
tendency to limit discussion of the Vietnam War by confining the arena 
of discussion has been recognized by both traditional and popular 
culture historians. The following two quotes illustrate this observation. 
Historian William Gibson notes:
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(In the 1980s) The w ar... disappeared as a topic for study and 
political consideration and Instead became dispersed and 
Institutionalized in the complex of medical, psychiatric, and 
legal discourse. Itwasaslfanewserlesof medical and Judicial 
problems with no traceable origin had appeared In American 
society. Orrather.although It wasack no wledged that Vietnam 
was the origin, once the word 'Vietnam' was mentioned, the 
war itself was dismissed and discussion moved on to how an 
Institution could solve the problem20.
In popular culture discourse, as well, the terms of the discussion 
have been limited in the ways that Michael Clark describes:
The motive underlying Rambo: First Blood. Part 2 and all the 
other back-to-Nam films Is ... a desperate wish to restore the 
community broken apart by that war... these films possess an 
undercurrent of bitterness and Indignation at the betrayal of 
Innocence that reflects the more profound and utopian 
longing behind the poignant conclusion of The Deerhunter. 
the sappy optimism of The Lady from Yesterday, and the 
sentimental realization of personal correspondence 
embodied In the most recent memorials. The utopian impulse 
behind all of these works has come to dominate popular 
representatlonsof the memory ofVletnam despite the lingering 
political animosities stemming from that war. and the only 
uncertainty that remains now seems to be whether that 
Impulse will find expression In the xenophobic vengeance of 
a chromed steel jungle knife, or the sentimental family Ideal 
of a letter home2’.
Both of these observations shed some light on the fears and 
anxieties reflected in the answers to questions about Vietnam in the 
Rolling Stone survey. By leaving out moral and historical questions and 
focusing on the psychic damage the war has caused Americans, we, 
as a society, can successfully avoid dealing with the difficult issue of 
responsibility and leave our collective self-image intact. The extent to 
which we are able to delude ourselves is stunning. In an August 1987 
New York Times article about the city of Hu6, journalist Barbara 
Crossette penned a line which promised absolution to any remaining 
Americans who had moral qualms about the war: ’Sometimes,' she 
wrote, "the Vietnamese seemed to be blaming Americans less for 
what happened here than Americans blame themselves.'22
On a societal as well as an individual psychological level, the 
penalty for repression is repetition. In Goleman's word's: "On the one 
hand, we forget we have done this before and, on the other, do not 
quite realize what we are doing again. The self-deception is complete. ' a
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These words from J. Glenn Gray's classic World War 2 narrative. 
The Warriors seem to most clearly represent the dangers of that process 
of self-deception:
I am afraid to forget.... What protrudes and does not fit in our 
pasts rises to haunt us and makes us spiritually unwell In the 
present.... We may become refugees In an Inner sense unless 
we remember to some purpose. Surely the menace of new 
and more frightful wars Is not entirely unrelated to our failure 
to understand those recently fought. If we could gain only a 
modicum of greater wisdom concerning what manner of 
men we are, what effect might it not have on future events?24
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